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ABSTRACT 
Implication of Information Disruption to Supply Chain Improvement Strategy 
Decision - An Entropy Perspective 
Impact studies relating to information security breach are few and somewhat 
understudied. This study was carried out with a view to create a better understanding 
of how information security breaches affect the performance of the supply chain and 
the role certain strategic factors (also called complexity drivers) play in either 
mitigating the level of impact or exacerbating it. Three categories of strategic factors 
are considered: ordering policy; supply chain structure; and information 
sharing/integration, and each category has 3 or more alternatives used for 
comparison. Using discrete event simulation (DES), the study found that these 
strategic factors help improve supply chain performance in the face of supply chain 
disruption as long as the right combination of alternatives are used. At another level, 
this thesis exposes the counter-intuitiveness of combining certain strategic factors.  
Beyond estimating the cost impact of information security breach, this study found 
that impact uncertainty has been overlooked in previous studies and this could be 
misleading and ultimately become the bane of existence for organisations that do not 
factor in the consequence of uncertainty in their impact cost estimation. This may 
result in treating a serious security threat as benign. Using the concept of entropy 
theory the study developed a methodology that helps measure the uncertainty 
associated with impact cost estimation. In addition a decision framework was 
developed, which includes an uncertainty cost implication component that helps 
make better strategic decisions.  
This study advances the field of impact assessment in that it proposes a more 
inclusive approach to impact assessment and helps in understanding where supply 
chain priorities lay both under normal and disruption circumstances. This 
understanding is key to making sustainable improvements to the supply chain either 
with a short term view or from a long term perspective.  
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Chapter 1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1BACKGROUND 
Traditionally, Supply Chain Management (SCM) focused around the manufacturer 
and their immediate suppliers. But in today’s world, SCM focuses on the 
optimization of all movement of goods and/or services and the flow of information, 
starting with the suppliers’ supplier all the way through to the customers’ customer 
(Plenert, 2002). In other words, firms have seen the need to manage the physical 
flows and the information flows up and down the supply stream in a coordinated 
manner. Management of these flows are increasingly becoming more challenging as 
there is currently a marked increase in the geographical dispersion of manufacturing 
sites, suppliers, warehouses and customers in today’s supply networks (Colotla et al., 
2003). However, Information Technology (IT) has been effective in improving the 
efficiency of inter-organizational operations by mitigating uncertainties inherent in 
collaborative networks via efficient transmission of information. IT has been used 
extensively by supply networks to enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of supply 
operations. Beyond that, it has been used as a vehicle for both internal and external 
integration. For most organizations IT is core to their competitive advantage.  
According to Wiengarten et al (2010) information quality plays a pivotal role in the 
success of  collaborative practices, and this is due to quality factors such as 
timeliness, accuracy, relevance and added value of the shared information. It is safe 
to say that most organizations are now extending the way IT is being utilized to 
improve their competitiveness in this highly competitive global market. For example 
the concept of cloud computing is a somewhat recent development in the way IT is 
being exploited where hardware or software resources, or a combination of both, are 
accessed anywhere in the world by an organization or an individual via the internet 
(Amir, 2009, Smith, 2009, Armbrust et al., 2010). These resources are shared 
amongst many users, abstracted, available on demand, scalable, and configurable 
(Marston et al. , 2011). Some have even extended the concept to manufacturing 
where product design, manufacturing, testing, management, and all other stages of a 
product life cycle are encapsulated into cloud services and managed centrally (Xu, 
2012) similar in principle to (but not the same as) distributed manufacturing 
described in Dekkers and Bennett (2009). Essentially the idea is to pay for what you 
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use as opposed to renting where you pay for the specified period irrespective of use 
(Subashini and Kavitha, 2011), which can be quite expensive. These growing 
advantages of leveraging processes using IT and the fact that IT cost is becoming 
more and more inexpensive have led to the increasing level of collaboration found in 
many networks.  
There is an increase in the level of connectivity and interdependency (referred to as 
complexity) found in the network as businesses come together in the spirit of 
collaboration being geographically distant from one another. These complexities 
affect the dynamics of the network and thus require an appropriate network 
management approach. It is perceptible that as complexity increases so does the level 
of uncertainty enveloping the business or supply chain. A compromise in the 
operations of one member could affect other interconnected members of the network, 
the extent to which depends on how reliant their operations are on the compromised 
company (Craighead et al., 2007). It is therefore apparent that strategies should 
change to accommodate the increased or increasing complexity present in the supply 
chain. Consequently there should be a pro rata increase in the level of information 
required to monitor and control the operations of the network.  
Nowadays it is difficult to separate information from operation as the absence of 
information results in the poor performance of supply operations. Managing supply 
operations effectively requires efficient management and use of information. One 
cannot be managed with total disregard to the other, it will only spell disaster. The 
fusion of both is crucial to business survival and serves as the foundation for 
competitive advantage. This study is positioned to examine an aspect of supply chain 
management which is information management by looking at the disruption in the 
flow of information and how this affects supply chain management practices. It will 
be interesting to know which areas of operation are most vulnerable.   
1.2 NEED FOR INFORMATION SECURITY MANAGEMENT 
As information is shared with the aid of Information Technologies (IT) and 
Information Systems (IS), practitioners, therefore, are expected to increase their 
effort in protecting their systems to reduce their vulnerability to system failure. 
However, security controls appear to be lagging behind the use of new technology 
(Baker et al., 2010, Potter and Beard, 2012).  This is due in part to the fact that the 
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number of occurrence of these incidents is quite small and very unpredictable, 
therefore most practitioners are not motivated to plan against them as planning incurs 
a huge cost. Besides this, most organizations are not even prepared to restore their 
services after disruption from information security breach1 and are unable to manage 
other consequential impacts on the organization. It is therefore necessary for each 
organization to assess the impact of security incidences on business operations, 
regardless of whether they have never experienced it before, and how this affects 
other businesses linked to it. This assessment should reveal ‘where?’, ‘what?’ and 
‘how?’ business is affected and this in turn would provide the necessary incentive 
that will encourage managers to proactively plan for any future occurrence. Pre-
empting disruption and planning for and against it has been shown by Mitroff and 
Alpaslan (2003) to be beneficial to firms as proactive businesses existed for an 
average of sixteen years more than their reactive counterparts. Unfortunately 
businesses are still not taking this issue as seriously as they should. According to 
Mitroff and Alpaslan (2003) and Altay and Ramirez (2010), 95 percent of Fortune 
500 companies are unlikely to be able to manage a disruption that the company has 
not experienced before because they are unprepared. There is therefore the need to 
profile different information security breach types (also called threats2) in order to 
understand the level of impact each has on an organization or supply chain as no two 
threats are exactly the same and they differ in the magnitude of impact each has on a 
business and supply chain. 
As threats to information security take various forms, their incidence could reduce 
the quality of information or even prevent accessibility to information. These 
incidences may result in delayed transmission of information which might reduce the 
relevance or value of the information, or altogether jeopardize the accuracy of the 
shared information. Depending on the form of threat, they can cause systems to crash 
preventing suppliers and other Supply chain members from having access to the 
service, hence disrupting the flow of transactions leading to loss of money amongst 
                                                 
1 The incidence of an information security threat compromising the integrity, confidentiality or 
availability of information needed for daily operations 
2 An event or action that can potentially inflict harm or damage to the functioning of an IT system 
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other intangible yet crucial losses. A classic example is the 2011 breach incidence in 
Sony’s PlayStation Network (PSN) which resulted in unavailability of service for 
weeks and cost the business billions of dollars (Osawa, 2011). 
1.3 NEED FOR APPROPRIATE SUPPLY CHAIN MANAGEMENT 
STRATEGY 
Organizations now understand the value of information and the need to protect their 
information from outsiders with malicious intent or from competitors to maintain the 
competitive advantage they have by leveraging such information.  By examining the 
impact of each threat, one can lay a foundation upon which appropriate supply chain 
decisions are made. It is important to understand what level of integration (or 
information sharing) in the supply chain is appropriate considering the impact these 
threats have and how it affects performance of the entire network.  Equally important 
is the way the entire network can be reconfigured to increase its resilience to threat 
impact outside of information security management efforts. For example which 
ordering policy would reduce the impact of information security breach on the 
supply chain performance more and how does impact at one tier in the supply chain 
affect the entire network? Also how are the different supply structures affected by 
these threat impacts. Beyond this, management should concern themselves with the 
areas of operation that requires the most attention depending on their vulnerability. 
Combining the answers to these questions would help create a better understanding 
of the dynamics of the supply chain and the interaction between information 
management and operations management. This would inform an appropriate strategy 
designed to cater for the needs of specific collaborative networks. This study stems 
from the need to develop concepts suitably adapted to supply chain management 
which is different from those intended for individual organizations. Understanding 
some of the dynamics mentioned earlier provides valuable insight and is a positive 
step in the right direction.  
1.4 PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Threats to the security of an IT system are becoming increasingly sophisticated and 
may result into loss of integrity, disruption of service and/or loss of confidentiality. 
Therefore the security risk of any Information System (IS) should be assessed and 
the appropriate countermeasures at the right level should be implemented. There are 
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many studies on the financial impact of threats to an organization, and a few have 
studied the distribution of risk to supply chain members. However there is yet to be 
found, a study in literature that has investigated the impact of information security 
breach on the performance of the supply chain at both operational (supply chain 
agent level) and strategic level (supply chain as a whole). Studies which have 
investigated the impact of security breaches have been largely qualitative and 
confined to individual organizations. These studies are quite subjective and lack 
consistency. There is need for an objective assessment which a quantitative study 
offers. This study will fill this important gap by conducting a quantitative assessment 
of the impact of information security breach and provide knowledge on how the 
incidence of these threats affects the operations of the supply chain. To prevent any 
obfuscation of terms, some of the key terms used in this study are defined in Table 
1.1.  
Term Definition 
Threat An information security related event or action that can 
potentially inflict harm or damage to the functioning of an IT 
system 
Breach The incidence of a threat or the onset of an attack. 
Information 
Security Breach 
The incidence of an IT related threat compromising the 
integrity, confidentiality or availability of information needed 
for daily operations 
Risk The chance of a threat occurring (in this case Information 
security breach) having either a negative or positive impact on a 
firm or supply chain 
Uncertainty Refers to the unpredictability of the what future impact would  
be whether positive or negative or what the extent of negative 
impact will be  
Supply Structure The configuration of the supply chain that indicates the number 
of agents in each tier of the supply chain  
Entropy A measure of the amount of uncertainty associated with 
predicting future impact of a specific breach under varying 
supply context. 
Ordering pattern This is defined as the combination of the average effective order 
quantity and the frequency of placing an order  
Table 1.1 Definition of key terms 
In assessing risk, in this case threats to information security, the impact of the 
incidence of such threat should first be estimated. It is apparent from literature that 
this estimation has not been sufficiently covered as it is not understood how an 
attack in one business will affect other aspects of the supply chain. This is called the 
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reverberating effect. Putting this in a supply chain context, it is not yet evidenced 
whether this will have a ripple effect (similar in principle to the bull-whip effect 
where there is significant increase in impact) or a trickle-down effect (i.e. where 
there is not a significant increase in impact) on members as one goes upstream the 
supply chain. Several questions arise from past studies which beg for answers. For 
example how does security breach affect each member of the supply chain, and what 
effect does it have on the entire chain? What effect does the structure of the supply 
chain have on how security breach impacts supply chain performance? What effect 
does the level of integration of the supply chain have on how security breach impacts 
supply chain performance? How does the ordering decision mitigate or exacerbates 
the impact that information security breach has on supply chain performance? The 
formal research questions of this thesis will be formulated in the next section. 
1.5 OBJECTIVE AND SCOPE OF RESEARCH 
1.5.1 Strategic Factors Considered in the Study 
Four structures are considered namely: serial, wholesaler type (WH), manufacturer 
type (MF) and network type (NT). These are properly defined in the methodology 
section. The WH and MF structures are considered to be structural reconfiguration 
strategies which entail a unification and simplification of two separate serial 
structures where there is only one agent in the wholesaler and manufacturer tiers 
respectively while the NT structure is considered a risk pooling strategy where each 
tier aggregates demand from downstream and shares it equally amongst themselves.  
To study the effect of integration, information sharing (also termed information 
integration) is conceptualised in this study as an upstream agent privy to the demand 
and other related inventory information of a downstream agent. Examples of the 
information being shared are inventory position, safety factor, lead time, ordering 
cost, backlog cost and holding cost. Four levels of information integration are 
considered: no integration (NI); integration between the retailer and wholesaler 
(RW); integration between the wholesaler and manufacturer only (WM); and 
integration between all three agents (RWM). RW and WM are partial forms of 
information integration existing between different agents. 
Three ordering policies are examined based on the ‘how much to order’ decision. 
The first ordering policy considered is the parameter based ordering system where 
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the decision on how much is being ordered to the upstream agent is determined by 
the difference or addition of two or more decision parameters. The second ordering 
policy is called the batch or fixed ordering system where the order quantity has a 
somewhat fixed value. The third one considered in this study is the combined batch-
and-parameter based ordering system where the order size is determined by a 
combination of fixed order quantity and a parameter based order quantity. These are 
fully explained in the literature review (Chapter 2) and methodology (Chapter 3).  
1.5.2 Research Questions 
The combination of the supply structure or configuration, the ordering policy and the 
level of information sharing may be different for various supply chains and this 
brings about varying levels of complexity. Complexity is mostly construed to mean 
the configuration of physical asset, material flow and operational characteristic or 
property of the supply chain which makes operations difficult to manage effectively 
and efficiently (Serdarasan (2013) Wilding (1998)). In summary, it is the aim of this 
research to provide insight on how these complexities affect the impact that various 
information security breaches have on supply chain performance. To do this this 
study is divided into three parts, Study 1, 2 and 3. 
1.5.2.1 Study 1 
The first study examines the influence of the interaction between these strategic 
factors under normal circumstances (i.e. in a non-information security breach 
scenario). Effectively the main question here is: 
Question 1: How do these strategic factors interact and what influence do these 
interactions have on supply chain performance?  
Studying the effect of these three strategic factors in a single study has been missing 
in literature and this study aims to fill that gap. Therefore the study examines the 
interaction between these three factors and the effect of this interaction on supply 
chain performance, which has not been studied extensively in the past. This 
knowledge is important to build a better holistic understanding of the dynamics of 
supply chain interactions. More to the point is that this study also serves as a 
reference point for the next study which is understanding the impact of information 
security breach and the role of these strategic factors in either mitigating or 
exacerbating this impact. 
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1.5.2.2 Study 2 
The second study builds on the first study to determine what the impact of 
information security breach is on supply chain performance. However, while it is 
important to understand the cost impact of these breaches, it is more so imperative to 
establish which aspects of operation or areas in the supply chain are most vulnerable. 
This will particularly help the supply chain prioritize ‘what?’ and ‘where?’ along the 
supply chain require immediate protection and what appropriate mitigation solution 
should be adopted on the long run. This way, the supply chain can effectively and 
efficiently plan its operations, optimally prepared for any eventualities. To build this 
understanding, the following questions are proposed and answered: 
Question 2: Does the impact of information security breach increases or decreases 
as one goes upstream?  
Question 3: What is the effect of increasing the rate of occurrence (RoC) or 
disruption duration of the breach from low to high on the impact a breach has on 
supply chain performance? 
Question 4: Are the improvement strategies beneficial to the supply chain especially 
under disruption brought about by information security breach? 
Beyond this, the study also aims to establish the role of these strategic factors in 
either mitigating or exacerbating this impact. A mitigating role would indicate that 
such strategic factor can be used to dampen the impact of a security breach when it 
occurs and this can be a good addition to any proposed information security impact 
management strategy. 
1.5.2.3 Study 3 
This research posits that the type of cost impact examined in study 2 represents a 
direct cost assessment considered by most organisations which they use in decision 
making. However this study opines that there exist an indirect cost implication that 
also needs to be considered before making any strategic decision. The argument for 
this approach stems from the fact that the estimated cost impact is quite uncertain in 
itself and the complexity of the supply chain could exacerbate this uncertainty and 
make it more difficult for supply chain managers to predict future impact. The ability 
to predict future impact is a form of control that any manager would like to have as 
this control is key to effective management. Therefore, a supply chain with high 
impact uncertainty would require a higher monitoring and review control level 
because of the high uncertainty associated with predicting future impact, while that 
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with low uncertainty would require low level of control. Increasing or decreasing the 
monitoring and control level due to changing complexity has cost implications which 
is regarded as an indirect cost. The question arises; how does supply chain 
complexity affect the impact uncertainty level of an information security breach and 
what implication does this cost have on supply chain strategy decisions? This type of 
analysis has not been seen in past literature, at least to the author’s knowledge, and 
this study aims to fill that gap. Finally, a decision framework is established that help 
supply chain stakeholders make strategic decisions based on both direct and indirect 
cost assessment. 
1.5.3 Research Scope 
The cost investigated by this study are operational costs, and do not include cost 
associated with damage to company’s image or regulatory fines. The study 
investigates the impact each security breach has on supply chain cost performance 
such as inventory holding, backlog, and ordering costs only. It also examines the 
effect on supply chain performance measures such as fill rate and the ordering 
pattern of individual agents. While the holding cost, backlog cost, ordering cost and 
fill rate are common performance measures used in past literature, the examination 
of the ordering pattern is unique only to this study and is established in this study to 
have implication to the transportation strategy used in the supply chain. Due to the 
different complexities found in different supply chains, this study uses an analysis of 
the ordering pattern to inform the appropriate transportation (or shipping) strategy. 
By looking at the impact of these breaches on supply chain performance, including 
the entropy assessment, one can begin to understand the dynamics of these security 
incidences in order to plan for an effective prevention-mitigation-correction strategy 
mix that suits the overall organization and supply chain management goal. 
1.6 RESEARCH APPROACH AND FRAMEWORK 
The framework for this study is shown in Figure 1.1. This is discussed in more 
details in the methodology section.  
To answer some of the questions stated above, this study proposes the use of discrete 
event simulation (DES). DES is one of the three types of dynamic simulations that is 
most widely used in Management Science (Pidd, 2003). This approach employs 
computer simulation which makes it possible to mimic changes that occur, through 
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time, in real life systems by using model representation in order to understand, 
change, manage and control such systems. The output of the simulation represents a 
direct cost assessment of information security breach impact. 
This study also utilizes the concept of entropy theory to measure the degree of 
uncertainty or perturbation the incidence of each breach type (or threat) introduces to 
the supply chain and its members and how this affects supply chain decisions. 
Entropy according to Shannon (1948), who first coined the term in information 
theory, is a quantitative measure of uncertainty. Entropy scores are calculated for 
each threat (as will be explained in the Methodology section) and its implication to 
monitoring and review cost is established. This represents an indirect cost 
assessment. 
 
Figure 1.1 Research Framework 
1.7 STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS 
This thesis is organized as follows.  
Security Breach 
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(WH) 
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(MF) 
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(NT) 
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Inventory holding cost 
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Wholesaler 
only (RW) 
Wholesaler + 
Manufacturer 
only (WM) 
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Manufacturer (RWM) 
No 
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(NI) 
Ordering Options 
 
Batch based (option II) Parameter based 
(option I) 
Batch-and-Parameter 
based (option III) 
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Chapter 2 reviews past works that forms the rationale for this study. It explains the 
gaps in literature and offers a description of the strategic factors considered in the 
study. The need for entropy assessment is also discussed. 
Chapter 3 is the methodology part which describes the simulation approach. The 
conceptual and computer models are discussed here along with the various computer 
experiments. This chapter also describes the entropy assessment methodology which 
is one of the significant contributions of the study.  
Chapter 4 discusses the result of the simulation experiment under all non-breach 
scenarios. The influence of each strategic factor is evaluated along with the 
interaction effect of all three factors on supply chain performance.  
Chapter 5 examines the impact of information security breach on supply chain 
performance under various supply chain context. The effect of structural 
reconfiguration and information sharing level on breach impact is evaluated both 
separately and in combination. A framework for best strategy is given and the 
rationale for stepwise adoption is established. 
Chapter 6 reveals the result of the entropy assessment of information security breach 
impact. The uncertainty level in each supply scenario is discussed and the effect of 
structural reconfiguration and information sharing level in raising or decreasing the 
uncertainty level is also discussed. The implication of uncertainty level change to 
monitoring and review efforts and the cost consequence is debated. Finally, a 
framework that justifies the inclusion of entropy assessment in supply chain breach 
mitigation decisions is established.  
Chapter 7 concludes and summarises the theoretical contribution of the study. The 
managerial implication of the main findings is also discussed. Finally the limitations 
of the study and recommendation for future work are given.  
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Chapter 2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
Concerns over the efficiency and effectiveness of supply chain operations have been 
raised over the years by academics as well as practitioners. These inefficiencies have 
been perceived to be as a result of uncertainties in key aspect of operations, which 
affect the flow of information and material along the supply chain. For example, 
uncertainties in demand, supply and processes for a long time, have led to distortion 
in the accurate capture of demand information and the ability to respond to them in a 
timely and efficient fashion. Traditionally, due to the absence of the integration 
initiative at the time, most members in each tier of the chain relied on historical 
demand or order data to forecast future demand. The traditional forecasting method 
could not accommodate the uncertainties of demand. As a result, supply chain 
members had to order and produce surplus to be able to accommodate these 
uncertainties. An interesting pattern emerged as the forecasted demand was 
amplified the further you go upstream the chain (Lee et al., 2004). The consequence 
of this action was that there tend to be more inventories in store than is needed, 
which can be very costly and even worse if the products are perishable. These 
uncertainties have led to poor performance of the supply chain and the reduction in 
the quality of product and/or services offered. 
2.1 SUPPLY CHAIN MANAGEMENT - FROM COMPETITION TO 
COLLABORATION 
Traditionally, Supply Chain Management (SCM) focused around the manufacturer 
and their immediate suppliers, but in today’s world, SCM focuses on the 
optimization of all movement of goods and/or services, starting with the suppliers’ 
supplier all the way through to the customers’ customer (Plenert, 2002). In other 
words, firms have seen the need to manage the physical flows and the information 
flows up and down the supply stream in a coordinated manner. Therefore 
competition in the global market place has grown from inter firm competition to a 
highly efficient collaborative supply chain network within and between industries 
(Lancioni et al., 2003). Organisations no longer relate to suppliers in a competitive 
manner and have adopted a collaborative approach where an organization aligns 
itself or some of its business functions with those of its counterpart-suppliers. Suffice 
to say, supply chain management has seen a paradigm shift from competition to 
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collaboration and this shift is premised on the need for improved efficiency and 
effectiveness in the supply chain. 
2.1.1 Managing Supply Chain Uncertainty through Information Sharing  
It is quite apparent that the world is currently in the information age and 
consequently business should be conducted with this in mind. A business would 
thrive if it can position itself to leverage as much relevant information as possible. 
Several studies have shown that supply chain performance can be improved, not only 
by sharing demand information, but other types of information such as production; 
inventory; capacity; and lead time information, as you go upstream (Mukhopadhyay 
and Kekre, 2002, Kulp et al. , 2004, Devaraj et al., 2007, Yu et al., 2010, Lau et al., 
2004). This enabled supply chain members to keep just the amount of inventory 
needed to efficiently cater for demand. The idea of information integration (in which 
IT is used to leverage operational activities) emerged as the new paradigm. As these 
IT technologies evolved, it later became apparent that it was not just enough to share 
relevant information but that the information being shared should be of good quality 
and be passed in a timely manner to help mitigate the effect of supply chain 
uncertainties (Bourland et al. , 1996, Wiengarten et al. , 2010). 
2.1.2 Business and the Information Integration Paradigm 
Information Technology (IT) has been the tool used by organizations (large or small) 
to greatly enhance their business operations via efficient information exchange. 
Information technology especially has been extended to increase the amount of 
benefits it can offer. For many years now technology has seen various developmental 
phases and the benefits derivable from its use has driven its further development. 
There have been massive improvements in the way organizations integrate business 
functions (and or processes) internally and externally with other business partners 
via electronic link. As described by Waters (2006), internal integration has been 
improved by tracking individual packages using bar codes, magnetic stripes and 
radio frequency identification (RFID) (Belal et al., 2008); monitoring vehicles 
through telematics; controlling warehouses through automatically guided vehicles; 
monitoring transactions and planning operations – and a host of other functions. In 
the same vein, external integration has been extended by allowing vendor-managed 
inventory (VMI); collaborative planning, forecasting and replenishment (CPFR); 
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synchronized material movement through the whole supply chain, payments by 
electronic fund transfer (EFT), roadside detectors to monitor traffic conditions and 
route vehicles around congestion – and so on. This integration, internal or external, is 
premised on uninterrupted communication or information sharing. 
Communication between businesses has greatly improved over the years with the use 
of Information Systems (IS) such as Inter-organizational Information Systems (IOIS) 
and huge efforts have been invested into communication with customers as well. 
Fuelling this agenda is the plethora of investigations into the benefits of 
communication and information sharing that can be found in literature (Bourland et 
al., 1996, Chan and Chan, 2009, Cheng, 2010, Kristal et al., 2010, Li et al., 2006, Li 
and Lin, 2006,  Yang et al., 2011, Zhou and Benton Jr, 2007, Yu et al., 2001, 
Raschke, 2010). Many researchers have looked into information sharing between 
businesses and their customers (B2C) while others have examined it in terms of 
business to business (B2B) (Mukhopadhyay and Kekre, 2002, Li et al., 2006, 
Humphreys et al., 2001, Zhou and Benton Jr, 2007, Yu et al., 2001). However, from 
the supply chain perspective information sharing is considered from both the B2B 
and B2C point of view. 
At a network or supply chain level, competiveness is no longer a case of sharing 
information but how efficiently it can be transmitted. The development in 
Information Technology (IT) seriously helped this course as the introduction of 
Information systems such as Electronic Data Interchange (EDI); World Wide Web 
(WWW); E-Commerce systems and especially the Internet has aided the timely 
exchange of data (Gunasekaran and Ngai, 2004). This not only helped mitigate the 
effect of supply chain uncertainties but enabled intra-organization information 
sharing as well as inter-organization transactions (Kappelman and Richards, 1995).  
2.2 GROWING USE OF THE INTERNET  
According to some experts, complexity of the supply chain is increasing, profoundly 
fuelled by the growing level of internet use and integration initiatives, as evidenced 
by the number of networks current IT systems are supporting (Yami et al. 2010). 
Due to its ubiquitous nature, the internet is being employed in multidimensional and 
multifaceted ways in various supply chains to improve the quality of information and 
integration initiatives. Irrespective of the type of supply chain, the internet has 
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proven to be limitless in the purpose it can serve provided its use had been carefully 
or strategically planned. Its use has ranged from communication information 
exchange (Hart et al. , 2000)  to more operational related functions such as order 
filling, purchasing, human resource management etc. (Lancioni et al. , 2003). These 
systems are increasing in the level of support and function provided and the cost of 
their application is increasingly becoming inexpensive where many small and 
medium size enterprises can now afford technologies that were beyond their reach 
due to lack of affordability. An example of this is the concept of cloud computing 
which is a somewhat recent development in the way IT is being exploited. It is a way 
of accessing hardware or software resources, or a combination of both, anywhere in 
the world by an organization or an individual via the internet. 
2.2.1 Cloud Computing- Internet Use Example 
At the most basic definition, cloud computing entails using computing resources 
such as computer applications and programmes over the internet as opposed to 
license-and-install on the desktop (Buttell, 2010). Leveraging Information 
Technology (IT) can be costly and has deterred small to medium scale organizations 
from using it. This in part has led to the emergence and justification for the 
somewhat new IT concept called ‘cloud computing’. The emerging trend of enabling 
IT systems on the platform of cloud computing has been a subject of discussion in 
recent years. A purely functional definition of cloud computing is that it is a way of 
accessing hardware or software resources, or a combination of both, anywhere in the 
world by an organization or an individual via the internet (Amir, 2009, Smith, 2009, 
Armbrust et al. , 2010). These resources are shared amongst many users, abstracted, 
available on demand, scalable, and configurable (Marston et al. , 2011). Although 
this is not an entirely new concept, its unique feature where resources are pulled as 
opposed to being pushed makes it a more promising concept than its predecessors; 
time sharing in the 1960s and application hosting in the 1980s (Amir, 2009, 
Cusumano, 2010). Its applicability would entail seeing this concept being delivered 
over different service configurations. There are three basic service configurations 
also known as cloud service models which are Software as a Service (SaaS), 
Platform as a Service (PaaS) and Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS). In SaaS, the 
cloud user buys the right to use a working application hosted by an external provider 
via the internet. The PaaS model involves the use of an externally provided 
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infrastructure to host the application, while IaaS model requires the use of servers 
provided externally for raw computing, storage and network transfers (Durkee, 2010, 
Subashini and Kavitha, 2011). One can also look at the scope of the service whether 
it is purely open to the public (Public Cloud) or restricted to certain users (Private 
Cloud) or a combination of both (Hybrid Cloud).  
2.2.2 Benefit of Cloud Computing 
The result of an information security survey by Ernst & Young (2011) reveal close to 
half of the total number of respondents from 56 countries have either deployed or are 
evaluating cloud computing. This suggests that a significant amount of organisations 
are now using or close to adopting cloud computing which in a way puts pressure on 
others to follow suit. A summary of the opportunities organisations can avail 
themselves to when they enable their IT on the cloud and the various concerns 
associated with this new concept is shown in Table 2.1. 
Cloud computing has several benefits over traditional IT models reported in 
literature. Cloud services bring flexibility, configurability, cost effectiveness, low 
implementation cost to IT and SCM. Primarily it offers a cost advantage to firms 
especially the small to medium scale enterprises who otherwise cannot afford the 
huge financial commitment required for deploying typical cutting edge enterprise-
level IT systems such as Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) systems (Marston et 
al., 2011). This is achieved through the metering system based on the notion of “pay 
as you go”. Other benefits include taking away the associated costs of IT such as; 
system upgrades; recruiting and training IT staff; equipment delivery and 
installation; or modification of IT facility, from the Cloud user (Smith, 2009). It also 
helps to prevent the loss that would otherwise be incurred when an organization is 
unsuccessful in deploying an expensive in-house information system (IS). This is 
because its flexible feature makes it possible to change from one cloud service 
provider to another without any major cost to the user. If a service provider does not 
deliver an agreed level of quality of service (QoS), the service user may change to 
another provider offering a better or even cheaper service. These advantageous 
features of Cloud computing can help organizations or supply chains to be lean, agile 
or both (le-agile), responding effectively to demand. However there are some 
concerns over its adoption with data security being the chief of those concerns. 
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Propellants for Adoption Barriers to Adoption 
Elasticity/scalability:  the 
ability to scale IT infrastructure 
requirements both up and down 
rapidly 
Corporate culture shock: going from internal 
provision to external provision 
Flexibility: ability to purchase 
software components from 
oracle, Apple, SAP etc and 
combine it to form a business 
solution 
Quick provisioning: being able to scale 
computing resources up or down at the level of 
automation 
Pay-as-you-go: pay-per-use 
basis versus install-and-own. 
Loss of control: managing IT infrastructure 
through service level agreements (SLAs) with 
Cloud Service Providers (CSPs) 
Cost savings: reduction in IT 
operational cost 
Information security: How safe is your 
information and data from security threats? 
Stepwise adoption: ability to 
decompose an entire technology 
into piecemeal sizes and 
gradually adopt it in stages 
Privacy concerns: safeguarding personally 
identifiable information of employees, business 
partners and customers and meeting legal and 
ethical requirements regarding privacy regulations 
Infrastructure utilization: 
virtualization of hardware and 
software resources as a service 
to multiple users simultaneously 
Regulatory compliance: conforming to the 
regulations of the part of the world where 
hardware and software is located 
Reducing market barrier: 
reduction of IT barriers to 
market entry. IT that was 
unaffordable before can now be 
utilised over the cloud. 
Specificity: has to do with compatibility issues 
and data lock-in. 
Security: delivering “security as 
a service” 
Lack of standards: lack of commonality in 
interoperability among cloud providers and 
between enterprise systems and cloud services 
Table 2.1 The opportunities and threats to cloud computing adoption 
2.3 MANAGING INFORMATION FLOW DISRUPTION  
It is very evident that nowadays, the flow of information is crucial to business 
survival. For materials to move down the supply chain there has to be a prior 
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movement of information up the chain. A disruption in this flow of information 
would have an effect on the movement of materials down the chain and hence lead to 
customer dissatisfaction. It is not surprising that a study by Munoz and Clements 
(2008) suggested that information flow delays play a larger role as a contributor to 
lost sale revenues in the supply chain than material delay does. There is of course a 
pressing need for operations managers to carefully protect and manage the flow of 
information and plan appropriately for disruption in this flow. It stands to reason 
therefore that while IT has been effective in curbing the effect of supply chain 
uncertainties; IT (in itself) introduces inherent uncertainties to the supply chain. 
Traditionally, the focus has been primarily on the uncertainties enveloping the 
supply chain. However there is an increasing awareness of the unique uncertainties 
that IT introduces to supply chain operations in the form of security risks. These 
unique uncertainties represent the possibility of an incidence of threat which might 
compromise the functioning of information systems (IS) and interrupt operations 
leveraged by such systems. The security of any IS is pertinent to obtaining the 
purported benefits derivable from its use. A secure system implies that there is no 
possibility of disruption in operations with which the system is being used to 
leverage. However, in practice, no system is totally secure as every system is 
susceptible to breach.  
Threats to the security of an IT system are becoming increasingly sophisticated and 
may result in loss of integrity, disruption of service and/or loss of confidentiality 
(Stoneburner et al. , 2002). Nonetheless, security controls appear to be lagging 
behind the use of new technology (Baker et al., 2010, Potter and Beard, 2012). As 
security breach comes in various forms, the quality of information or even the 
accessibility to information can be compromised. This may result in delayed 
transmission which might reduce the relevance or value of the information, or 
altogether jeopardize the accuracy of the shared information. Therefore appropriate 
countermeasures should be implemented. However, various countermeasures which 
protect information systems from threats exist in practice, some more expensive than 
others. As a result, organizations engage in risk management, which informs their 
choice and level of countermeasure based on an assessment of risk incidence and 
cost impact. 
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2.3.1 Types of Information Security Breach 
According to Vinod et al. (2008), ISO27001 mandates that the potential threats to the 
system and assets be identified in compliance with control A.7.1.1 (inventory of 
assets), and this can be done by using an appropriate threat database. Several 
databases exist that contain data on information security breach collected from 
various organisations in the form of surveys. A survey done by 
PricewaterhouseCoopers in conjunction with Infosecurity Europe, under the auspices 
of the Department for Business Innovation and Skills (BIS), called The Information 
Security Breach Survey (ISBS) 2012 reported some security breaches experienced 
by various organizations. These include: Systems failure or data corruption; 
Infection by viruses or malicious software; Theft or fraud involving computers; other 
incidents caused by staff; attacks by unauthorised outsider including hacking 
attempts (Potter and Beard, 2012). These breaches can be grouped under internal-
based, external-based or platform-based. The internal based security breaches are 
those resulting from deliberate or in deliberate actions of staff and members of the 
organization. External –based breaches include those perpetrated by outsiders who 
are not members or staff of the business. This security breach can be worm; virus or 
malicious software attack. It can also be password sniffing/cracking software; 
spoofing (either IP spoofing or web spoofing) attack, denial of service attack (email 
bomb attack or Ping O’Death), or direct attack (hacking) (Warren, 2000). Lastly the 
Platform-based incidences are caused by the service provider. Examples of this 
include; systems failure or data corruption resulting from poor resource management 
or over committing computing resources (Durkee, 2010), policy violations or 
physical damage or theft of the resources.  
A survey done by Verizon Risk team joined by United States Secret Service (USSS) 
also revealed some breaches faced by organizations and reported that 70% of data 
breach was caused by external agents, 48% by insiders and 11% implicated business 
partners (Baker et al. , 2010). Whitman (2003) proposed 12 categories of security 
threat, namely: Act of Human Error or Failure (accidents, employee mistakes); 
Compromises to Intellectual Property (piracy, copyright infringement); Deliberate 
Acts of Espionage or Trespass (unauthorized access and/or data collection); 
Deliberate Acts of Information Extortion (blackmail of information disclosure); 
Deliberate Acts of Sabotage or Vandalism (destruction of systems or information);  
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Deliberate Acts of Theft (illegal confiscation of equipment or information); 
Deliberate Software Attacks (viruses, worms, macros, denial of service); Forces of 
Nature (fire, flood, earthquake, lightning); Quality of Service Deviations from 
Service Providers (power and WAN service issues);  Technical Hardware Failures or 
Errors (equipment failure); Technical Software Failures or Errors (bugs, code 
problems, unknown loopholes); Technological Obsolescence (antiquated or outdated 
technologies).  
These forms of security breach cause disruption in business processes and may 
ultimately lead to loss of business. They can cause systems to crash preventing 
suppliers and other Supply Chain members from having access to the service, hence 
disrupting the flow of transactions leading to loss of money amongst other intangible 
yet crucial losses. Depending on the form of attack, the magnitude of the impact of 
such failure can be colossal and highly detrimental to Supply Chain performance. 
2.3.2 Consequence of Information Security Breach 
Security concerns as it relates to information sharing are privacy, protection of 
proprietary information, and preservation of the quality of information. According to 
Wiengarten et al. (2010) information quality plays a pivotal role in the success of  
collaborative practices, and this is due to quality factors such as timeliness, accuracy, 
relevance and added value of the shared information. Rees et al. (2011) described 
three types of losses an organszation faces when they experience data breach: 
damage to a company’s image, regulatory fines e.g. fines paid to Health Insurance 
Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) due to non-compliance to regulation, 
and production losses as a result of disruption in production’s IT support. The 
National Institute of Standards and Technology in their 2002 report described three 
types of impact on IT systems: loss of integrity, loss of availability and loss of 
confidentiality (Stoneburner et al. , 2002). This paper aims to investigate the impact 
of loss of availability or disruption due to security breach on the performance of 
business operations.  
2.3.3  Use and Reliability of Information Security Breach Survey Data 
There have been several arguments as to the reliability of quantitative data on 
security. Some have argued that most organisations that have taken part in surveys 
cannot themselves attest to the fact that the information provided is near perfect. 
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Some have been heard saying they just had to put down a rough estimate (Rees et al., 
2011). Adding to this is the fact that incidence of security breach changes from year 
to year some worse than others. It is believed that many security breaches go 
unnoticed perhaps due to a poor monitoring system or the absence of it. 
Corroborating this assumption is a survey by Baker et al. (2010) which revealed that 
61% of data breach was detected by external parties. Organisations therefore need to 
adopt a proactive approach rather than a reactive one to managing security. An 
organisation needs to be able to detect any incidence of security breach within its 
premises and must be able to log it. The ability to profile these breaches and 
recognize ‘hot spots’, as these changes yearly, is paramount in establishing a 
formidable security policy. Due to the rising level of sophistication hackers and other 
fraudulent agents carry out their attacks, what might seem less harmful to an 
organisation a few years ago might become the bane of existence.  
Besides profiling the occurrence of breaches within an organization and learning 
from one’s failure, it is equally important to learn from the failure of others. This is 
why surveys are important so that one can make decisions not just based on one’s 
internal data but on the likelihood that external data represents. According to Mitroff 
and Alpaslan (2003) in Altay and Ramirez (2010), 95 percent of Fortune 500 
companies are unlikely to be able to manage a disruption that the company has not 
experienced before because they are ill-equipped. This is because many 
organisations are not proactive towards information security breach and are quite 
complacent towards a breach type that occurred in another organisation but not 
theirs. However, according to a survey by  Mitroff and Alpaslan (2003), proactive 
businesses existed for an average 16years more than their reactive counterpart. This 
goes to show that organisations need to learn from the failure of others and put 
appropriate security measures in place to avoid being caught unprepared. Many 
organisations are now using multiple sources in evaluating security threats (Potter 
and Beard 2012). Although sometimes they may be restricted in terms of reliability, 
security surveys give a good picture of the types of security threats faced by 
organizations from different industrial sectors, a careful analysis of these data might 
give invaluable insights. This is valuable information and should not be disregarded 
on the account of reliability. Giving credence to this, the United States Secret 
Service pooled resources together with Verizon Risk Team to come up with an 
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investigative report on data breach in 2009. Similarly, PriceWaterHouseCoopers in 
conjunction with Info Security Europe, under the auspices of the Department for 
Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS), conducted an information security breach 
survey in 2010, although this has been organized in the past by BIS and its 
predecessors (DTI and BERR) every couple of years since the early 1990s.  There 
are other surveys that aim to provide a rich pool of data on security breach. 
Organizations need to realize the importance of other sources of information security 
practices and incidents other than their own.  
A study by Gordon et al. (2003) revealed that sharing security information with 
partners helps to reduce the amount each firm spends on information security 
activities. The view that no quantitative analysis should be done due to the 
unreliability of security data, as it can change from year to year, has been suggested 
by Rees et al. (2011) to be a minority view. 
2.3.4 Risk Management 
Threats to information security bring an organization to the possibility that their 
operations would be disrupted and their data compromised. This possibility, also 
referred to as risk probability, is defined as the probability of incidence of a threat 
and is different for each threat (Kaplan and Garrick, 1981). In this study risk is 
defined as the likelihood of a threat occurring (in this case Information security 
breach) having either a negative or positive impact (Gerber and von Solms, 2005) on 
a firm or supply chain. For the purpose of clarity, throughout this study, risk is 
contextualized as the chance that a particular IT-related breach will occur and 
compromise the security of information which in turn impacts the performance of an 
organization in a negative way. Each breach is conceptualized as an incidence of 
each form of threat and represents different risks to an organization. Examples of 
these are systems failure or data corruption; infection by viruses or malicious 
software; theft or fraud involving computers; other incidents caused by staff; attacks 
by unauthorised outsider (including hacking attempts) etc. (Potter and Beard, 2012).  
In risk management, all risks that the organization potentially faces are identified and 
assessed, and the appropriate strategy is implemented to manage the incidence of 
these threats (Stoneburner et al. , 2002). In coping with risks, organizations use all or 
any combination of the following strategies: risk prevention and deterrence (also 
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called Prevention); risk detection and recovery (also called Mitigation), and risk 
correction (also called Monitoring and Review) (Ouyang 2012). These strategies 
involve management or administrative, operational and physical, technical or logical 
tools. According to Ouyang (2012a), Management or Administrative tools include 
policies; standards; processes; procedures; and guidelines. Operational and Physical 
Control tools include execution of policies; standards & process; education and 
awareness; program security; personnel security; document controls; facility or 
infrastructure protection etc. Technical or Logical controls include, but are not 
limited to, access controls; identification and authorization; confidentiality; integrity; 
availability; non-repudiation.  
According to Ouyang (2012), risk prevention deals with protective measures put in 
place to prevent the occurrence of breach or deter perpetrators from attacking. This is 
perhaps the first line of defense. An example of this is installing firewall or security 
software. However this might not be very effective as breaches do still occur. The 
second strategy which is the mitigation strategy helps to reduce the impact of the 
incidence of breach when it occurs. A mitigating strategy would entail repair of 
damaged assets, initiatives to restore integrity and reputation after the incidence of 
threat, and efforts to bring back lost customers. For instance, backing up data on 
another system can help an organization retain accessibility to valuable data in the 
event of a compromise to the current system. It is more or less a recovery 
contingency plan to keep the business going or to restore the operations of the 
business to full functionality after severe attack. Choosing one or any combination of 
these response strategies requires an earlier assessment of the threats an organization 
is exposed to in terms of occurrence and cost impact (Rees et al 2011). The cost 
impact is determined a priori and this is poorly estimated as it reflects more direct 
costs and less indirect costs. The indirect costs such as loss of control are hard to 
estimate and most studies in literature tend to ignore this when estimating the impact 
on a business. 
2.3.4.1 Risk Assessment 
Being proactive requires rigorous risk assessment. However there are some 
limitations on the components of risk assessment. Reducing vulnerability to threats 
require the implementation of appropriate risk strategy which is informed by 
adequate risk assessment. To assess any risk, the probability of incidence (P) is 
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multiplied by the cost impact (I) on the organization if it occurs (Deane et al. 2009, 
Rees et al. 2011). These two components of risk assessment, P and I, have 
limitations as estimating P is very difficult due to unpredictability3 and estimating I 
is also very poorly understood. The inconsistencies in P and I result in poor 
assessment of risks and could result into a Type-1 error or a Type-2 error (Banerjee 
2009). A Type-1 error (false positive) occurs when an insignificant threat is poorly 
assessed to be a significant one. Here, the organization wastes effort and resources 
by implementing unnecessary risk management strategy where monitoring alone 
would have sufficed. The Type-2 error (false negative) on the other hand occurs 
when a significant threat is seen as an insignificant one. The effect of this is that a 
less stringent strategy is implemented to manage the threat which would be 
ineffective and result in an unprecedented impact on the organization. It stands to 
reason that cost impact represents a higher interest to most organisations than the 
probability of occurrence. It is logical that if the impact is high and despite the 
probability of occurrence being very low, then such breach incidence is still a source 
of concern for the organisation. If, however, the probability of occurrence is high and 
the cost impact is low, then organisations may decide to forego the cost impact if it is 
not too significant. Therefore the focus of this study is on the cost impact estimation. 
2.3.4.2 Inconsistencies in Estimating Impact, I. 
The threat-type incidence, hacking, experienced by Sony’s PlayStation Network 
(PSN) in 2011 affecting up to 77 million consumers reportedly compromised over 
ten million customer’s credit card information and was to cost the organization $171 
million in remediation. This impact cost has been suggested by experts to be a rather 
optimistic assessment and that the true impact might be in the region of billions of 
dollars. Sony’s spokeswoman, Kumie Tanaka, was reported to admit that they could 
not estimate the true impact of the breach at the time as they were still ‘figuring out’ 
the impact on its earnings (Osawa, 2011). Further to this, two different experts 
Mizuho Investors Securities analyst, Nobuo Kurahashi, and Barclays Capital analyst, 
Yuji Fujimori, reported an impact of $1.25 billion and $2.74 billion respectively 
(Brightman, 2011). A difference of $1.49 billion in their estimates lends credence to 
                                                 
3 Refers to the changeable nature of the number of times threat incidence occur and the uncertainty of 
whether or not it will occur. 
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the fact that Impact (I) is poorly understood, even by experts. An even bigger 
estimate was reported by Forbes Business Magazine in tune of $24 billion impact 
cost (Phillips, 2011). While it has been difficult to estimate the true impact cost on 
an organization, it is even more difficult to estimate that for a supply chain. It is 
therefore crucial to adequately assess each threat to determine the best strategy to 
manage it. In literature, most IT breach impact studies are qualitative and are 
restricted to an organizational level (Goel and Shawky, 2009). These qualitative risk 
assessment studies are subjective and lack consistency. On the other hand, some 
quantitative studies have looked at the impact of other types of threat (such as natural 
disasters) to an organization, and some to the supply chain. However, there is no 
quantitative study in literature that has investigated the impact of IT threat-type 
incidences on supply chain material flow operations.  
2.4 DISRUPTION RISK ASSESSMENT 
A number of studies have approached disruption risk in different ways ranging from 
conceptual, empirical, simulation, survey, case study and review or a combination of 
these (Rao and Goldsby, 2009, Olson and Wu, 2010, Rainer et al., 1991). Rao and 
Goldsby (2009) conducted an extensive review of supply chain disruption literature 
and created a typology of disruption types and sources. However, they did not 
mention IT itself as a source of disruption. Most risk studies have been primarily 
based on threats other than those from IT and information communication 
technologies (ICTs) while a few studies have suggested IT security as a potential risk 
to the supply chain (Schmitt and Singh, 2009, Kim et al., 2011, Rees et al., 2011). 
Table 2.2 shows a summary of work that has been done on disruption risk 
assessment at the organizational level as well as the supply chain level and delineates 
between those that have provided real and objective estimation of impact, I, of 
certain threats on business operation and those that have looked at specific IT 
security risks. The third column reveals the approach taken to undertake the study. 
From the last three columns of the table we see that no single study has covered all 
three aspects.  
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Authors Subject Approach Impact 
study? Y/N 
IT security 
incident? 
Y/N 
Supply 
chain study? 
Y/N 
Altay and 
Ramirez, 2010 
Impact of disasters on firms in different 
sectors: implications for supply chains 
Fixed effect regression Y N Y 
Schmitt and 
Singh, (2009) 
Quantifying supply chain disruption risk Monte Carlo and Discrete-Event 
Simulation 
Y N Y 
Deane et al., 
2009 
Managing supply chain risk and disruption 
from IT security incidents 
Mixed Integer Linear Programming N Y Y 
Munoz and 
Clements, 2008 
Disruptions in information flow: a revenue 
costing supply chain dilemma 
Discrete event simulation of beer 
distribution game 
Y N Y 
Rees et al., 2010 Decision support for Cybersecurity risk 
planning 
Genetic algorithm N Y N 
Whitman (2003) Profiling threats to information security Interviews and Survey N Y N 
Wilson (2007) The impact of transportation disruptions on 
supply chain performance   
Dynamic simulation modelling Y N Y 
Bellefeuille, 
2005 
Quantifying and Managing the Risk of 
Information Security Breaches to the Supply 
Chain 
Descriptive research N Y Y 
Yeh and Chang, 
2007 
Threats and countermeasures for information 
system security: A cross-industry study 
Questionnaires and Analysis of 
covariances (ANCOVAs) 
N Y N 
Goel and 
Shawky, 2009 
Estimating the market impact of security 
breach announcements on firm values   
Event-study methodology Y N N 
Craighead et al., 
2007 
The Severity of Supply Chain Disruptions Multiple-method, multiple-source 
empirical research design 
N N Y 
Kim et al., 2011 The dark side of the Internet: Attacks, costs 
and responses 
Explorative research N Y N 
Loch et al., 1992 Threats to information systems: Today's 
reality, yesterday's understanding 
Questionnaires N Y N 
Table 2.2 Summary of some relevant disruption risk studies 
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A few studies have examined the impact of disruption on supply chain operations. 
While some of these studies have examined the effect of physical disruption such as 
natural disasters (Samir, 2008), interestingly, a few others have examined the effect 
of IT security incidents (Deane et al., 2009, Kim et al., 2011, Loch et al., 1992, 
Pisello, 2004). Some approaches have focused primarily on disruption effects (in 
terms of delay in information flow) on supply chain without any regard to cause 
(Munoz and Clements, 2008, Schmitt and Singh, 2009) while others have looked 
more specifically at how specific disruption types (threats) affect the supply chain 
(Altay and Ramirez, 2010, Craighead et al., 2007). While the former approach gives 
a more general assessment of the impact of disruption, the latter gives clearer 
understanding of the dynamics of threats and how they impact the chain. From Altay 
and Ramirez (2010) it is understood that disasters lead to disruption which affects all 
sectors of the chain but certain threats have more impact than others. This type of 
specific-threat impact study is not as common as one would expect in literature, 
specifically in the area of information security management. It is still not quite 
understood how the impact of various threats to information security on supply chain 
performance vary (especially inventory management performance). Although a few 
qualitative and quantitative studies (Whitman, 2003, Yeh and Chang, 2007, 
Bellefeuille, 2005, Goel and Shawky, 2009) have looked at this in a rather subjective 
way requiring managers to rank or score threats according to their perception, there 
is still a lack of objective measure of these variances. Deane et al. (2009) examined 
how risks originate from one business, due to poor countermeasures put in place to 
prevent it, and is being transferred to adjoining firms in the supply chain using mixed 
integer linear programming (MILP). While they termed the risks they studied IT 
security incidents, there was no evidence of specific threats to security being 
addressed and it is not clear how these risks affect the dynamics of the supply chain. 
In a similar work by Rees et al. (2011), specific threats were addressed and the 
financial impact for a given countermeasure was estimated. However, it was still 
unclear how these threats affect the operations of an organization, not to mention the 
supply chain. This threat-type impact study seems to be lacking in information 
disruption literature. To know how these threats affect the performance of the 
network is crucial to appropriate disruption risk planning and management.  
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Having reviewed literature, it was clear that there is a paucity of quantitative 
research on information security as a potential source of disruption. Out of those that 
have considered information security, a very few have tried to investigate how 
threats to information security impact the supply chain: some purely qualitative, 
others a mix of qualitative and quantitative.  Of this few, none has investigated how 
these affect the operations of the supply chain at an operational and strategic level 
and how a breach in one organization affects others that are linked to it, although 
they have not experienced any breach in themselves. For instance it is not yet 
understood, in real terms, from these studies what the cost implications of security 
breach in an organization’s procurement process are for supply partners. It is obvious 
that these breaches can cause delays in transactions between supply chain partners 
but it not well understood to what extent these delays will impact the operating cost 
of members further upstream or further downstream of the supply network. There are 
other key performance indicators that are affected such as ordering pattern which 
may ultimately affect the shipping strategy of agents in the supply chain, but to what 
scale are they affected? The understanding of how these impact not just an 
organization but other members of the network is crucial to successful network 
management or coordination activities. It has not been evidenced how the 
complexity or conditions of the supply chain affect the impact of information 
security breach on its operations. 
Most security risk studies have been based on cost to an organization, and have 
provided ways in which an organization can make economic assessment of 
countermeasures available to them. While these studies have focused on direct costs, 
there is yet to be a study that presents real evidence on indirect costs to the 
organization. This indirect cost is discussed later in section 2.6. 
2.5 MITIGATING ROLE OF SUPPLY CONDITIONS 
The best solution to information security problems of course would be to have 
appropriate levels of prevention and deterrence; detective and recovery, and 
corrective measures (Ouyang 2012). Disruption duration is a function of the level of 
security breach detection and recovery measures (otherwise called mitigation 
measures). It is within reason that higher breach disruption duration means the 
detection and recovery level is not high enough. Lower disruption duration is 
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indicative of having near appropriate level of detection and recovery measures. On 
the other hand, rate of breach occurrence (RoC) is indicative of the required level of 
security breach prevention and deterrence measures (otherwise called prevention 
measures). Higher RoC means the preventive and deterrence measure is not at an 
appropriate level, and lower RoC means that the level of breach prevention and 
deterrence is high (Dai et al. 2012).  
However, the incidence and type of security breach changes year in year out and as 
such, businesses should be able to contain any changes using an appropriate security 
management system that can analyse these changes (Potter and Beard 2012). 
Breaches that were no longer an issue a year ago, being mitigated by the security 
measures already put in place, might become a serious issue the next year rising 
from changes in the incidence and level of sophistication with which these breaches 
occur. In the same vein, breaches considered benign last year might become 
malignant the next year following an increase in the number of occurrence.  
Although many have reported that collaborative practices such as information 
sharing are beneficial to the supply chain, others have shown that there are 
moderating factors which affect these purported benefits. For instance, high cost of 
making IT investment typical of bigger business ventures (Dermikan, 2010), quality 
of information shared- timeliness; accuracy; relevance and added value (Weingarten 
et al, 2010), mode of information sharing (Lau et al., 2002), contextual factors such 
as external pressure and internal readiness of the organization, amongst other related 
factors have been reported to undermine the benefits derivable from sharing 
information. From this mix of studies, one can begin to appreciate the role of 
preparedness and requisite understanding of one’s business environment (both 
internal and external) in deriving the said benefits of any information sharing 
strategy. It is therefore within reason, to assume that that the same information 
security breach would impact supply chains in different ways due to the different 
operating variables (also known as complexity drivers) found in various supply 
chains. 
2.5.1 Supply Chain Complexity Drivers 
Several definitions of complexity exist in literature. Bozarth et al. (2009) defined 
complexity as the level of detail complexity and dynamic complexity exhibited by 
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the products, processes and relationships comprising the supply chain. Serdarasan 
(2013) defined it under static; dynamic; and decision making complexities. 
According to Serdarasan (2013), Static complexity connotes the structure of the 
supply chain, the variety of its components and strengths of interactions; dynamic 
complexity describes the uncertainty in the supply chain which involves the aspects 
of time and randomness; while decision making complexity involves aspects of static 
and dynamic complexities. A review of complexity drivers was carried out in the 
study of Serdarasan (2013) and the study listed various drivers which include, but 
not limited to, number/variety of suppliers, number/variety of customers, 
number/variety of interactions, conflicting policies, demand amplification, 
differing/conflicting/non-synchronized decisions and actions, incompatible IT 
systems. In a separate work by Hoole (2005), the study listed five complexity drivers 
(which was referred to as performance levers); configuration; management practices; 
external relationships; organisation; and systems. Wilding (1998) examined what he 
called the supply chain complexity triangle: deterministic chaos, parallel interactions 
and demand amplification. From these studies, it is very obvious that supply chain 
structure, decision making policies (ordering policy), and the level of information 
integration present in the supply chain are prominent common factors. Studying the 
impact of an element in a supply chain setting should therefore include these three 
variables and conversely, the influence of these three variables can be examined to 
see how they affect the impact of the said element.  
2.5.2 Conceptualisation of Supply Chain Structure 
Supply chain structure or configuration has been suggested as one of the most 
prominent performance lever that helps improve supply chain performance (Hoole, 
2005). Configuration or structural complexity is mostly construed to mean physical 
asset and material flow in the supply chain (Hoole, 2005); hence improving supply 
chain configuration has been suggested as one of the most common methods for 
reducing supply chain uncertainties and improving performance (Childerhouse and 
Towill, 2003). Supply chain structure has been defined by many researchers based 
on several parameters. Randall and Ulrich (2001) defined structure in their work as a 
function of distance of production facility to target market and the extent of 
production to reach minimum efficiency. In their work, Stock et al. (2000) 
conceptualized structure as a function of geographic dispersion and channel 
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governance. Structure according to Xu et al. (2010) was defined in the context of 
how the manufacturer directs its capabilities. They defined three structures; a 
component supplier structure is one where the manufacturer produces components 
for the original equipment manufacturer (OEM); a monopoly structure where the 
manufacturer assembles the product under their own brand; and the dual distributor 
structure which is a combination of the previous two. This study, however, adopts 
the notion of structure found in Hoole (2005) based on the indication of  what gets 
done where?’. According to Hoole (2005), the Supply Chain Operations Reference 
(SCOR); which is endorsed by more than 750 member organisations, breaks the 
supply chain into four process elements (plan, source, make, deliver). These 
elements are reflective of the role the retailer, distributor/wholesaler, and the 
manufacturer/supplier play in the supply chain. It seemed quite appropriate to 
include all these elements when defining a supply chain. Therefore structure in this 
study is defined in terms of ‘how many agents are in each process element’, and the 
retailer, wholesaler and manufacturer are all separate tiers in the supply chain. This 
three tiered structure is more representative of a supply chain than a two tiered 
supply chain, and on the other hand represents a simplified version of a four or more-
tiered supply chain.  
Some studies have looked at the effect of supply chain structure on the performance 
of supply chains (Beamon and Chen, 2001, Mills, 2004, Xu et al., 2010) but this has 
mostly been an evaluation of the performance of one multi-agent structure to another 
multi-agent structure. The performance of a simplified supply chain in the form of a 
serial structure against two or more complex supply chain structures with multi-
agent components has not been studied, at least to the author’s knowledge. This type 
of analysis is very important in complexity studies as simplifying the structure in 
certain aspects may help reduce the uncertainties associated with such highly 
complex supply systems. Beamon and Chen (2001) described four supply chain 
structures based on a single manufacturer present in the chain namely; convergent 
(assembly type), divergent (Arborescent type), conjoined (combination of 
convergent and divergent) and general (also called network). They then examined 
the performance of a conjoined supply chain structure while Lau et al. (2002) 
included a linear structure (also called serial) in addition to what was described by 
Beamon and Chen (2001) but they only considered the impact of information sharing 
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on a divergent supply chain in their study. It appears that many of these studies 
consider various supply chain structures with one thing in common; there is only one 
manufacturer in the chain, except for the network structure. In order to examine the 
effect of structure on supply chain performance, this study evaluates the relative 
performance of a distribution type, manufacturing type and network type structures 
to a serial counterpart in disrupted and non-disrupted supply chain scenarios. In 
addition the effect of structure on supply chain disruption has been under studied in 
literature. Study of the structure effect in the context discussed above is one of the 
contributions of this study. 
2.5.3 The role of ordering options 
Several studies have established the cost controlling effect of ordering policies in a 
supply chain. These policies determine the key inventory decision of ‘when to order’ 
and ‘how much to order’. The ‘when to order’ decision is governed by certain 
conditions that need to be met before an organisation can place an order to its 
supplier. This could mean when the inventory position falls below a target level (re-
order point) after periodic or continuous checks (Axsäter and Juntti, 1997, Axsäter, 
2003), or when an order is received from downstream agents in the form of 
aggressive ordering (Papanagnou and Halikias, 2006) Agrawal et al 2009). The 
condition mostly used in literature and in practice to decide if an order should be 
placed is whether the inventory level falls below the predefined re-order point. This 
point could generally mean a target level that must be kept at all times but may be 
exceeded. The ‘how much to order’ can either be a predetermined quantity (batch 
ordering) (Baganha and Cohen, 1998, Axsäter, 2003, Mitra and Chatterjee, 2004, 
Tee and Rossetti, 2002) or the difference or addition between two or more decision 
variables or parameters (Agrawal et al., 2009, Banerjee et al., 1996, Chen et al., 
2000, Chen and Disney, 2003, Wright and Yuan, 2008). The continuous review 
model, (Q, R), and the order-up-to (OUT) comprising of the base stock model (r, S) 
and the min-max (s, S) model, have been studied extensively. According to 
Vasconcelos and Marques (2000), in the continuous review (Q,R) option, Q is 
usually set to Economic Order Quantity (EOQ) and R is the re-order point computed 
for each replenishment period. The EOQ model being deterministic usually fails and 
causes a significant increase in cost when used in a stochastic environment. However  
Axsäter (1996) proposed an optimal solution for Q by multiplying the EOQ by 
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square root of 1+α2 when α=2. This optimal model is used as one of the ordering 
options in our simulation model. Another ordering policy commonly used in 
research is the base stock option (r, S) where r represents the review period and S the 
OUT level (Agrawal et al., 2009, Bensoussan et al., 2007, Beamon and Chen, 2001, 
Chen et al., 2000). The other option is the OUT (s, S) option where s is the re-order 
point and S is the order-up-to level (Chen and Disney, 2003, Lau et al., 2004, Arrow 
et al., 1951). Again we see from several studies that organisations perform 
differently under various ordering policies. In a study by Lau et al. (2008) they found 
that the EOQ model held the most benefit for the retailer while the periodic order 
quantity was more beneficial to the suppliers. However it is not evident from 
literature how these policies perform under information security breach. 
2.5.4 Role of Information Sharing 
Information integration results in interdependencies amongst supply partners where 
the upstream partners rely on key business information from downstream partners in 
a timely manner. Therefore disruption in this flow of information could have a 
negative effect on the movement of materials down the chain and hence lead to 
customer dissatisfaction. Alluding to this reality is a study by Munoz and Clements 
(2008) which suggests information flow delays play a larger role as a contributor to 
lost sale revenues in the supply chain than material delay does. 
Information sharing (or information integration as it is also called in this study) has 
been a solution pushed by some research (Bourland et al. , 1996, Chan and Chan, 
2009, Cheng, 2010, Kristal et al., 2010, Li et al. , 2006, Li and Lin, 2006, Yang et al. 
, 2011, Zhou and Benton Jr, 2007, Yu et al., 2001, Raschke, 2010). A good amount 
of research, both empirical and analytical, has been conducted in the area of 
information sharing and how agents in the supply chain derive benefit from it, if any 
at all. It has been reported that there exist benefit to members of the chain who 
engage in information sharing especially those types of information that are 
important to the timely operation of the chain such as demand, inventory, supply 
lead time and capacity information (Mukhopadhyay and Kekre, 2002, Kulp et al. , 
2004, Devaraj et al., 2007, Yu et al., 2010). Although the benefit may be 
disproportionately distributed amongst supply chain members (Yao and Dresner, 
2008), each member strives to position themselves in a vantage point where benefit 
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accrues to them. The question has been who stands to gain the most if information is 
shared, that is if there is any benefit to be derived at all. Therefore there has been 
discussion about ways to incentivise members or agents in the chain that do not 
directly benefit from information sharing (Yao et al., 2010). 
2.5.5 The Need for a Systemic Study 
There have been many studies looking at IS risks to an organization and a very few 
have studied IS risk to the supply chain. However there is yet to be an academic 
study on the impact of IS disruptions on the supply chain under various supply chain 
context or conditions. The supply chain context is defined here as the state of the 
chain in terms of the level of information sharing (information integration) present, 
the specific ordering option being used and the structure of the supply chain. Table 
2.3 reveals a list of some of the previous studies and the supply chain context their 
work was based on. Three different contextual factors are considered in this study, 
namely ordering option; supply structure; and information sharing level. Each 
contextual factor or complexity driver has various alternatives. Under the ordering 
option, Table2.3 shows three alternatives that have been studied which are parameter 
based ordering (PBO); batch ordering (BO); and combined batch-and-parameter 
based ordering (CBPO). The supply chain structure is examined whether it is a serial 
type structure with only one agent in each tier of the supply chain or if there are 
multiple agents (multi-agent) in each tier representing a more complex structure. 
However the multi-agent type structure can also exist in different alternative forms 
such as distributor, manufacturer, or network type structures. Under the information 
sharing context, the table examined two alternatives, centralized and decentralized 
information sharing, although the centralized option can also exist in two 
alternatives: partial or full information sharing. It is clear that none have studied 
supply chain contextual effect under all three categories together. Some have 
examined the effect of these complexity drivers separately but there is a need to 
build as much context as possible in supply chain studies.  Perhaps a change in one 
of these contextual variables in the supply chain may result in a completely different 
outcome when the effect of the other two is examined. Also, it is not clear what the 
interaction between the effects of two or more contextual factors is on supply chain 
performance. In addition, it is not evident from literature how this contextual effect  
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 Ordering Option Structure Information sharing 
Author PBO BO CBPO Serial Multi-agent Centralised Decentralised 
Papanagnou and Halikias (2006)  *  *   * 
Chen (1998)  *  *  * * 
Banerjee et al. (1996) * *  *  *  
Agrawal et al. (2009) *   *  * * 
Wright and Yuan (2008) *   *   * 
Chen and Disney (2003) *   *   * 
Hosoda and Disney (2004) *   *   * 
Chen et al. (2000) *   *  * * 
Sterman (1989) *   *   * 
Wu and Edwin Cheng (2008) *   *  * * 
Yu et al. (2001) *   *  * * 
Lau et al 2002  *   * * * 
Lau et al 2004   *  * * * 
Chen and Samroengaja 2004 * *   * *  
Beamon and Chen * *   *  * 
Chatfield et al. (2004) *   *  * * 
Baganha and Cohen 1998  *   *  * 
Table 2.3 Review of past contexual studies
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or the interaction effect mitigates or worsens performance especially in an 
information security breach scenario.  
2.6 ENTROPY ASSESSMENT AND THE INDIRECT IMPACT COST 
PARADIGM 
While the direct cost impact of a security breach on two different 
organisations/supply chains might be the same, the level of uncertainty associated 
with such impact may not be the same due to the different complexities of both 
organisations/ supply chains. In other words, the direct cost impact when the breach 
occurs at another period in the same year might be different for both 
organisations/supply chains. It is therefore necessary to capture this uncertainty and 
this can be done using an entropy approach.  
2.6.1 The Supply Chain Scenario Narrative 
Consider a scenario where a supply chain contains the retailer, distributor, 
manufacturer and supplier and it is known that information about demand flows from 
the retailer through the chain to the manufacturer, which uses this information to 
place orders to its supplier. Depending on the level of integration, supply partners 
can access this information once they have access to the internet and plan their 
operations effectively in a timely manner. Intuitively, one knows that if the system, 
which the retailer uses in capturing demand, is compromised due to an attack that 
makes service unavailable, the other parties in the supply chain would be denied the 
advantage of knowing demand as it occurs or even denied access to real demand 
information because the database has been corrupted. Consequently, they would 
have to rely on forecasted demand in making ordering decision with their suppliers 
and cannot take advantage of having timely demand information. Bourland et al. 
(1996) revealed that a supplier could reduce inventories and its associated costs or 
improve the reliability of deliveries to its customers given more accurate demand 
information.  
On the other hand if a system, with a customer interface, which allows a 
customer to place an order to the retailer or manufacturer directly, becomes 
unavailable due to security breach, or crashes due to a sudden increase in the number 
of customers accessing the interface at the same time. The organization or supply 
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chain might lose that customer depending on the severity of the incidence. Severity 
here means the duration of the breach and the number of repeated occurrences. 
According to Hoffman and Lowitt (2008), retaining  customers is critical to survival 
of an organization, let alone growth. Assume, hypothetically, that a web service 
where customers are able to place their orders online is compromised and has 
become inaccessible to customers. This in effect will result in the customers 
defecting to use services provided by competitors. The customers are classified into 
two categories which are the ‘loyal customers’ (which are those accustomed to the 
use the service and regularly patronize it) and the ‘likely customers’ (which are 
trying the service for the first time and are looking for a reliable service to stick to). 
From Capraro et al. (2003) and Hennig-Thurau and Klee (1997) it is understood that 
loyal customers are still likely to purchase from vendors despite incessant 
dissatisfaction. However, a research conducted by Accenture revealed that 70% of 
US retail customers are loyal customers and that 85% of these “loyal” customers are 
willing to shop elsewhere if properly enticed (Hoffman and Lowitt, 2008). In other 
words, there is an 85% chance they could defect. Inaccessibility to service might be 
the defecting factor which could cause ‘loyal customers’ to defect and ‘likely 
customers’ to permanently defect. The breached organization would then have to 
spend more money on promotional packages, among other things, to win back 
customers.  
The objective of any organization or supply chain would be to reduce the number of 
occurrences of security breach or totally eradicate it if possible. It is understood from 
the above that there is an 85% chance of losing customers or customer transaction if 
they experience incessant dissatisfaction caused by security breach of the system. As 
it has been established in section 2.3.4, one way of calculating the risk to an 
organization is by multiplying the probability of incidence (P) of the breach by the 
impact cost  (I) incurred when that breach occurs (Rees et al., 2011, Deane et al., 
2009). Therefore, the higher the probability of an incident occurring the greater the 
risk and vice versa. For instance if the cost incurred when an incidence occurs is 
£20k and the probability of occurrence is 0.5, then the risk impact is £10k. If the 
probability of occurrence reduces to 0.1 due to countermeasures put in place, then 
the risk impact becomes less, £2k. In the same light, if there is an increase in the 
probability of incidence then the risk impact increases. In essence once the cost 
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impact (I) is established, then all that requires monitoring is the probability of 
incidence (P). Ideally any preventive measure would be to reduce the level of 
occurrence of these breaches (i.e. P) and any mitigating measure would be to reduce 
the impact cost (I). However there is still a conundrum yet un-tackled. The pre-
estimated impact cost is in itself uncertain. For example, the impact of a security 
breach may vary depending on the time of the year it occurs. It is expected that the 
same breach occurring during peak demand periods will have more cost impact than 
when it occurs during the less busy periods of the year.  Therefore this uncertainty 
needs to be reflected in the risk calculations. A very well established means of 
estimating uncertainty is the entropy theory which is discussed in the subsequent 
section. 
2.6.2 Entropy Assessment 
Entropy has been described as a quantitative measure of uncertainty which describes 
the level of chaos or surprise associated with an event (Sivadasan et al., 2002, 
Shannon, 1948, Shuiabi et al., 2005). This concept has been applied in various ways 
in literature to capture performance (Martínez-Olvera, 2008), flexibility (Shuiabi et 
al., 2005), complexity (Frizelle and Woodcock, 1995, Frizelle and Efstathiou, 2002, 
Sivadasan et al., 2002), anonymity (Bezzi, 2007, Deng et al., 2007), trail disclosure 
(Airoldi et al., 2011) and so on. However this concept has not been applied to 
information security impact assessment in supply chain management studies despite 
its promising advantages over the use of just probability alone. While previous 
studies have estimated information security risks as a function of threat occurrence 
and the associated financial loss (Rees et al. 2011, Deane et al. 2009), only a few 
have employed the Entropy theory. Although the concept of using entropy as an 
approach to determine uncertainty has been used in literature by Frizelle and 
Woodcock (1995); Frizelle and Efstathiou (2002); Ronen and Karp (1994); 
Sivadasan et al. (2002); and Martínez-Olvera (2008), the closest previous studies 
have come to applying entropy in security studies has been in data privacy studies 
such as disclosure risk assessment (Airoldi et al., 2011), measuring anonymity 
(Bezzi, 2007, Deng et al. , 2007). The argument is that since complexity of a system 
(characterized as the uncertainty of a system) can be measured using an entropy 
approach (Frizelle and Woodcock, , 1995, Martínez-Olvera, 2008), and, the little is 
known about a random variable the more the entropy of that variable, hence the level 
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of entropy of a security breach can be determined once the probability of occurrence 
is known (Airoldi et al., 2011). By inference, since an information security breach 
can be modelled as a disruption in the flow of real time market demand information, 
the level of entropy introduced into the operation can be determined once the 
probability space of disruption occurrence is known. This study therefore proposes 
the concept of Total Entropy which encapsulates the unpredictability inherent in the 
estimation of security breach cost impact. This is explained in greater details in the 
methodology section. 
The assessment here is to evaluate security threats using threat occurrence to work 
out the level of entropy each threat introduces into the system. This will help identify 
those threats that are hot spots to guide management decision in selecting appropriate 
countermeasures and mitigation solutions. While this study is not an optimality 
study, it provides a useful methodology to security risk assessment from a process 
based view where financial loss information is not known a priori. But first the 
impact of these threats needs to be established using a simulation approach to mimic 
real life operations. 
2.7 SIMULATION APPROACH TO UNDERSTANDING SUPPLY CHAIN 
DYNAMICS 
A very powerful tool in analysing real life situations is the computer simulation 
approach. A definition of simulation given by Shannon (1998) is “the process of 
designing a model of a real system and conducting experiments with this model for 
the purpose either of understanding the behaviour of the system or of evaluating 
various strategies (within the limits imposed by a criterion or set of criteria) for the 
operation of the system.” This has been used extensively in literature because of its 
promising advantages. It has been described as an effective and practical tool in 
evaluating and analyzing, in great details, supply chain design and management 
alternatives (Swaminathan et al., 1998). It can prove to be more credible than most 
analytical approaches being that it requires fewer simplifying assumptions and as a 
result captures more of the true characteristics of the system under study (Lau et al., 
2004, Shannon, 1998). It has been used in supply chain studies to understand impact 
of different variables on supply chain performance such as information sharing 
(Yang et al., 2011, Lau et al., 2002, Lau et al., 2004, Chan and Chan, 2009), 
40 
 
integration (Wang et al., 2008, Chan and Zhang, 2011, Zhang et al., 2006) and 
inventory management (Schwartz et al., 2006, Lau et al., 2008, Southard and 
Swenseth, 2008, Jammernegg and Reiner, 2007), to mention a few. This study 
focuses on information sharing as breach in information security is conceptualized as 
a disruption in the flow of information. According to Lau et al. (2004), a simulation 
approach has an advantage over an analytical approach in that the effect of 
information sharing on a supply chain can be investigated under various scenarios. 
Their work on the impact of information sharing on inventory replenishment offers a 
simple yet detailed model of supply chain interactions. In a similar work by Lau et 
al. (2002), they showed how various information sharing modes affect the dynamics 
of the supply chain and they presented a description of how the ordering policy is 
adjusted based on available information. These studies were limited to 
manufacturer’s (divergent) supply chain. The current study aims to extend their work 
by including other supply chain structures such as retailer’s supply chain, 
distributor’s supply chain and supply network. These are explained in more details in 
the methodology section. Discrete event simulations (DES) are a powerful tool used 
in mimicking the dynamics of a real system as it evolves over time (Ingalls, 2008, 
Law, 2007). A multi-agent approach where each tier of the supply chain has at least 
one agent (or member as it is sometimes called) making decisions is quite 
representative of the real world situation, hence making it the approach of choice 
(Swaminathan et al., 1998).  
2.8 SUMMARY OF MAIN RESEARCH GAPS 
Having reviewed past works, it became apparent that some gaps still exist in 
literature and this thesis aims to fill those gaps. The main gaps are listed below: 
 Several studies have examined the role of ordering policy, supply chain 
structure and information sharing/integration on supply chain performance 
separately, but no study has examined the combined role of all three strategic 
factors in a single study. The interaction effect of all three strategic elements 
is not well understood. Does the combination of the best alternative amongst 
each of the three strategic factors produce the best synergic effect? Or are 
certain combinations better than combining the best alternatives in each 
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category even if they do not represent the best choice under each category of 
strategic factors?  
 Impact studies relating to information security breach are few and somewhat 
understudied. The interaction of the strategic factors in an information 
security breach scenario are not well understood. Much focus has been on 
what IT managers can do to reduce the impact of a breach but not much 
attention is paid on how the supply chain context can be strengthened and 
poised for minimal cost impact. Certain pertinent questions have not yet been 
answered. How does the ordering policy, supply structure or information 
sharing level respond to information security breach impact and what 
alternatives within each strategic factor constitute the most resilient 
combination or synergy to the impact? 
 Most studies in the area of information management are subjective and based 
on subjective risk estimation. Amongst the few objective ones, none have 
looked more closely at the pre-estimated impact cost component of the risk 
evaluation, at least to the author’s knowledge. It is generally assumed that 
estimating the impact of information security breach is quite uncertain due to 
various exigent factors and the effect of this uncertainty on supply chain 
priorities has not been studied. For most organisations this impact is 
measured against a threshold that the organisation deems significant without 
any regard for the uncertainty surrounding the estimate. Therefore an impact 
with a low cost amount may be considered insignificant and the organisation 
may decide to ignore such breaches.  This study aims to demonstrate that 
disregarding the implication of this uncertainty may ultimately cost the 
organisation and lead to poor supply chain strategy decisions. Besides the 
above gap, no study has used entropy theory to measure the uncertainty 
surrounding the information security breach impact cost estimate. 
Filling these gaps would be a reasonable step forward in the area of information 
security management and supply chain management. With respect to supply chain 
management, this study creates a better understanding of the impact of security 
breach on supply chain performance under different supply chain scenarios. This 
understanding will help businesses make better strategic decisions on supply chain 
configuration, ordering policy, and information sharing in order to make their supply 
42 
 
chains more resilient to information security breach impact. For information security 
management, this study develops a novel application of entropy theory to measure 
impact uncertainty which informs the level of monitoring and review required to 
offset such uncertainty. Changing the monitoring and review level has cost 
implications which should be factored in when estimating impact cost. Using this 
entropy assessment creates a more inclusive approach to impact assessment than 
other existing ones.  
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Chapter 3 : RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
Several approaches can be used to study the research questions posted in the 
introduction chapter. Analytical approach, surveys, interviews, case studies are all 
viable approaches to undertake the study. However, using these approaches would 
require tremendous amount of effort, time, and money due to the complex nature of 
the research. This is because the research requires the study of 240 distinct supply 
chain scenarios that are all subject to the same supply chain conditions. An empirical 
research for such a complex study is close to impossible. A very powerful tool in 
analysing real life situations is the computer simulation approach. Therefore 
simulation modelling becomes the obvious research approach.  
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
A definition of simulation given by Shannon (1998 p. 7) is “the process of designing 
a model of a real system and conducting experiments with this model for the purpose 
of understanding the behaviour of the system and/or evaluating various strategies for 
the operation of the system.” This has been used extensively in literature because of 
its promising advantages. It has been described as an effective and practical tool in 
evaluating and analysing, in great details, supply chain design and management 
alternatives (Swaminathan et al., 1998). It can prove to be more credible than most 
analytical approaches being that it requires fewer simplifying assumptions and as a 
result captures more of the true characteristics of the system under study (Lau et al., 
2004, Shannon, 1998). It has been used in supply chain studies to understand impact 
of different variables on supply chain performance such as information sharing 
(Yang et al., 2011, Lau et al., 2002, Lau et al., 2004, Chan and Chan, 2009), 
integration (Wang et al., 2008, Chan and Zhang, 2011, Zhang et al., 2006) and 
inventory management (Schwartz et al., 2006, Lau et al., 2008, Southard and 
Swenseth, 2008, Jammernegg and Reiner, 2007), to mention a few.  
3.1.1 Two Main Types of Simulation 
There exist two main types of simulation namely; the discrete event simulation 
(DES) and the continuous simulation. Continuous simulation entails the study of a 
system as it evolves through time without any break in simulation, while DES refers 
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to the study of a system as a discrete sequence of events with breaks in between 
events. The reason for allowing breaks in DES is based on the assumption that no 
changes occur during the break and, ideally, this makes it run faster than the 
continuous simulation counterpart. The use of either of the two simulation 
approaches would depend on the nature of the study. If the study is interested in 
understanding the dynamics of the system through time, then continuous simulation 
would be ideal but if the study is about understanding the system during various 
events that occur at different time instances, DES would be the choice. This study 
adopts the DES as the simulation of choice due to the fact that it is interested in 
understanding the effect of discrete events rather than continuous events.  
Discrete event simulations (DES) are a powerful tool used in mimicking the 
dynamics of a real system as it evolves over time (Ingalls, 2008, Law, 2007). It 
allows users to do a comparison of different alternatives without interrupting the real 
system and also to perform powerful sensitivity or what-if analysis that enables them 
to make better planning decisions. A multi-agent approach where each tier of the 
supply chain has at least one agent (or member as it is sometimes called) making 
decisions is quite representative of the real world situation, hence making it the 
approach of choice (Swaminathan et al., 1998). 
3.1.2 Structure of the Chapter 
This chapter discusses the simulation model in terms of the conceptual model, data 
validity, the simulation model specification, the computerised simulation model, the 
experiments, verification and validation of the simulation model. Lastly the entropy 
concept in information theory is explained and the entropy assessment methodology 
adapted in this study is shown. 
3.2 THE MODEL DEVELOPMENT PROCESS 
 A simulation model is developed through a series of steps that assures that the real 
system or problem entity is being adequately mimicked. This requires a thorough 
understanding of the real system and the objective for modelling should be clearly 
defined. These steps include but are not limited to conceptual modelling, 
computerisation of the conceptual model (model coding), experimentation and 
implementation (Robinson 2004). Other activities such as data collection and 
analysis, verification and validation are continuously carried out throughout each 
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stage of the simulation study. The first step in the model development process is 
developing a conceptual model. According to Sargent (2010) the conceptual model 
could either be a mathematical, logical or verbal representation of the system, or a 
combination of these, developed for the objectives of a particular study. The 
specification and assumptions in the conceptual model are carefully chosen to mimic 
what is obtainable in the real system. After the conceptual model development, this 
model is converted into a computerised model; which is a detailed written computer 
programme for implementing and running the conceptual model on a computer 
system for the purpose of conducting experiments on the simulation model. The 
computer model can be developed using commercial software packages or written by 
the user by means of a general programming language. Various scenarios of the 
computer model can be specified and run (experimenting) and the output is collected 
and analysed, and inferences can be made.  
3.3 CONCEPTUAL MODELLING OF THE SUPPLY CHAIN 
This study is interested in understanding the impact of information security breach 
on supply chain performance under various supply chain operating scenarios. The 
impact can be determined by comparing the performance of the supply chain in a 
non-breach situation to that of a breached situation. Therefore for each of the 
scenarios, a non-breached and a breached version of the simulation model is created. 
To do this, first a conceptual model of the non-breach version is developed for each 
ordering option, supply chain structure and information sharing level scenarios. The 
conceptual model developed in this study is explained in this section.   
3.3.1 Modelling the Supply Chain Activities 
The supply chain is conceptualised as a series of agents working autonomously to 
deliver goods to the end consumer. For simplicity the number of echelons within the 
supply chain is limited to three consisting of the retailer, wholesaler and 
manufacturer. The decision on when to order and how much to order is determined 
internally by each agent and each operates independently and strives to achieve the 
minimal operating cost possible. Depending on their position in the supply chain, 
each agent places an order to the upstream agent and the upstream agent delivers 
goods to the downstream agent. Essentially, the retailer experiences the demand 
from the end customer (market demand) and determines when and how much order 
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to place to the wholesaler. In turn, the wholesaler works out when to order and how 
much to order from the manufacturer. The manufacturer then produces the product 
and delivers it to the wholesaler who in turn determines the quantity of goods to 
deliver to the retailer and supplies it. The sequence of activities involved in 
determining when to order and how much to order for each agent is shown below. 
Each agent makes their decision using key parameters (adapted from Lau et al., 
2004) and these are shown in Table 3.1.  
Parameter Notation Retailer Wholesaler Manufacturer 
Market demand D *   
Order quantity Q * *  
Production quantity PQ   * 
Mean of Orders from downstream 
agent 
μ * * * 
Standard deviation of Orders σ * * * 
Stock received by agent SR * *  
Stock shipped by agent SS * * * 
Stock from Production SFP   * 
On-hand inventory OH * * * 
On-order/Pipeline inventory OO * * * 
Backlog quantity BL * * * 
Inventory position IP * * * 
Transportation lead time L  * * 
Production lead time PL   * 
Production Capacity PC   * 
Re-order point ROP * * * 
Order up to level OUT * * * 
New order quantity NQ * *  
New production quantity NPQ   * 
Unit shortage cost b * * * 
Unit Holding cost h * * * 
Unit ordering cost o * *  
Unit production cost om   * 
Fixed ordering cost f * *  
Production setup cost p   * 
Safety factor k * * * 
Table 3.1 Key Modelling Parameters 
The table shows the parameters of operation and their mathematical representation 
(notation). The use of ‘*’ is to indicate whether the parameters relate to a specific 
agent or not. For example Market demand (D) only relates to the Retailer and stock 
received by agent (SR) relates to the retailer and wholesaler only, while stock from 
production only refers to the manufacturer. To help distinguish between information 
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relating to other agents when describing the activities of a particular agent, subscripts 
x, and y are used. Subscript ‘y’ represents information relating to the upstream agent 
while ‘x’ refers to such parameters relating to the downstream agent. The sequence 
of activities and mathematical model is described as follows. 
Step 1: At the beginning of each operating day, an agent receives stock 
delivered by upstream agent 
The stock sent by the upstream agent is received at the current period by the agent 
after the transportation lead time of the upstream agent. This stock is received at the 
start of business. 
SRt= SSy,t-L        (1) 
For the manufacturer SSy is replaced with SFP which is stock received from 
production after the production lead time. 
i.e. SRt= SFPt-PL       (2) 
Step 2: Update inventory position 
Once the stock is received, the state of the on-hand inventory and the on-order 
inventory is updated as follows: 
OHt= OHt-1 + SRt                 (3) 
OOt= OOt-1 - SRt        (4)  
Then the inventory position is updated as shown below: 
IPt= OHt + OOt - BLt-1      (5) 
Step 3: Decides if an order should be placed and what quantity to order 
A decision to order is made when the inventory position is less than the re-order 
point and the quantity to order (Qt) at a given period, t, is governed by the ordering 
option adopted by the agent. This is discussed in section 3.3.2.1. 
Step 4: Updates its on-order inventory 
The order information above (if any) is passed to the upstream agent and the on-
order inventory is updated. 
𝑂𝑂𝑡 = 𝑂𝑂 + 𝑄𝑡       (6) 
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Step 5: Experiences order from downstream agent 
The order information for that day is received from the adjacent customer 
(downstream agent) and this is added to the pending order previously placed to 
determine the new order quantity for that period. If the agent is the retailer, the 
adjacent customer is the end customer and the customer order is called market 
demand.  
𝑁𝑄𝑥,𝑡 = 𝑄𝑥,𝑡 + 𝐵𝐿𝑡−1       (7) 
Step 6: Decides the quantity to deliver to fulfil order from downstream agent 
Each agent tries to fulfil all demand/order placed by downstream customer. However 
whatever the agent is unable to fulfil is back ordered. 
𝑆𝑆𝑡 = 𝑀𝑖𝑛(𝑁𝑄𝑥,𝑡, 𝑂𝐻𝑡)      (8) 
𝐵𝐿𝑡 = 𝑁𝑄𝑥,𝑡 − 𝑆𝑆𝑡       (9)  
Step 7: Updates its on-hand inventory information 
𝑂𝐻𝑡 = 𝑀𝑎𝑥(𝑂𝐻 − 𝑆𝑆𝑡, 0)      (10) 
Step 8: Computes mean and standard deviation of orders 
The mean of orders and standard deviation of orders is computed using the moving 
average (MA) technique. For the retailer the mean of orders is represented as mean 
of demand instead.  
Step 9: Computes the operating cost for the day 
The operating cost this study is interested in are the holding cost, the backlog cost 
and the ordering cost. These are computed using eq. (11), (12) and (13) respectively. 
 𝐻𝐶𝑡 = ℎ ∗ 𝑂𝐻𝑡       (11) 
𝐵𝐶𝑡 = 𝑏 ∗ 𝐵𝐿𝑡       (12) 
𝑂𝐶𝑡 = 𝑝 ∗ 𝑀𝑎𝑥(𝑄𝑡, 0) + 𝑜 ∗ 𝑄𝑡     (13) 
For the manufacturer, the fixed ordering cost is known as production set up cost (p) 
and the unit ordering cost is called the unit production cost (op). Each cost is 
computed at the end of the day and averaged over the effective simulation period 
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only. Another performance measure used was the daily fill rate of each agent as 
shown in eq. (14). This is expressed as a percentage. The average fill rate is 
computed only over the effective simulation period by adding all the fulfilled orders 
and dividing it by the total orders placed by downstream agents within the total 
effective period.  
𝐹𝑅𝑡 = 𝑆𝑆𝑡/𝑁𝑄𝑥,𝑡       (14) 
3.3.2 Modelling the Strategic Factors  
This study is interested in understanding the impact of information security breach 
on supply chain performance and this is studied under three strategic factors which 
are ordering option, supply chain structure and information sharing level.  Each 
strategic factor is studied under various alternatives or levels to understand how 
changing the strategy from one alternative to another would impact the performance 
of the supply chain under non-breach as well as breached situations. The various 
levels, or scenarios as it is also called, are described in this section and the 
mathematical model for each scenario under each strategy is explained. 
3.3.2.1 Ordering Policy Decision Models 
It is assumed in the simulation model that each supply chain agent orders from the 
upstream agent when the inventory position (also called installation stock) falls to 
the re-order point (eq. 15) and the magnitude of order is decided by the choice of 
ordering policy adopted.  
𝑅𝑂𝑃𝑡 =  𝜇(𝐿𝑦 + 1) + 𝑘𝜎√𝐿𝑦 + 1                                                         (15) 
The safety factor (k) is computed using eq. (16) which gives the optimal value of k 
which is the solution to the standard newsvendor problem as expressed in Lau et.al 
(2002). 
𝑘 = Φ−1 (
𝑏
𝑏 + ℎ
)                                                                                        (16) 
The magnitude of order quantity could either be the difference between two specific 
decision parameters (parameter based) or it could just be a predetermined batch size 
(batch ordering), or a combination of both (batch-and-parameter based).  These three 
alternatives have been used in different forms and studied separately in literature. 
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They have been used in periodic review models as well as continuous review 
models. Each of these three alternatives is considered in this study: (i) The first 
alternative which determines its order size by computing the difference between two 
decision parameters (parameter based ordering) is exemplified in this study with 
Ordering Option I- the order-up-to base stock policy; (ii) the second alternative of 
using predetermined batch size (batch ordering) is represented in this study as Option 
II- the optimal economic order quantity (EOQ*); (iii) the last alternative which 
combines the previous two alternatives in determining its order quantity (combined 
batch-and-parameter based ordering) is represented as Option III- the modified base 
stock policy with an EOQ component. The reason for using these three different 
ordering options is to establish that the best alternative in a non-breach scenario does 
not necessarily perform the best in an information security breach situation.  
This study hopes to demonstrate that the magnitude and direction of the impact of 
information security breach will depend on the choice of ordering policy being used 
by the members of the supply chain. In order to facilitate a more accurate 
comparison of the three alternatives the review period under each policy was set to 
one day which means they can be classified as either periodic review models or 
continuous review models as long as they satisfy certain assumptions which will be 
discussed later.  
3.3.2.1.1 Option I- The Base stock Policy 
One ordering policy commonly used in research is the base stock option (Agrawal et 
al., 2009, Bensoussan et al., 2007, Beamon and Chen, 2001, Chen et al., 2000). Here, 
an order is placed to raise inventory to the base stock level (otherwise called order-
up-to level, OUT) when the inventory position falls below the base stock level. This 
option is also called an adaptive model because the order-up-to level is recalculated 
every replenishment period. The ordering decision for this policy is shown in eq. 
(17). 
𝑄𝑡 = {
max (𝑂𝑈𝑇𝑡 − 𝐼𝑃𝑡 , 0), 𝐼𝑃𝑡 < 𝑅𝑂𝑃𝑡
0, 𝐼𝑃𝑡 ≥ 𝑅𝑂𝑃𝑡
    (17) 
Where the order-up-to level (OUT) is the same as the value of the re-order point 
shown in eq. (15). The order quantity is determined by two decision parameters: the 
order-up-to level and the inventory position (Cimino et al., 2010). 
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3.3.2.1.2 Option II- The optimal EOQ policy 
In a (R, Q) option, when the inventory position falls to the re-order point (R), a batch 
Q is ordered. However, according to Vasconcelos and Marques (2000), Q is usually 
set to Economic Order Quantity (EOQ) which is predetermined and R is the re-order 
point computed for each replenishment period. The EOQ model being deterministic 
usually fails and causes a significant increase in cost when used in a stochastic 
environment. However  Axsäter (1996) proposed an optimal solution for Q. The 
standard solution for EOQ in a stochastic environment is given by eq. (18). 
𝐸𝑂𝑄𝑡 = √
2𝜇𝑓(𝑏 + ℎ)
𝑏ℎ
                                                                                (18) 
However, according to Axsäter (1996), multiplying the EOQ by square root of 1+α2 
becomes optimal when α=2. This optimal model is used as one of the ordering 
options in the current study.  
 
𝑄𝑡 = {
max (𝐸𝑂𝑄𝑡 ∗ 2.2361, 0), 𝐼𝑃𝑡 < 𝑅𝑂𝑃𝑡
0, 𝐼𝑃𝑡 ≥ 𝑅𝑂𝑃𝑡
                         (19)  
3.3.2.1.3 Option III- The Modified Base stock Policy 
The other option is the modified base stock policy which is a min-max policy (s, S) 
where s is the re-order point and S is the order-up-to level (Chen and Disney, 2003, 
Lau et al., 2004, Arrow et al., 1951). OUT in option III is the sum of the re-order 
point and a simple EOQ, unlike option I, where OUT is the same as the re-order 
point. This model can be viewed as a combination of options I and II.  
𝑄𝑡 = {
max (𝑅𝑂𝑃𝑡 + 𝐸𝑂𝑄𝑡 − 𝐼𝑃𝑡, 0), 𝐼𝑃𝑡 < 𝑅𝑂𝑃𝑡
0, 𝐼𝑃𝑡 ≥ 𝑅𝑂𝑃𝑡
   (20)                                                    
Again it is seen from several studies that organisations perform differently under 
various ordering policies. In a study by Lau et al. (2008) they found that the EOQ 
model held the most benefit for the retailer while the periodic order quantity was 
more beneficial to the suppliers. However it is not evident from literature how these 
policies perform under information security breach. 
3.3.2.2 Supply Chain Structure Decision Models 
The concept of structure in this study differs from past literature in that the supply 
chain structure has been defined in this study as a reflection of a singular 
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organisation, be it wholesaler or manufacturer, serving more than one upstream 
and/or downstream agent and is shown in Figure 3.1.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1 Four supply chain structures under investigation 
The structures considered here represent a strategic decision which supply chains can 
make to improve operational performance and reduce the risk of information security 
breach. There are two strategies examined here: a simplification strategy and a form 
of risk sharing strategy called networking strategy. Figure 3.1(a) shows a typical 
serial structure where each supply chain agent is being served by and is serving a 
single upstream and downstream agent respectively. Figures 3.1 (b) and (c) is 
considered a form of simplification strategy where the number of agents in each tier 
is reduced from two to one in the serial type structure and this simplification occurs 
at the wholesaler tier and the manufacturer tier respectively. Therefore a wholesaler 
supply chain (WH) is defined as a single wholesaler serving and being served by two 
downstream and two upstream agents while a manufacturer supply chain (MF) is 
defined as a supply chain with a single manufacturer serving two different supply 
streams. This MF structure is somewhat equivalent to a divergent structure discussed 
in some literature (Lau et al., 2004) while WH structure is similar to that discussed in 
Wholesaler Manufacturer Retailer 
Wholesaler Manufacturer Retailer 
Manufacturer Retailer 
Wholesaler 
Manufacturer Retailer 
Wholesaler Retailer 
Wholesaler 
Manufacturer 
Retailer 
Wholesaler Manufacturer Retailer 
Wholesaler Manufacturer Retailer 
(a) Serial Supply Chain (BC) 
(b) Wholesaler Supply Chain (WH) 
(c) Manufacturer Supply Chain (MF) 
(d) Network Supply Chain (N) 
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(Wilding, 1998). It will be interesting to know where along the supply chain is 
simplification best to occur.  
The last structure shown in Figure 3.1 (d) is a network structure (N) which is a risk 
sharing strategy (referred to in this study as networking strategy). Instead of reducing 
the number of agents in each tier (simplification strategy), a network is formed 
where multiple agents in each tier divide all the orders coming from different 
demand streams equally between themselves. In other words they share the risk 
associated with each demand stream equally between themselves. The reality of 
course is that in some cases, equal sharing might not be possible as some members 
have higher level of participation in the supply chain than others. The point being 
made here is that risk sharing can still take place as long as the division of 
responsibility to each member in the tier is commensurate with their level of 
participation. For simplicity and comparative reasons the number of agents in each 
tier has been limited to two. The interest here is to understand whether simplification 
strategy is better than networking strategy or vice versa.  
3.3.2.2.1 The wholesaler structure model 
In the WH structure, there is a single wholesaler serving two downstream retailers 
and two upstream manufacturers. The retailers and manufacturers in this model make 
their decisions independently but the wholesaler acts like a consolidation centre. 
After receiving the shipment from both manufacturers, the wholesaler adjusts its 
inventory position (eq.1-5) and an ordering decision is made depending on the 
ordering policy of choice. In determining its re-order point, the mean order (µ) and 
standard deviation (σ) used is determined from the moving average of the aggregate 
orders from both retailers. The order size is then split into two and sent to the two 
manufacturers separately. To fulfil the sum of the retailers’ order (eq. 21), the 
wholesaler checks if its on-hand inventory is greater than the sum of the retailers’ 
order and fulfils the entire order when the inventory level is greater (eq. 22). 
However when the inventory level is lesser than the sum of the orders from both 
retailers, then the wholesaler fulfils part of each retailer’s order by sending half of 
the on-hand inventory to each retailer.  
𝑁𝑄𝑥,𝑡 =  𝑁𝑄𝑥1,𝑡 + 𝑁𝑄𝑥2,𝑡      (21) 
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𝑆𝑆𝑡 = {
𝑁𝑄𝑥,𝑡, 𝑂𝐻𝑡 > ∑ 𝑁𝑄𝑥,𝑡
𝑂𝐻𝑡, 𝑂𝐻𝑡 ≤ ∑ 𝑁𝑄𝑥,𝑡
     (22) 
Whatever is not fulfilled is backordered and the wholesaler maintains a record of the 
backlog for each retailer separately. 
3.3.2.2.2 The Manufacturer structure model 
For the Manufacturer structure, there exists a single manufacturer serving two 
separate serial demand streams. The order of activities remains the same as described 
in eq. (1) to (14). The only difference is that the manufacturer computes the moving 
average of its orders over the sum of orders from both wholesalers. Also, the order 
fulfilled by the manufacturer is determined in a similar way to the wholesaler in the 
wholesaler structure using eq. (21) and (22) and whatever is not fulfilled is 
backordered. The manufacturer also maintains a separate backlog record for each 
wholesaler when the entire order is not fulfilled.   
3.3.2.2.3 The network structure model 
In the network structure each agent splits its order into two and sends an order to the 
two upstream agents. In order words, retailer1 divides its determined order quantity 
into two and sends the information to wholesaler1 and wholesaler 2 separately. 
Retailer2 does the same and sends the orders to wholesaler1 and 2. Each wholesaler 
also splits its order quantity into two and sends to manufactuere1 and manufacturer2 
separately. Each agent combines the order placed by downstream agent1 and 2 in 
determining its moving average information and the requested orders are fulfilled in 
a similar way described in 3.3.2.2.1 and 3.3.2.2.2.   
3.3.2.3 Information Sharing Level (ISL) 
The work of Lau et al. (2004) on the impact of information sharing on inventory 
replenishment offers a simple yet detailed information sharing model. In a similar 
work by Lau et al. (2002), they showed how various information sharing modes 
affect the dynamics of the supply chain and they presented a description of how the 
ordering policy is adjusted based on available information. This study adopts the 
conceptual model of information sharing level developed in Lau et al. (2002) and 
Lau et al. (2004). 
Information sharing (also termed information integration or simply integration) is 
conceptualised in this thesis as an upstream agent privy to the demand and other 
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related inventory information of a downstream agent such as the inventory position, 
safety factor, lead time, ordering cost, backlog cost and holding cost. Information 
sharing level (ISL) therefore refers to where along the supply chain the information 
is being shared. This is a strategic decision that needs to be made carefully. Figure 
3.2 shows the three main information sharing levels examined in this study. The 
performance of each of the three ISL strategy is evaluated against the performance of 
a non-information sharing mode (also called the base model). The Non-information 
sharing level (NI) or non-integrated mode represents a supply chain where each 
supply agent acts independently and do not share information with each other. Only 
the order information is passed from a downstream agent to the preceding upstream 
agent. 
 
 
Figure 3.2 Three levels of Information sharing 
3.3.2.3.1 Integration between Retailer and Wholesaler only (RW mode) 
In Figure 3.2a, the RW level is a supply chain where the retailer shares market 
demand information and other related inventory information with the wholesaler. 
The wholesaler in turn uses this information in its inventory decisions. The retailer 
and manufacturer control their inventory as previously described but certain decision 
parameters changes for the wholesaler. Instead of using the installation stock, the 
wholesaler uses the echelon stock instead represented as IP′ as shown in eq. (23). 
The echelon inventory position at the current period t is the sum of the inventory 
position of the agent calculated normally in eq. (5) and that of the retailer computed 
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using eq. (5) as well.  The re-order point also changes to ROP′ as shown in eq. (24) 
while the EOQ computation changes from (18) to (25). 
𝐼𝑃𝑡
′ = 𝐼𝑃𝑡 + 𝐼𝑃𝑥,𝑡       (23)  
𝑅𝑂𝑃𝑡
′ =  𝜇𝑥(𝐿𝑦 + 𝐿 + 2) + 𝑘𝑥𝜎𝑥√𝐿𝑦 + 𝐿 + 2    (24) 
𝐸𝑂𝑄′𝑡 = √
2𝜇(𝑓+𝑓𝑥)(𝑏+ℎ)
𝑏ℎ
      (25) 
Where μx and σx is the average market demand and standard deviation of market 
demand respectively instead of the retailer order since the wholesaler is now privy to 
this information from the retailer. 
3.3.2.3.2 Integration between wholesaler and manufacturer only (WM mode) 
In Figure 3.2b, the WM level represents a supply chain where the wholesaler shares 
its order information including other related inventory information with the 
manufacturer in real time. The manufacturer in turn makes its inventory decision 
based on the information provided by the wholesaler. In this information sharing 
scenario, the retailer of course does not share any information with the wholesaler 
and nobody is privy to market demand information except the retailer alone. Again, 
the decision parameters are not changed for the retailer and wholesaler but that of the 
manufacturer changes in a similar way to the wholesaler in the RW mode. Equations 
(23) and (24) applies to the manufacturer but the lead time of upstream agent (Ly) in 
eq. (24) changes to production lead time (PL) and eq. (25) changes to (26). 
𝐸𝑂𝑄′𝑡 = √
2𝜇𝑥(𝑝+𝑓𝑥)(𝑏𝑥+ℎ𝑥)
𝑏𝑥ℎ𝑥
      (26) 
Where μx is the average retailer order. 
3.3.2.3.3 Integration between retailer, wholesaler and manufacturer (RWM mode) 
Lastly the information sharing mode considered is the RWM mode (Figure 3.2c) 
which is a situation where the wholesaler and the manufacturer are privy to the 
retailer’s market demand information and other related inventory information. The 
manufacturer is also privy to the wholesaler inventory information. The decision 
parameters of the retailer do not change but that of the wholesaler and the 
manufacturer changes. The wholesaler parameters is similar to those in the RW 
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mode and the manufacturer parameters now includes the retailer’s inventory 
information. Therefore, the echelon stock for the manufacturer becomes the 
summation of the inventory position of the manufacturer calculated normally and all 
the downstream agent (wholesaler and retailer) as shown in eq. (27). Equations (24) 
and (25) also changes to (28) and (29) for the manufacturer. 
𝐼𝑃𝑡
′ = 𝐼𝑃𝑡 + ∑ 𝐼𝑃𝑥,𝑡       (27)  
𝑅𝑂𝑃𝑡
′ =  𝜇𝑥(𝐿𝑥 + 𝐿 + 𝑃𝐿 + 3) + 𝑘𝑥𝜎𝑥√𝐿𝑥 + 𝐿 + 𝑃𝐿 + 3   (28) 
𝐸𝑂𝑄′𝑡 = √
2𝜇𝑥(𝑝+𝑓𝑥+𝑓𝑟)(𝑏𝑥+ℎ𝑥)(𝑏𝑟+ℎ𝑟)
(𝑏𝑥ℎ𝑥)(𝑏𝑟+ℎ𝑟)
     (29) 
Where μx and σx in eq. (28) represent the average and standard deviation of retailer 
order respectively while μx and subscript ‘r’ in eq. (29) represent the average market 
demand information and retailer parameter respectively. 
3.4 MODELLING INFORMATION SECURITY BREACH 
This study focuses on information security breach and the effect of a breach is 
conceptualised as a disruption in the flow of information (particularly real time 
market demand information). To understand breach impact, data was sourced from 
the 2012 information security breach survey carried out by Pricewaterhousecoopers 
(PwC). The data was collected and information on the average service disruption 
period caused by the breaches as well as the frequency of occurrence (RoC) was 
extracted. The extracted information was used to create profiles for each breach type 
and this information was incorporated into the simulation model as a deterministic 
model. 
3.4.1 Data Collection and Analysis 
The 2012 information security breach data was obtained from Chris Potter, 
Information Security Partner at PwC, who was involved in carrying out the survey. 
The survey was an online self-select survey with 447 respondent organizations and 
the respondents were security professionals who were in the best position to supply 
security related data.  
The first step to appreciating security breach impact is to understand the nature of the 
breach occurrence. This has been tagged ‘breach profiling’ in this study.  The data 
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extracted from the survey was decomposed to create the profile of each security 
breach type and this is shown in Table 3.2.  From the table, some patterns emerged. 
SFDD has long disruption duration but low occurrence per year while AOW has a 
short disruption period but high occurring frequency. These two represent two 
contrasting breach types. IBMS on other hand has short disruption period like AOW 
but low occurrence rate like SFDD. The only difference between IBMS and PT 
profile is that PT has slightly higher occurrence rate. Therefore from these profiles 
we can begin to understand what singular impact disruption duration would have by 
comparing SFDD with IBMS as both have the same occurrence rate (3/yr) but 
differing disruption length. In the same light we can understand what singular impact 
occurrence rate will have by comparing AOW, IBMS and PT, particularly IBMS and 
PT as there is only a slight increase between these two.   
Breach Type 
Average Disruption 
Length (days) 
Average 
Occurrence/yr 
System Failure and Data 
Corruption  (SFDD) 
5 (Long disruption 
duration) 
3 (Low occurrence 
rate) 
Attack on the Web (AOW) 
1 (Short disruption 
duration) 
54 (High occurrence 
rate) 
Infection by Malicious 
Software (IBMS) 
1 (Short disruption 
duration) 
3 (Low occurrence 
rate) 
Physical Theft of Computer 
Equipment (PT) 
1 (Short disruption 
duration) 
5 (Low occurrence 
rate) 
Table 3.2 Security Breach Profile (Extracted from ISBS 2012) 
3.4.2 The Security breach model  
When a security breach occurs, the information system that allows customers to 
place demand becomes unavailable and the breach disruption duration represents the 
amount of time it takes to rectify the problem caused by the breach. The assumption 
is that the end customer waits till the retailer’s system is restored and places its 
demand. Therefore demand is not actually lost during the disruption period but only 
delayed. During this period the retailer is unable to know what the actual demand 
would be. The retailer then assumes the demand for that day is zero but continues to 
forecast demand based on moving average forecasting technique. The total amount 
of time the retailer is unable to see the real time demand information is equivalent to 
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the disruption duration of the breach. For example, SFDD has an average breach 
duration of 5 days which means the retailer would continue to forecast demand as 
usual but assumes daily demand is zero for the 5-day disruption duration. On the 
sixth day, however, the actual demand information plus that period’s demand 
information becomes available creating a sort of demand increase shock for the 
retailer. The recurrence rate (RoC) represents the number of times this breach occur 
in a year. As this research is interested in understanding the reverberating effect of 
the breach at the retailer on the wholesaler and manufacturer cost performance, the 
breach is modelled to occur at the retailer’s end only. Hence only market demand 
information is inaccessible. It is expected that an order or other inventory 
information can still be communicated, for example over the phone between supply 
agents. Consequently each breach is modelled as a delay in accessing actual demand 
information. It is important to state at this juncture that the cost being investigated in 
this study are those directly related to inventory management and not to other 
functions in the business such as the cost of fixing the problem or the cost to 
reputation or image. This is one of the scope and limitations of the research.  
3.5 THE COMPUTER MODEL 
The next phase of the simulation process is the conversion of the conceptual models 
into a computer readable model. This section is an attempt to show the application of 
Java Programming to the research and not a full description of what Java 
programming is all about. Several books and articles have presented a full 
description of Java programming and offered guide to using it, but the focus here is 
on the application of it. Several commercial software exist that have been used 
extensively in simulation studies. Such commercial software package as Arena, 
Anylogic, Automod etc., have wide application ranging from logistics, 
manufacturing to 3D virtual reality domain (Cimino et al. 2010). However these 
software packages are relatively expensive to purchase which leaves low budget 
users with two options: use an open source simulation programme or develop 
simulation models based on general purpose programming language such as Java, C, 
or C++. The advantage of developing the models using the general purpose language 
is that it affords the user the advantage of creating bespoke models for specific 
applications which commercial software packages or open source software may not 
have.  
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Java is a programming language that affords the user the ability to develop 
programmes that are concurrent, object oriented and class based. Being concurrent 
means codes can be run on any platform without a need for recompiling. This is 
because the compilation of Java applications is typically bytecode (class file) which 
means it can run on any Java virtual machine notwithstanding the type of computer 
architecture. The Java language is accompanied by a standard class library which is 
also referred to as Java Application Programming Interfaces (API) (Lewis et al. 
2013). These APIs have many features, one of which is the ability to interact with 
databases. For this reason, and also budgetary constraints, Java programming was 
used to encode the conceptual model and run the simulation experiments. 
All codes are written inside a class and the result of each experiment is outputted 
into a .txt file which is then converted into an Excel file for further analysis. 
3.5.1 The Class Files 
Each class file contain the description for the non-breach scenario and all the breach 
scenarios described in sections 3.3 and 3.4. All together each class file houses 15 
separate scenarios which are the three ordering options and their respective non-
breached and breached scenarios. Each scenario is run separate from the other by 
using a combination of for() and If() functions. Under each scenario, the 
variables are declared and initialised and when the simulation is complete for a 
particular scenario, the results are outputted into a labelled .txt file. and all the 
variables are re-initialised for the next scenario. Altogether there are 16 class files 
created for modelling the combination of the four supply chain structures and the 
four information sharing levels. All the scenarios created are 240 in total and the 
result from each scenario are converted from the .txt to the Excel file format for 
further analysis. Within each class, the retailer, wholesaler and manufacturer all 
carry out their daily activities as explained in section 3.3 and market demand is 
experienced and fulfilled at the end of the day at the retailer’s end. A breach is 
modelled as a delay in the acquisition of market demand information. 
3.5.2 Demand Generation 
The Math class in Java provides a range of basic mathematical functions including 
random number generation function (Math.random). This function generates a 
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number in the range of 0 to 1 (1 not inclusive) and was used in selecting demand 
values from a normal (or Gaussian) distribution at random.  
A class was created to generate random demand values from a normal distribution 
with mean 10 and standard deviation of 2 for each simulation day (800 in total) 
which is then outputted into a .txt file and labelled accordingly. Different demand 
streams are then generated for all 45 replication scenarios and these streams are 
labelled accordingly. In the computer model, the file containing the generated 
demand stream for the simulation is opened and the demand values are then placed 
in an array. At the end of each day when the retailer is expected to experience market 
demand, the demand value is called from the array where the demand values are 
stored. 
3.6 SIMULATION EXPERIMENT 
This study first examines the performance of the supply chain with no security 
breach under the various scenarios of the three strategic factors: ordering options; 
supply chain structures; and information sharing levels. Each strategic factor is 
evaluated by comparing the performance of the other alternatives to the base factor. 
In this study, ordering option I is considered to be the base factor for evaluating 
ordering option decisions. For supply chain structure, the serial structure (S) is the 
base factor and the non-integrated mode (NI) is the base factor for comparing 
information sharing alternatives. Therefore the base model for comparing all three 
strategic factors is the non-integrated serial supply chain structure with ordering 
option I. All supply chain scenarios considered in this study would have an ordering 
option being used, a supply chain structure and a level of information sharing. The 
combination of these three factors is also referred to as the supply chain condition. In 
other words the supply chain condition refers to the type of ordering option, supply 
chain structure and information sharing level present in any particular supply chain. 
Therefore 48 distinct supply chain conditions are considered in this study and the 
impact of four distinct information security breaches on these scenarios are 
evaluated. Therefore a total of 240 different scenarios are created and evaluated 
altogether as shown in Table 3.3.  
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 Level 
Factor 1 2 3 4 5 
Information Security 
Breach 
No Breach SFDD AOW PT IBMS 
Ordering Options I II III   
Supply chain structure S WH MF NT  
Level of Information 
Sharing 
NI RW WM RWM  
Table 3.3 Design of Experimental Scenarios 
 The values of the simulation parameters for the experiment are shown in Table 3.4. 
These values are derived from Lau et al. (2002 and 2004). The market demand is 
observed at the end of the day and is normally distributed with mean of 10 and a 
standard deviation of 2. The capacity of the manufacturer is 80 and the production 
lead time is 3 days. The assumption is that manufacturer capacity is in use for the 
duration of the production lead time after which it becomes available again, an 
assumption also used in Lau et al. (2004). For instance if the manufacturer is 
committed to producing 80 items at once, then 80 units of capacity is unavailable for 
3 days and any more production orders will have to wait until the production lead 
time is completed. 
Each experiment was run for a total of 800 simulation days and, using time series 
inspection method, the warm up period was determined to be 100 days leaving an 
effective simulation period of 701 days. Using the confidence interval method 
described in Law (2007), the number of replication was determined to be 45 at 98% 
confidence level and the same random number streams were used for each 
experiment to ensure consistency and variance reduction (i.e. reduce randomness 
effect) (Kelton et al., 2010).  
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Parameter Value 
Demand (units) NORM(10,2) 
Demand Arrival End of day 
Production Lead Time 3 days 
Manufacturer Capacity 80 
Transportation Lead time from Wholesaler to Retailer 2 days 
Transportation  Lead time from Manufacturer to 
Wholesaler 
5 days 
Retailer Unit Holding cost, Backlog cost, Ordering cost £5, 10, 5 
Wholesaler Unit Holding cost, Backlog cost, Ordering 
cost 
£3, 10, 5 
Manufacturer Unit Holding cost, Backlog cost, 
Production cost 
£3, 10, 5 
Table 3.4 Simulation parameters 
3.6.1 Performance Measures and Test of Significance 
The cost performance measures used in this study include the holding, backlog and 
ordering cost (similar to Lau et al. 2002), while the service performance measure 
used is the fill rate (commonly used in many studies). The performance measures are 
averaged over the effective simulation period and this is computed for each supply 
agent (the retailer, wholesaler and manufacturer) and the sum of the three cost is 
referred to as the daily average operating cost. The sum of the daily average 
operating cost of all three agents is called the supply chain daily average operating 
cost. The fill rate is only considered at the operating level of each supply chain agent 
but not considered as a performance measure for the supply chain as a whole. The 
average performance under security breach in each scenario is noted and the 
difference in performance level to that of the corresponding non-breach scenario is 
called the breach impact. This impact is expressed as a percentage of the non-breach 
scenario performance.  
To test for significance during result comparison, we employed the Paired-t 
Confidence Intervals for Mean Differences with Bonferroni Correction and standard-
t Confidence Intervals for Mean Differences with Bonferroni Correction at 95% 
confidence level (Law, 2007, Robinson, 2004). It is important to note that while the 
difference between two values may be statistically significant, it does not mean the 
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magnitude of the difference is a huge concern. To help understand the impact of 
information security breach on supply chain performance, the effect of each breach 
on the ordering pattern of the agents in the supply chain is examined. The ordering 
pattern is defined by the frequency of placing an order to the upstream agent and the 
effective average order quantity computed over the ordering days only. In addition 
the singular effect of both element of the breach profile (i.e. disruption duration and 
recurrence rate) is studied to understand how increasing one element affect the 
magnitude and direction (whether positive or negative) of breach impact. Then the 
effect of changing the strategic factors from the base model to the other alternatives 
is examined to determine if any improvement can be obtained. An improvement in 
performance (which should also be statistically significant at p<0.05) would show 
that the alternative strategic factor also holds benefit in a breach scenario. 
3.6.2 Sensitivity Analysis 
Sensitivity analysis, also known as what-if analysis, is a systematic investigation of 
the reaction of the model output to changes in model input and or model structure 
(Kleijnen, 1995). The demand input constitute the only random input in this model 
and since a breach is modelled as a delay and not loss of demand information, the 
demand stream used represents the single most important source of uncertainty. The 
question asked here is; if the variability of the demand stream is increased by two 
fold, what happens to the findings? Does the impact of information security breach 
increase or decrease? And is this change consistent or inconsistent for all supply 
chain scenarios. The assumption in this study is that demand follows a normal 
distribution with mean of 10 and a standard deviation of 2. Therefore to accept that 
the findings in this study are true for any stream of demand, the standard deviation of 
the demand distribution was increased from 2 (low) to 4 (high) to perform a 
sensitivity assessment of the main model (base model) in this study. The result of the 
effect of increasing the standard deviation of the demand distribution from 2 to 4 is 
shown in Table 3.5.  
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Option I Option II Option III 
NB -6% -17% -17% 
AOW -15% -14% -15% 
IBMS -8% -16% -18% 
PT -9% -16% -18% 
SFDD -12% -5% -12% 
Table 3.5 Effect of increased variability in the demand distribution  
The values were obtained by computing the difference between the cost performance 
under low demand variance (2 standard deviation) and high demand variance 
(standard deviation of 4), expressed as a percentage of the former.  A negative sign 
indicates the supply chain daily average operating cost in the high demand variance 
scenario is higher than the low demand variance scenario. Although one would 
expect that a change in the variability of the demand distribution would affect the 
performance of the supply chain as the result reveals, however the consistency in the 
result is of concern here. It can be seen from the result in Table 3.5 that increasing 
the demand variance consistently increases the magnitude of the impact but not the 
direction of the impact for both breach and non-breach scenarios. The consistency in 
the direction of the effect implies that for all 15 scenarios, the observed effect is an 
increase in cost performance and not an increase in some and then a decrease in 
others. Hence the inference drawn from the output of this study using low demand 
variance (standard deviation of 2) is expected to be consistent for any demand stream 
following a normal distribution regardless of the demand variance.  
In a broader sense, the effect of changing the different aspects of the supply chain 
(ordering option, structure and information sharing level) from one alternative to 
another using the design of experiment described in section 3.6 is also a sensitivity 
analysis in itself. 
3.7 VALIDATION AND VERIFICATION 
In simulation modelling, the models developed and used in mimicking real life 
systems or problems need to be verified and validated. Model verification and 
validation needs to be conducted throughout the modelling phase and the 
experimental phase of simulation. According to Sargent (2010 p. 166), model 
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verification is defined as “ensuring that the computer program of the computerized 
model and its implementation are correct” while Cimino et al. (2010 p. 6) adopted 
the following definition for model validation; “the process of determining the degree 
to which a model is an accurate representation of the real world from the perspective 
of the intended use of the model”. The conceptual model, which is a mathematical 
and/or logical model has to be an accurate representation of the real system being 
studied, hence validation is done at this stage to ensure this. Once this is done, the 
computerisation aspect of the modelling process has to be verified to assure that the 
conversion of the conceptual model into a computer model and its implementation is 
correct (Sargent 2010). Lastly, during the experimentation phase the output of the 
simulation experiment has to be validated as well to ensure the result exist within an 
acceptable range of accuracy and to assure the decision maker or users of the 
information of the correctness of the model for the intended use. These validation 
and verification needs to be done to assure the integrity and credibility of the 
simulation model in addressing the objective of the real life system. One commonly 
used method for validation is comparison with other models that have been validated 
in literature.  
3.7.1 Conceptual Model Validation  
The conceptual model used this study has already been validated by previous work 
in literature. Several authors have used the same representation of the three ordering 
policies used in this study. Option I has been used by Cimino et al. (2010), Chatfield 
et al. (2004), and (Agrawal et al., 2009, Bensoussan et al., 2007, Beamon and Chen, 
2001, Chen et al., 2000). Option II was developed by (Axsäter, 1996) and option III 
has been used by Lau et al. (2002). The mathematical representation of the levels of 
integration used in this study was developed and validated by Lau et al. (2002) and 
Lau et al. (2004). Validating the conceptualisation of the supply chain structure is 
rather simple. The three supply chain structures are simplification (WH and MF) and 
networking strategies (NT) being considered as an alternative to the serial type 
structure. The structures are merely a reduction in the number of agents within a tier 
or simply a splitting of orders coming from downstream agents. Reducing the 
number of agents in each tier translate into a single agent (wholesaler in WH 
structure or manufacturer in MF structure) aggregating and fulfilling the orders from 
downstream agents. These type of structures have been studied in the past, however, 
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under different circumstances. The splitting of order is conceptualised in this study 
as equal sharing between agents in the same tier. While it is possible that equal 
splitting may not be agreed to by members in many supply chains, the point is that 
the proportion of split can be made based on the size and level of commitment of the 
supply agents. In this study, the assumption is that all supply agents are of equal size 
and the level of commitment to the chain is the same, which is the case for many 
supply chains.  
The supply chain parameters and assumptions used in this study are similar to the 
ones used in Lau et al (2002) and Lau et al. (2004) and the result of the study is used 
to validate the output in this study.   Here is a summary of all the main assumptions 
made in the supply chain 
 Demand is normally distributed with mean of 10 quantities and a standard 
deviation of 2 
 All the lead times are constant.  
 All members of the supply chain use the same ordering policy 
 If on-order quantity cannot be met with current on hand inventory, then the 
on-hand inventory is shipped and the rest is back ordered leaving the agent 
with zero inventories.  
 Each unfulfilled order is backordered and a shortage or back log cost is 
incurred per unit item including a fixed shortage cost once an order is 
unfilled or partly filled 
 The performance of each tier is seen as an average of the performance of all 
the agents within that tier. 
 Agents in the same echelon use the same sharing mode.  
 The total production capacity at the manufacturer tier is equal to 80 equally 
split between all manufacturers. 
 A unit of production capacity makes a unit of the product for the duration of 
the production lead time.  
 The manufacturer has an unlimited and unfettered supply of raw materials. 
3.7.2 Computer Model Verification 
The programmed model is verified to ensure the implementation of the codes is 
correct. The Java Development Kit (JDK) includes development tools such as Java 
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compiler, Javadoc, Jar and a debugger. The debugger is an excellent tool that aids 
the user in determining programming errors which might affect the output or running 
of the simulation model. In other words it is a useful verification tool (Kleijnen 
1995) that helps to ensure (in part) the integrity of the written programme.  Each 
time there is an error in coding, the java compiler registers an error and the 
programme will not be executed until the error is found and fixed. On the other hand, 
a very useful and widely used verification method is structured walkthrough or 
traces. According to Sargent (2010) traces is defined as following (tracing) the 
behaviours of different types of specific entities through the model to determine if 
the model’s logic is correct and if the necessary accuracy is obtained. In this study, 
each of the 240 scenarios is run for a simulation time of 10 days and the predicted 
result (obtained by manual calculation) is compared with the simulation output. This 
confirmed that the computerised model was properly implemented using the java 
programming language.  
3.7.3 Experimental Output Validation 
Experimental output validation is also known as operational validation. The aim is to 
check if the output of the computerised model exists within the level of accuracy 
required for the model’s intended purpose over the domain of the model’s intended 
applicability. To ensure this accuracy, during the experimentation phase the 
simulation warm up period was determined and the output was computed over the 
effective simulation period which is the total simulation time minus the warm-up 
period. This was done to remove the warm-up effect and ensure that the output was 
determined over a steady state. In addition, a confidence level (98%) was built into 
the result by conducting multiple replications (predetermined to be 45) for each of 
the 240 scenarios (making the total number of experiments 10800). The output for 
each scenario was averaged over the 45 replications meaning the result was 
computed with 98% confidence. 
3.8 ENTROPY ANALYSIS 
Entropy, in information theory, is a measure of the uncertainty associated with a 
random variable. If there are several possible events that may occur and the 
probability of occurrence of each event is known, there exists a conundrum of 
determining how much “choice” is there in the selection or how uncertain one would 
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be of the outcome (Shannon 1948). This “choice” or uncertainty conundrum can be 
measured using Entropy Theory. 
3.8.1 Shannon’s Entropy 
The mathematical definition of entropy as prescribed by Shannon (1948) is a 
quantitative measure of uncertainty (Martínez-Olvera, 2008, Sivadasan et al., , 2002) 
and this is shown in equation (30): 
𝐻(𝑆) = − ∑ 𝑝𝑖  log2 𝑝𝑖                                                                                    (30)
𝑛
𝑖=1
 
H(S) is the entropy level of the system, defined here as the expected amount of 
information needed to describe the state of the system S , and pi is the probability of 
an event i (i=1,....,n) occurring, where 𝑝𝑖 ≥0 and ∑ 𝑝𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1 = 1 
If the probability of each event occurrence within the system, S, are equal, then there 
is more choice (or higher uncertainty) when the number of events, n, increases. This 
means that  𝑝𝑖 = 1/𝑛 and H(S) would be a monotonic function of n, and is 
considered to be the maximum entropy of the system. However if a choice (that is 
one of the possible events) can be decomposed into two successive sub-events, then 
it follows that the total entropy would be a weighted sum of the individual entropy 
values. For instance if the system has possibility of two events a or b occurring, and 
b can be decomposed into events b1 and b2, according to Shannon: 
𝐻(𝑎, 𝑏1, 𝑏2) = 𝐻(𝑎, 𝑏) + 𝑏𝐻 (
𝑏1
𝑏
,
𝑏2
𝑏
)    (31) 
It generally follows that if ‘a’ is the chance/probability that an event will occur and 
‘b’ is the possibility that that event will not occur (i.e. b =1-a) then the first 
expression in eq. (31) becomes: 
𝐻(𝑎, 𝑏) = −(𝑎𝑙𝑜𝑔2𝑎 + 𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑔2𝑏)     (32) 
It also follows that since ‘b’ may occur over several states, b1, b2, b3 …n then the 
second expression in eq. (31) can be rewritten as: 
𝑏𝐻 (
𝑏1
𝑏
,
𝑏2
𝑏
…
𝑏𝑛
𝑏
) = −𝑏(∑ 𝑏𝑖
∗𝑛
𝑖=1 𝑙𝑜𝑔2𝑏𝑖
∗)    (33) 
Where 𝑏𝑖
∗ =
𝑏1
𝑏
,
𝑏2
𝑏
, …
𝑏𝑛
𝑏
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 Therefore the sum of eq. (32) and (33) represents the total entropy (hence the level 
of uncertainty) of the system experiencing an event that has a probability of 
occurrence ‘a’ (with probability of non-occurrence 1-a = b) with the non-occurrence 
probability existing within several countable space (b1, b2, b3 …n). These two 
equations were later adapted by Sivadasan et al 2002 and they called eq. (32) 
operational complexity index (OCI) SINC and eq. (33) they called OCI SNC. These 
two equations were used as a measurement of complexity which derives from 
variation in information and material flow between a supplier and a customer. They 
obtained data from two organizations and measured the variation between sales 
forecast and sales order; sales order and actual dispatch; purchasing forecast and 
purchasing orders; purchasing orders and actual deliveries. These variations were 
sources of uncertainty which result in operational complexities that can be passed on 
from one business to the other (Sivadasan et al. (2002).  Frizelle and Efstathiou 
(2002) explained that high entropy can impede flow by introducing obstacles that 
makes supply chain operations less predictable. By inference, disruption in 
information flow introduces obstacles to the flow of operation and the predictability 
of these disruptions can help evaluate the level of chaos they introduce into the 
system. The argument is that since information security breach can be modelled as a 
disruption in the flow of real time market demand information, the level of entropy 
introduced into the operation can be determined once the probability space of 
disruption occurrence is known.  
Therefore uncertainty can be defined and measured as the deviation from a 
scheduled or planned state which in this study is conceptualised as the performance 
deviation of a breached state from a non-breach state. The approach is to evaluate 
disruption threats using established threat occurrence to work out the level of entropy 
each threat introduces into the system.   
3.8.2 Applying Shannon’s Entropy to Information Security Impact Assessment 
In this study both equation (32) and (33) were adapted where ‘a’ would be the 
probability of a breach not having a negative impact while b is the probability of the 
breach having a negative impact. This negative impact can occur over several 
countable states, which is explained in the following section. The expression in eq. 
(32) is called the “Nature Uncertainty” and that in eq. (33) is tagged the “Extent 
Uncertainty”. The term uncertainty is used interchangeably with entropy through the 
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text. This entropy assessment will help identify those threats that are hot spots to 
guide management decision in selecting appropriate strategy that mitigates the 
impact of information security breach. 
3.8.2.1 Nature Uncertainty 
The uncertainty associated with knowing whether the system is “in-control” or “not-
in-control” is called the nature uncertainty (NU). The in-control state is 
conceptualised as the information security breach not having a negative impact on 
the performance of the supply chain, while a not-in-control state is defined as a 
breach having a negative impact on supply chain performance. Adapting the concept 
in this study, eq. (32) becomes eq. (34), where P is the probability that a breach will 
exist within the in-control state.  
𝐻 (NU) =  −𝑃 log2 𝑃 − (1 − 𝑃)log2(1 − 𝑃)                                             (34) 
H (NU) is the uncertainty associated with not knowing whether there would be a 
negative impact or not, that is the 50/50 chance of a negative impact. The closer the 
probability (P) of in-control (i.e. no negative impact observed) is to 50%, the closer 
NU is to the maximum value, 1. Also the further the probability of in-control  is 
from 50% either increasing or decreasing, the closer NU is to 0. Hence the lower the 
NU score the more certain you are of either experiencing a negative impact or not, 
the higher the score the less certain you are.  
3.8.2.2 Extent Uncertainty 
The second expression of uncertainty is the extent uncertainty (EU) which is the 
uncertainty associated with the existence of the system in several not-in-control 
states. In other words, EU is the uncertainty of knowing the number of countable 
states the negative impact can occur in, given that the system is not-in-control. This 
is shown in equation (35), where pi* is the conditional probability computed over the 
“not in control” state with states i (i=1,..., n).  
𝐻(𝐸𝑈) = −(1 − 𝑃)(∑ 𝑝𝑖
∗𝑛
𝑖=1 𝑙𝑜𝑔2𝑝𝑖
∗)    (35) 
This index is a measure of the amount of information needed to monitor the extent to 
which the system is not in control i.e. the extent of negative impact. Higher scores 
occur when the impact is spread over several countable states, and lesser scores 
occur over fewer countable states. Consequently the higher the probability of 
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experiencing a negative impact over just one single state or non at all, the closer EU 
is to 0. NU cannot exceed 1 but EU can exceed 1 depending on the spread of impact.  
3.8.2.3 Total Uncertainty 
The total uncertainty or entropy (TE) is the sum of nature uncertainty and extent 
uncertainty and this is used in this study’s assessment. It follows that the higher the 
TE, the higher the uncertainty introduced by the breach into the system and hence 
the more the associated information needed to manage the system and vice versa. 
The concept of Entropy has been adapted in this study to reflect the level of 
uncertainty created by disruptive threat in a supply chain.  
3.8.3 The Entropy Assessment Methodology 
Simulation approach allows the user to develop a computerised version of the real 
system in order to investigate the impact of certain variables on the system which 
may be difficult to assess in real life. The computerised version is then run under 
different scenarios (experimentation). The output of each scenario is usually 
averaged over a number of replication, predetermined to ensure that the output falls 
within certain level of confidence. In other words the mean output is a mean 
aggregate of the output of each replication. Consequently the output of each 
replication is important in determining mean output of a particular system. It stands 
to reason that the uncertainty associated with the state of a system (in this case the 
mean output) is a function of the uncertainty associated with the member states of 
that system (in this case output of each replication). In this study the performance of 
the supply chain under a breach scenario is under study and for a 98% confidence 
level in the result, the simulation had to be conducted with 45 replications. In other 
words 45 different demand scenarios were created and the impact of the breach was 
determined to be the average of all 45 scenarios. In the entropy analysis, each of the 
45 demand scenarios were used and the steps are outlined below with Table 3.6 
representing an illustration of the computation using the manufacturer’s average 
backlog performance as an example:  
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Replication Difference 
in quantity 
(n-BS minus 
BS) 
Replication Difference 
in quantity 
(n-BS 
minus BS) 
Bin Frequency 
(f) 
1 0 24 0 10 0 
2 0 25 0 8 0 
3 0 26 0 6 0 
4 1 27 0 4 0 
5 0 28 0 2 8 
6 1 29 0 0 37 
7 0 30 0 -2 0 
8 0 31 1 -4 0 
9 0 32 0 -6 0 
10 0 33 1 -8 0 
11 0 34 0 -10 0 
12 0 35 0 -12 0 
13 0 36 1 -14 0 
14 0 37 0 -16 0 
15 0 38 0 -18 0 
16 0 39 0 -20 0 
17 0 40 0 -22 0 
18 0 41 1   
19 1 42 0   
20 0 43 1   
21 0 44 0   
22 0 45 1   
23 0     
Table 3.6 The Manufacturer average backlog performance example 
a) Determine Breach Impact 
From the experimental result, the impact of a breach on each supply chain 
performance indices, average backlog quantity and on-hand inventory, is first 
established for each supply chain member/agent by computing the difference 
between the operational performance of each agent in the non-breach scenario (i.e. 
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system under control) and that in the corresponding breach scenario (i.e. system not-
in-control). The performance measure used here is the quantity measure instead of 
the cost measure to enhance the generalisability of the finding. For instance the 
impact on average backlog quantity was used instead of average backlog cost. 
Comparison is between same agent in both scenarios i.e. manufacturer in the breach 
scenario (BS) and manufacturer in the non-breach scenario (n-BS). The breach 
impact is construed as the daily average performance measure of an agent in the non-
breach scenario minus that in the breach scenario. A positive difference indicates 
there is reduction in average quantity when breach occurs and negative indicates 
there is increase in average quantity when breach occurs. This information for the 
manufacturer’s daily average backlog quantity can be found in column two of Table 
3.6. Only the average backlog quantity and on-hand inventory is used in this 
analysis. The average ordering quantity is not included in this analysis as the impact 
of information security breach on it is not large enough to warrant such analysis. 
b) Determine the Countable States of  Negative Impact 
Once the impact of the breach under each replication is determined, the difference is 
categorised into bins (which is also referred to as states). According to Sivadasan et 
al. (2002), these states must be carefully selected and should represent a significant 
variation from one state to another. Therefore this study conceived that since the 
average daily demand follows a normal distribution with an acceptable standard 
deviation (SD) of 2, any deviation above 2 would amount to an aberration which 
upsets the system. Consequently, the states are determined to be in increment of 2. 
Simply put, the standard deviation modelled into the demand distribution is used as 
the state differentiator. Therefore each bin is an increment of 2 quantities. This is 
shown in the fifth column of Table 3.6. 
c) Determine the frequency of occurrence of each state 
After creating the bin states, the number of replications whose quantity difference 
exist within each state is counted and written down. Since risk assessment is 
generally based on the negative impact of threat, all states in the positive range is 
considered to be an in-control state and all negative states are considered to be not-
in-control state. 
d) Compute the probability of in-control and not-in-control 
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The total number of replications existing within the in-control state is determined 
and divided by the total number of replications. Using the example in Table 3.6; 
No. of In-control replications (NIC) = 45 
No. of Not-in-control replications (NNIC) = 0 
Probability of In-control, P(NIC)  = NIC/Total No. of Replication = 45/45= 1 
Probability of Not-in-control, P(NNIC)  = 1-Probability of In-control= 1-1= 0 
Probability of state i, pi = f(i)/ Total No. of Replication 
Where f(i) is the number of replications existing within state i  
and i = (10,8,6,4,2,0,-2,-4,-6,-8,-10) 
e) Compute H(NU) and H(EU) 
Applying eq. (34) to the example yields H(NU)= 0 indicating that the uncertainty of 
knowing whether the breach impact on manufacturer’s daily average backlog 
performance will be negative or positive is nil. Consequently, one is more certain 
that future breach impact will not be negative under similar supply chain condition. 
The computation for H(EU) using eq. (35) also yielded zero. Since no negative state 
was found, it suffice to say that the uncertainty associated with knowing the extent of 
negative impact is zero which means one is quite certain that the extent of negative 
impact of future breach occurrence of that specific breach type will be zero since no 
negative impact was found in all 45 scenarios. 
The total entropy (TE) of the system is H(NU) + H(EU) = 0, which implies that little 
or no amount of information is needed to control the outcome of the impact of this 
particular breach on manufacturer’s daily average backlog performance in the future, 
provided the breach type exist within the current breach profile. However it is 
important to note that the profile of information security breach may change as the 
level of sophistication of perpetration increases, and this might affect the dynamics 
of its impact. Therefore this sort of analysis should be done regularly to see if the 
profile has changed and if the information needed to control the impact should be 
increased.   
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This analysis was carried out for each performance measure (in terms of average 
daily quantity) for each supply chain agent and the aggregate of the total entropy for 
each supply chain agent was computed to give the supply chain total entropy level. 
3.8.4 Determining the Maximum Number of States 
From past literature, it is known that maximum entropy occurs when the probability 
of each state (i) are the same over the number of states, n, (Shannon 1948). 
Therefore, entropy is a monotonic function of n such that 𝐻(𝐸𝑈) = log2 𝑛 is the 
maximum entropy. The following condition therefore applies: 
0 ≤ 𝐻(𝐸𝑈) ≤ log2 𝑛 
On the other hand the maximum of H(NU) is 1 as it a classical example of entropy 
with two equal possibilities (Shannon 1948).  
Consequently the maximum total entropy is 𝑇𝐸 = max 𝐻(𝑁𝑈) + max 𝐻(𝐸𝑈) and 
the following condition applies: 0 ≤ 𝑇𝐸 ≤ 1 + log2 𝑛 
It is important to note here that the larger the n, the greater the maximum entropy, 
therefore n should be chosen within reason. For some systems, determining n is quite 
straightforward. For example, the outcome of throwing a pair of dice may take one 
of 36 possible combinations. The number of states is straight forward in this 
example, 36 states. However, for others it may require well informed subjective 
judgement or case specific information. It is particularly difficult for security impact 
studies as the profile of a breach may become worse than anticipated and as such 
create a very wide difference which may not be covered within the predetermined 
states. For instance if the maximum state for the negative impact is predefined as 
between -10 and -12 (i.e. max n=5) and, due to an increase in the level of 
sophistication, the same breach at a future date creates a surprise increase in 
performance quantity of 15, then maximum n would need to be recalculated based on 
this new possibility. Finding the generic or universal n is beyond the scope of this 
study, but is determined within reason based on the output of the simulation 
experiments. The author agrees with the following statement given by Carter (2011): 
“We shouldn't expect to be able to come up with a single universal measure of 
complexity. The best we are likely to have is a measuring system useful by a 
particular observer, in a particular context, for a particular purpose.” 
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Therefore maximum n was selected after all replications of the different 192 breach 
scenarios had been carried out. The replication showing the largest variation in 
performance quantity was used to set max n= 11 and the size of the variation was 21. 
This was done to preserve the generalisability of the analysis for all security breach 
considered in this study. It is therefore admitted that while the severity of 
information security breach may significantly increase over the years, each assessor 
must revisit the decision for n and find one that is most suited for the current 
situation.  
Recall that the higher the total entropy the more information is needed to manage or 
control future breach occurrence. High entropy systems require more information 
than low entropy systems. However for managers, this analysis should be able to 
inform the decision of what to do if entropy is high or low or even medium. A 
classification system would be useful to help managers decide what the “appropriate 
action” to take given their uncertainty status. “Action” in this context would be to 
either increase or decrease their monitoring and control effort for each breach type 
and corresponding inventory management operations, while the term “appropriate” 
in this context means ‘to what monitoring and control level’? 
3.8.5 Entropy Categorisation 
 If a small proportion of the total number of replication outputs a negative breach 
impact (i.e. not-in-control), then the possibilities or choices are less in comparison to 
when the proportion of not-in-control are greater. It is therefore necessary to create a 
classification of the range of choices to help practitioners determine if any actions 
are needed and to what extent the action needs to be carried out. Let x be the number 
of replications that are in control when a breach occurs (i.e. no negative breach 
impact occurred) and let y be number of replications that are in the not-in-control 
state (i.e. negative impact occurred), y = 45-x. It follows that there are 46 different 
combinations of (x,y) that may occur as shown in Table 3.7. Each combination is 
referred to as an outcome. C1 represents the outcome where all of the 45 replications 
do not output a negative breach impact while C46 represents the outcome where all 
45 replications output a negative breach impact. Due to the fact that y may occur in 
any of the 11 states that was already predetermined, the maximum TEn=11 was 
determined for each combination and the result is shown in Table 3.7. Therefore the 
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maximum entropy that any of the 46 combinations can attain, given that n=11, is 
3.57 represented by combinations C42 and C43. 
 Possible Outcomes 
 C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C6 C7 C8 C9 C10 
x 45 44 43 42 41 40 39 38 37 36 
y 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Max 
TE 
0.00 0.15 0.31 0.46 0.61 0.76 0.91 1.06 1.21 1.36 
            C11 C12 C13 C14 C15 C16 C17 C18 C19 C20 
x 35 34 33 32 31 30 29 28 27 26 
y 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 
Max 
TE 
1.50 1.65 1.75 1.85 1.95 2.04 2.14 2.23 2.33 2.42 
           
 C21 C22 C23 C24 C25 C26 C27 C28 C29 C30 
x 25 24 23 22 21 20 19 18 17 16 
y 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 
Max 
TE 
2.51 2.60 2.69 2.76 2.83 2.90 2.96 3.03 3.09 3.15 
           
 C31 C32 C33 C34 C35 C36 C37 C38 C39 C40 
x 15 14 13 12 11 10 9 8 7 6 
y 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 
Max 
TE 
3.21 3.27 3.32 3.37 3.41 3.45 3.48 3.51 3.53 3.55 
           
 C41 C42 C43 C44 C45 C46     
x 5 4 3 2 1 0     
y 40 41 42 43 44 45     
Max 
TE 
3.57 3.57 3.57 3.56 3.54 3.46     
Table 3.7 The maximum entropy of each possible outcome 
It is clear from the result that max TE increases as y increases or as x decreases.  
Consequently the classification of the amount of choice present is done using y (the 
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number of replications outputting a negative impact or simply not-in-control state) 
and the corresponding entropy categorisation is done using the maximum TE values.  
Ideally one would prefer that the impact of information security breach on daily 
average performance should be minimal. In other words the negative impact (i.e. 
variation of the average on-hand inventory or backlog quantity) should not be more 
than one standard deviation (SD = 2 in this case). This means that the variation 
should exist within only one state (n=1). A variation of 2SD (which equals 4 units) 
would be considered a low impact and this means any negative impact may span 
over two countable states (i.e. n=2). A variation of 3SD is considered moderate or 
medium impact (with spread over 3 states, n=3) and above 4SD is considered high 
(with n=4) Therefore total entropy values existing within the Max TE values when 
n=1 is considered nil; n=2 is considered low; and n= 3 is considered medium and n ≥ 
4 is categorised as high. From the maximum entropy estimation for this study over 
these states, the categories of uncertainty level is classified as follows: 
 Level of Uncertainty 
 Low  Medium High 
Total Entropy values 0.01 - 1.00 1.01 - 1.59 1.6-3.57 
Rating 1 2 3 
 
To obtain the uncertainty level for each supply agent, the mean of the rating of the 
average on-hand inventory and average backlog quantity for each agent is computed, 
rounded to the nearest whole number. The corresponding uncertainty rating for each 
agent is classified as low, medium and high as explained above. This classification 
and rating is done for all the 192 supply chain scenarios. 
3.9 SUMMARY OF STUDY APPROACH 
In practice, several alternatives of a specific strategic factor exist and some 
alternatives give better operational benefit than others. It is therefore worthwhile for 
supply chains to consider adopting the more promising alternative. However because 
a particular alternative offers benefit in one supply chain does not necessarily mean 
it holds benefit in another. Again, the purported benefit may however be short lived 
when the information system used to leverage business activities is compromised by 
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information security breach. Therefore an investigation of whether it would be 
suitable to one’s supply chain is required, especially in the event of a security breach. 
Therefore this study aims to understand, the effect of changing from one alternative 
strategy to another and the effect of making more than one strategic decision. This 
effect is investigated under a breach and non-breach scenario to understand whether 
the effect of a particular strategic factor (or combination of factors) exacerbates or 
mitigates the impact of information security breach on supply chain inventory 
management performance. 
 Simulation modelling is a cost effective approach of investigating the effect of 
various factors and alternatives on supply chain performance. Its application has to 
be carefully considered to ensure it is an accurate representation of the real system. 
To achieve this, verification and validation is required throughout the life cycle of 
the simulation model. Simulation modelling is accomplished by developing 
conceptual models of the real system or problem entity, which is then converted into 
computer models in order to perform different experiments on the said model. The 
output of the simulation experiments is then analysed and inferences can be drawn. 
 The output of the breach scenario is compared to the output of the non-breach 
counterpart, and the ensuing percentage difference is termed breach impact. This 
breach impact is a direct cost impact assessment.  
Apart from the direct cost impact information security breach has on the supply 
chain inventory management performance, these breaches also introduce 
uncertainties in the supply chain. These uncertainties make it difficult to ascertain 
what future breach impact would be on the supply chain and hence might affect 
future performance of the supply chain. Due to the uncertainties associated with 
information security breach impact the supply chain decision of which alternative 
strategy to adopt should not be made on only direct cost impact alone. Although 
some alternative strategies may offer benefit to the supply chain, it is not clear how 
the uncertainty level of the breach increases or decreases in the new structure. This 
study posits that any change in breach impact uncertainty level will produce a 
corresponding change in the level of monitoring and review required in the supply 
chain and this has cost implication. It is therefore imperative that the decision to 
change from one alternative to another should not only be based on direct impact 
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cost assessment but also on the indirect cost implication that changing uncertainty 
level represent. This study therefore incorporates the uncertainties of breach impact 
in making a final decision.   
The entropy assessment described in section 3.8 above is one of the contributions of 
this study. While entropy has been used as an assessment tool in certain studies 
(Sivadasan et al. 2002; Martinez-Olvera 2008; Airoldi et al. 2011), this entropy 
assessment methodology is novel in its application to information security impact 
studies. The framework thus developed (explained in Chapter 6) demonstrates that 
using a direct cost impact assessment could be misleading and it is imperative to also 
include an indirect cost impact assessment to get a complete picture. This would help 
supply chain managers make the right strategic decisions that are robust both in non-
breach and breached situations.  
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Chapter 4 INFLUENCE OF INFORMATION INTEGRATION AND SUPPLY 
STRUCTURE ON SUPPLY CHAIN PERFORMANCE IN A NON-BREACH 
SCENARIO 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
Several studies have examined the role of information sharing on supply chain 
performance. Other studies have looked at the performance of the supply chain under 
varying levels of information sharing (Chan and Chan, 2009, Yang et al., 2011, Lau 
et al., 2002, Lau et al., 2004) but this has largely been based on one ordering policy. 
It is however difficult to ascertain the relative performance of different ordering 
policies under various information sharing levels from past studies because each 
study was based on different supply chain conditions. A study where the various 
ordering policies are compared to one another under various information sharing 
scenarios would provide a more substantive means of comparison. Therefore each 
ordering policy has to be subject to the same supply chain conditions to obtain any 
meaningful comparison.  
This study goes even a step further and examines this performance under various 
supply chain structures. Certain structures by themselves gives operational advantage 
to certain supply chain members and when this is combined with information 
sharing, the resultant effect to supply chain members may be positive or negative. 
Some have looked at structure separately (Beamon and Chen, 2001, Mills, 2004, Xu 
et al., 2010) and others information sharing separately (Bourland et al., 1996, Lau et 
al., 2002, Lau et al., 2004). It has not been specifically established in past studies 
how supply chain structure interacts with information sharing. This study aims to fill 
that gap. It is important for supply chain members to know how their operation will 
be affected in any information sharing scenario so that proper incentives can be put 
in place to foster existing or newly formed partnerships.   
4.1.1 Brief Description of the Three Strategic Factors and Their Alternatives 
Information sharing (also termed information integration or simply integration in this 
thesis) is conceptualised as an upstream agent privy to the demand and other related 
inventory information of a downstream agent such as the inventory position, safety 
factor, lead time, ordering cost, backlog cost and holding cost. Information sharing 
level (ISL) therefore refers to where along the supply chain the information is being 
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shared. The Non-information sharing level (NI) or non-integrated mode represents a 
supply chain where each supply agent acts independently and does not share 
information. The RW level is a supply chain where the retailer shares market 
demand information and other related inventory information with the wholesaler. 
The wholesaler in turn uses this information in its inventory decisions. The WM 
level represents a supply chain where the wholesaler shares its order information 
including other related inventory information with the manufacturer in real time. The 
manufacturer in turn makes its inventory decision based on the information provided 
by the wholesaler. In this information sharing scenario, the retailer of course does 
not share any information with the wholesaler. Lastly the information sharing mode 
considered is the RWM mode which is a situation where the wholesaler and the 
manufacturer are privy to the retailer’s market demand information and other related 
inventory information. The manufacturer is also privy to the wholesaler inventory 
information.  
The supply chain structure has been defined in this study as a reflection of a singular 
organisation, be it wholesaler or manufacturer, serving more than one upstream 
and/or downstream agent as explained earlier in section 3.3.2.2. The first structure, 
also considered the base structure, is a serial structure where each supply chain agent 
is being served by and is serving a single upstream and downstream agent 
respectively. The wholesaler (WH) and manufacturer (MF) structures are considered 
to be a form of simplification at the wholesaler tier and the manufacturer tier 
respectively. The last structure considered in this study is a network structure (NT) 
which is a risk sharing strategy (also called networking strategy) that entails a supply 
chain with multiple agents in each tier of the supply chain serving and being served 
by two supply agents.  
This study compares three different ordering policies (also called ordering options) 
under the same supply chain conditions. Option I is the base stock policy, which is a 
parameter based policy where the order quantity is determined by the difference 
between two decision parameters (inventory position and order-up-to level). Option 
II is the optimal stochastic EOQ model which is a form of batch ordering policy 
where the order quantity is not determined by the difference between two decision 
parameters but computed separately when a decision point is reached (i.e. when 
inventory position falls below re-order point). Option III is a combination of the 
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other two, and it is a modified base stock policy with an additional element called a 
simple non-optimal stochastic EOQ component. The order quantities generated by 
the three policies are not fixed but variable in nature and have been discussed in 
greater details in Chapter three. This sort of comparison based on a combination of 
different ordering policies, supply chain structures plus the extent of information 
sharing is missing in literature and this study fills that gap.  
4.1.2 Research Motivation and Questions 
This study is important so as to create a more holistic understanding to information 
sharing benefit. The effect of supply chain structure coupled with the extent of 
information sharing is expected to be different in magnitude as well as direction 
(whether positive or negative) for each supply chain agent depending on the ordering 
option of choice. Many studies have reported that information sharing does not 
provide benefit to some agents and others in the same supply chain are benefited 
(Yao and Dresner, 2008, Lau et al., 2002, Yu et al., 2002) and the reason for this 
discrepancy is not fully understood or at the least has not been shown but is believed 
to be due to the operating conditions of the supply chain. This study also aims to 
provide an answer to this question by confirming that the condition of the supply 
chain (structure and ordering policy type) is a factor to consider in information 
sharing decisions. The main question here is how does information sharing; supply 
chain structure; and ordering policy interact and what influence do these interactions 
have on supply chain performance? However this question can be decomposed into 
the following questions to paint a fuller picture: 
 Question 1a: Given the same supply chain conditions, how does a batch ordering 
policy perform against a parameter based ordering policy, and how does the 
combined policy fare against the individual ordering policy types? 
Question 1b: How does supply chain structural reconfiguration alone affect the 
performance of the three ordering policies mentioned?  
Question 1c: Considering the simplification strategy, where along the supply chain 
should simplification be carried out, at the wholesaler tier or at the manufacturer 
tier? 
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Question 1d: Which strategy offers more benefit, the simplification strategy or the 
networking strategy?  
Question 1e: How does varying the level of information alone affect the performance 
of the three ordering policies mentioned? 
Question 1f: What is the interaction effect of supply chain structure and information 
sharing level on batch ordering, parameter based and the combined ordering 
policies? 
It should be noted that this study serves as a benchmark for evaluating the impact of 
information security breach on supply chain performance, which is one of the 
primary aims of this thesis. This is discussed in the next chapter. However the 
answer to the above questions has been elusive in previous studies and they can help 
inform supply chain managers on the counter-intuitiveness of certain combinations 
of strategic factors. This understanding will help businesses make better strategic 
decisions on supply chain configuration, ordering policy, and information sharing. 
 4.1.3 Structure of Chapter 
This chapter examines the influence of information sharing under various supply 
chain conditions in a non-security breach scenario. The structure of this chapter is 
shown below.  
 
Section 4.2 examines the behaviour and performance of all three ordering options in 
a serial supply chain without information sharing. This behaviour is examined 
according to the ordering pattern and the bullwhip effect inherent in each ordering 
policy and this serves as the base study. Section 4.3 then examines the effect of 
changing the structure of the supply chain from the serial type (base model) to the 
Section 
4.2
• Ordering Policy
Section 
4.3
• Ordering Policy & Supply Chain Structure
Section 
4.4
• Ordering Policy & Information Sharing Level
Section 
4.5
• Ordering Policy & Supply Chain Structure & Information Sharing 
Level
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other structure types, WH; MF and NT structures. Each structure is analysed to 
understand how the behaviour of each ordering policy is changed and the implication 
to supply chain performance and prioritisation. In section 4.4 the effect of engaging 
in varying levels of information sharing on the ordering pattern and bullwhip effect 
is examined. The implication to supply chain performance is then discussed. The 
subsequent section 4.5 begins to look at the influence of varying level of information 
sharing under different supply chain structures. In other words the interacting effect 
of information sharing and supply chain structure on the performance of each 
ordering policy is examined. This section examines the influence of RW, WM and 
RWM respectively on all supply chain structures under all three ordering policy 
scenarios and presents a summary of the result along with the implication to supply 
chain priorities.  
The output of the simulation experiments is averaged over the 45 replications to give 
the average daily performance in terms of holding cost, backlog cost, and ordering 
cost under each information sharing scenario. The average fill rate is obtained by 
dividing the average order quantity sent to the downstream agent by the average 
order quantity placed by the same downstream agent. For each supply chain agent 
the daily average holding cost, backlog cost and ordering cost is added to give the 
daily operational cost and the operational cost of each agent is aggregated to give the 
supply chain total operational cost. This result can be found in Appendix 4.1. 
However for the purpose of discussion in this chapter the operational cost and the 
supply chain cost has been extracted from Appendix 4.1 and presented in Table 4.1.
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  Daily Average Operating cost (£) 
  Option I Option II Option III 
  Retailer Wholesaler Manufacturer SC 
Total 
Retailer Wholesaler Manufacturer SC 
Total 
Retailer Wholesaler Manufacturer SC 
Total 
NI BC 194.90 112.69 89.40 396.99 120.00 86.81 102.96 309.77 106.68 79.72 113.50 299.90 
WH 199.00 112.42 84.66 396.08 123.69 79.85 95.62 299.16 105.27 70.73 108.45 284.45 
MF 194.80 112.01 79.52 386.34 123.36 87.12 89.83 300.30 107.79 79.49 106.80 294.08 
NT 198.89 114.89 84.78 398.56 124.70 82.81 90.06 297.56 105.65 73.73 108.37 287.74 
RW BC 171.34 92.27 92.15 355.76 113.85 82.99 105.27 302.12 108.73 80.67 98.71 288.11 
WH 171.41 86.74 89.94 348.09 113.81 78.45 108.58 300.84 108.45 75.82 97.80 282.07 
MF 171.25 91.35 84.76 347.35 115.43 82.88 93.97 292.28 109.67 80.56 85.60 275.82 
NT 184.23 106.10 90.07 380.39 127.64 99.80 94.47 321.91 115.11 87.82 91.91 294.83 
WM BC 198.73 116.25 77.53 392.51 121.79 87.48 95.28 304.55 113.85 85.19 85.52 284.57 
WH 200.58 113.92 73.74 388.24 124.04 79.72 92.06 295.83 110.56 75.03 81.33 266.92 
MF 200.20 117.14 68.68 386.03 127.27 89.71 88.75 305.72 116.77 86.44 82.16 285.37 
NT 202.06 117.96 72.67 392.70 125.90 83.49 89.53 298.91 113.06 79.94 82.66 275.67 
RWM BC 155.57 78.77 79.65 313.99 114.22 81.81 91.26 287.29 109.92 81.31 86.46 277.70 
WH 153.23 70.35 80.00 303.59 113.93 76.16 91.83 281.93 109.18 75.64 86.04 270.87 
MF 155.91 78.51 69.60 304.01 116.32 81.98 82.63 280.92 110.33 80.98 77.74 269.05 
NT 169.34 94.12 76.33 339.79 129.81 101.17 84.81 315.79 116.09 88.48 83.36 287.92 
Table 4.1 Supply chain performance under various supply chain scenarios 
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4.2 COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE PERFORMANCE OF THE 
THREE ORDERING POLICIES IN A SERIAL SUPPLY CHAIN SCENARIO 
Under the non-integrated serial supply chain mode, the cost performance behaviour 
of each agent in the option I-supply chain is similar for all supply chain structures 
considered. The pattern is that the daily operating cost of the retailer is highest 
followed by that of the wholesaler and the manufacturer experienced the least cost. 
However, the pattern is different under options II and III. Here the daily operating 
cost is highest at the retailer but lowest at the wholesaler while the manufacturer has 
the median cost performance. Consequently option II and III have a similar trend for 
all examined supply chain structures while option I has a different one. This trend 
according to Table 4.1 appear to differ for each ordering policy based on the level of 
information sharing within the supply chain and the structure of the chain. To 
understand the anatomy of the difference in behaviour, each ordering policy is 
looked at more closely. To do this, an analysis of the ordering pattern is done 
coupled with a bullwhip effect analysis.  
4.2.1 Ordering Pattern Anatomy of the Three Ordering Policies in a Serial 
Chain Structure (Base Model) 
The ordering pattern has been defined in this study as a combination of the ordering 
rate (OR) and effective average order quantity (EAOQ) of each ordering policy. The 
ordering rate is expressed as a percentage and represents the portion of the number of 
days an order is placed against the total number of simulation days. For instance, a 
value of 100 shows that an order is placed 100% of the time, which means that an 
order is placed to the upstream member every day. A value of 50 means that an order 
is placed on the number of days that is equivalent to half the total simulation time of 
701 days.  The EAOQ on the other hand is the total order quantity divided by the 
actual ordering days. As a simple illustration, say 1000 units were made in total and 
the number of ordering days were 500 out of 701 total simulation days, then the 
average order quantity would be 1000/701. However the EAOQ would be 1000/500. 
Appendix 4.2 presents the percentage of time an order is placed (ordering rate) and 
the effective average order quantity for each supply chain agent under all examined 
supply chain scenarios.  
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In the methodology chapter it has been established that option I places an order 
whenever the inventory position falls below the re-order point, the quantity of which 
is equivalent to the difference between the order-up-to level (also re-order level) and 
the inventory position. From the ordering pattern result in Appendix 4.2 under the 
non-information sharing serial supply chain scenario (i.e. the base model) the order 
quantity for the retailer averages 9.98 which is less than the average demand quantity 
of 10. This means that the inventory position more often than not would be less than 
the re-order point prompting a daily order placement. The results suggest a 100% 
ordering rate which confirms that the retailer places an order every day. This of 
course would mean that the fill rate of the retailer would be low and consequently 
the backlog cost would be high. Since order quantity is not able to sufficiently satisfy 
demand, the expectation is that the holding inventory will be very low or near zero as 
there is constantly a demand that needs to be fulfilled. The result in Appendix 4.1 
confirms this with the retailer fill rate very low (at 45%) and the backlog cost high 
(at £140). The holding cost for the retailer is near zero at £0.02. A similar 
observation is seen at the wholesaler and the manufacturer where the respective 
effective average order quantity is lower than the order from the downstream agent. 
Therefore the ordering rate is the same for all supply chain agents at 100% but the 
average effective order quantity decreases slightly as one goes upstream the supply 
chain. 
For option II however, the order quantity is equivalent to the amount determined by 
a dynamic optimal EOQ model which is larger than that determined in the option I 
scenario. This quantity is large enough to better satisfy initial demand and raise the 
inventory position. Raising the inventory position implies that there would be less 
number of times the inventory position is lower than the re-order point. Therefore, 
orders would be placed less frequently and the inventory holding cost would be 
higher than in the option I scenario but the cumulative fixed ordering cost would be 
much lower. In addition the fill rate performance is expected to be higher under 
option II than in option I and consequently the backlog cost should be lower. From 
the result in Appendix 4.1, this expectation is confirmed to be true. Interestingly, the 
ordering rate decreases as one goes up the chain and the average effective order 
quantity significantly increases. This scale of increase in effective order quantity as 
one goes up the chain is high enough to create external economies of scale which 
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translates into an improvement in operational efficiency at the manufacturer. 
Therefore the manufacturer is able to enjoy a reduction in daily average inventory 
holding cost that would have otherwise been high considering the size of the 
wholesaler orders to it. The consequence of this again is that the backlog cost would 
then be higher than anticipated. Hence the fill rate performance of the manufacturer 
in option II (92%) is less than that in option I (95%) meaning the daily average 
backlog cost in Option II (£9) is higher than that in option I (£5). This would have 
been the other way round if not for the scale increase effect. 
Option III is an extension of option I (the base stock policy) with the addition of the 
simple EOQ component to its order quantity determination. This quantity is larger 
than the quantity in option I but less than that in option II. Therefore, orders would 
be placed less frequently in option III than in option I but more frequently than in 
option II. Consequently inventory holding cost would be higher under option III than 
in the option I scenario, but less than the option II scenario and the cumulative fixed 
ordering cost would be lower in option III than in option I but higher than the option 
II scenario. However the holding inventory for the manufacturer in option III is 
higher than in option II. This has been explained in the previous paragraph. The 
reason is because the scale increase effect was observed at the manufacturer under 
option II but not under option III as the order size is not large enough to create this 
effect in option III. This effect in option II is however large enough to ensure better 
daily average inventory holding cost performance in option II than in option III. 
Option III appears to be in between option I and option II in terms of the ordering 
pattern performance and the fill rate performance under this option is better than the 
other two ordering options. This suggests that the balance between the ordering rate 
and the EAOQ in option III creates a better balance between how much is ordered 
against how much is being demanded making it the best cost performer of the three 
ordering options.  
In summary, option I is such that the ordering rate is high and the EAOQ is low and 
this is classed as a Case-1 ordering state. Option II is such that the ordering rate is 
low and the EAOQ is high and this is classed as a Case-2 ordering state. 
Comparatively, option II (£310) performed better than option I (£397) which means 
Case-2 scenario is more desirable than Case-1 scenario under normal circumstances. 
Option III, however, has median ordering rate and median average effective order 
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quantity existing between the Case-1 and Case-2 ordering states. This state appear to 
be the nearer-optimal state making it the best overall cost performer (£300) of the 
three ordering policy. 
4.2.2 Anatomy of the Bullwhip Effect in a Non-Integrated Serial Chain 
Structure (Base model) 
The bullwhip effect has been described in literature as an amplification of order 
variance which increases as one goes from the demand side to the supply side 
(Sterman, 1989, Lee et al., 1997, Lee et al., 2004). The order quantity variance of 
each supply agent for all the examined supply chain scenarios is computed in MS 
Excel and shown in Appendix 4.3. The result in Appendix 4.3 reveals that under the 
non-information sharing scenario, the order variance increases as one goes from the 
downstream demand side to the upstream supply side and this was found for all three 
ordering policies. The implication of the bullwhip effect from past literature is that 
upstream agents tend to carry excess inventory and therefore incur higher inventory 
holding cost (Lee et al., 1997). This is confirmed for each ordering policy. The 
holding inventory cost of the retailer is lowest and that of the manufacturer is the 
highest with the wholesaler experiencing the median holding inventory cost as seen 
in Appendix 4.1. This trend is observed in all three ordering policies for all the 
supply chain structures considered, which in a way validates the simulation models 
used in this study.  
The above analysis is an intra-supply chain ordering policy bullwhip assessment 
meaning the trend was observed separately under each ordering option in each 
supply chain scenario. The next phase of analysis is an inter-supply chain ordering 
policy bullwhip assessment meaning each ordering policy is compared to one 
another based on the magnitude of the bullwhip effect observed. However, to 
compare the three ordering policies in terms of their respective bullwhip 
quantification and the implication to inventory holding cost, two methods of order 
amplification ratio have been suggested in the literature. The first method captures 
the order amplification as the ratio of the order variance of each supply member to 
that of the consumer demand as described in Chen et al. (2000) and Hosoda and 
Disney (2006). In other words, the order variance at the retailer is divided by the 
variance of the consumer demand and the wholesaler order variance is divided by the 
variance of the consumer demand as well and this also applies to the manufacturer. 
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The second method applies the concept of control theory defined in Hosoda and 
Disney (2006) (citing Jury, 1974). According to this control theory, the order 
amplification is calculated as a ratio of output to input which means the variance of 
retailer’s order quantity is divided by the variance of the consumer demand, while 
that of the wholesaler is divided by that of the retailer; and that of the manufacturer 
is divided by that of the wholesaler. The result of both calculations for all supply 
chain scenarios can also be found in Appendix 4.3. By comparing the result of both 
methods of order amplification calculation to the inventory holding cost performance 
of each supply chain agent across the each ordering policy in Appendix 4.1, it was 
found that the second method (the control theoretic perspective) was more consistent 
in confirming the relationship of the bullwhip effect to inventory performance of the 
supply chain. The amplification ratio of the retailer was highest under option II then 
followed by option III and option I had the least ratio in the serial supply chain 
scenario. In the same way, similar trend is observed in Appendix 4.1 for the 
inventory holding cost performance of the retailer under the three ordering policies. 
This sort of direct comparison between the three ordering options is applicable 
because they were all subjected to the same supply chain condition/variables. The 
inventory holding cost of the retailer is highest under option II, then option III and 
least under option I. Comparing the performance of the wholesaler and the 
manufacturer in the same way yields the same observation and this trend is 
consistent for all observed supply chain structures.  
Doing the comparison at the supply chain level, Option I exhibits stability in the 
bullwhip effect (that is no apparent bullwhip effect as the order amplification is 
unitary) where the order amplification ratio is more or less the same as you move up 
the supply chain. This is because the average order quantity in this ordering policy 
for each supply chain agent is slightly lower than the average market demand. 
Consequently the bullwhip effect is not very apparent, although there is slight 
increase in order variance as one goes upstream as the result in Appendix 4.3 reveals. 
This is perhaps part of the reason why the backlog cost in this policy rule is very 
high since, according to Disney and Lambrecht (2007), lower bullwhip effect has 
negative consequence to customer service level. 
Option II on the other hand exhibits partial bullwhip effect at the interface between 
the wholesaler and the manufacturer. The control theory order amplification ratio of 
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the manufacturer (1.73) is much less than that of the wholesaler (4.66). This 
observation is consistent with the findings of Baganha and Cohen (1998) where a 
fixed order quantity is used and their study suggest that the wholesaler has a 
stabilizing effect on variance amplification in such an ordering policy. One would 
have anticipated that the manufacturer will incur the highest holding cost under 
option II (much greater than the £39.2 in the serial scenario and even greater than 
£56.6 under option III serial scenario) but the reduction in amplification ratio 
between the wholesaler and the manufacturer reveals why this is not so. This also 
corroborates the explanation offered in section 4.1.1 that the manufacturer enjoyed 
increased operational efficiency under option II due to the scale of increase in 
effective order quantity as one goes up the supply chain. The partial bullwhip effect 
at the wholesaler/manufacturer interface suggest that the variance of the orders 
placed by the wholesaler to the manufacturer is not as large as it should have been 
because of the stabilising effect of the wholesaler resulting in the reduction of safety 
stock estimation at the manufacturer. This therefore allows the manufacturer to enjoy 
reduced inventory holding cost under option II. Therefore option II inherently offers 
bullwhip protection especially to the manufacturer. 
Option III on the other hand showed bullwhip effect consistency as the order 
amplification increased as one goes upstream the supply chain and there is no 
apparent stabilising effect of the wholesaler. Consequently the supply chain total 
holding inventory cost for option III was greater than for option II with partial 
bullwhip effect and that of option I was least due to having minimal bullwhip effect.  
4.2.3 Summary of Findings and Discussion 
This section deals with Question 1a set at the start of the chapter. 
Question 1a: Given the same supply chain conditions, how does a batch ordering 
policy perform against a parameter based ordering policy, and how does the 
combined policy fare against the individual ordering policy types? 
All the observations under the serial structure were consistent for all other structures 
considered which validates the findings of this study. The finding of this aspect of 
the study is summarised below: 
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 Each of the three ordering policies excelled in different aspects. The base 
stock policy (option I) fared much better than the other two in terms of the 
bullwhip effect; the optimal EOQ model (option II) enjoyed the least 
ordering frequency because of the size of each order quantity which could be 
an advantage depending on how big the fixed ordering cost is; while the 
combined policy (option III) enjoyed the least operating cost of the three.  
 A direct comparison between the optimal EOQ model (batch ordering policy) 
and the base stock model (parameter based policy) revealed that the optimal 
EOQ ordering type would require a shipping strategy that favours higher 
order quantity with less ordering frequency while a base stock policy under 
the same supply chain condition would require a shipping strategy that 
favours lower order quantities ordered more frequently.  
 Overall, under normal circumstances, the base stock policy is a worse cost 
performer than the optimal EOQ model and the combined batch-and-
parameter based model is the best cost performer of the three. 
As the result in Appendix 4.1 suggests, bullwhip effect does cause an increase in the 
inventory holding cost performance of the supply chain providing further evidence to 
back up what has been established in past literature. However, this study provides 
further evidence which has not been fully established in past literature in establishing 
a bullwhip comparison of different supply chain ordering policies under similar 
supply chain conditions and how this links to inventory holding cost performance of 
the supply chain.  
The performance trend of all three ordering policies in the serial structure was 
similar in the wholesaler, manufacturer and network structures but only differ in 
magnitude. The magnitude of the difference in performance level is the basis of this 
study’s structural comparison. This is discussed in the next section. 
4.3 THE INFLUENCE OF RE-STRUCTURING ALONE ON ORDERING 
POLICY PERFORMANCE IN A NON-INTEGRATED SUPPLY CHAIN 
SCENARIO 
To understand how structure affects supply chain performance, the performance 
under the three supply structures (WH, MF and NT) are compared to the serial 
structure (which is also termed the ‘base model’) performance. The first step of 
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examination is to see how the ordering pattern and the bullwhip effect changes when 
you move from the serial structure to the other three structure types. The second step 
of examination is to assess the implication of this change to supply chain cost 
performance. 
4.3.1 Effect of Structural Change on the Ordering Pattern of Options I, II and 
III  
The change in ordering pattern is conceptualised as the change in ordering frequency 
and effective daily average order quantity. The change brought about by 
restructuring in ordering frequency/rate is calculated by taking the difference 
between the ordering rate (expressed in %) in the base model and the corresponding 
ordering rate in the WH, MF and NT structures. On the other hand, the change in 
average effective order quantity is calculated as the difference between the values in 
the base model and the corresponding structure but is expressed as a percentage of 
the base model. The result for this computation for each ordering policy under each 
structure type is shown in Table 4.2. For each ordering option, the original or initial 
values in the base model is included in the first three rows of the table and the 
respective changes in ordering rate and effective average order quantity (EAOQ) due 
to all three structures is included under the corresponding label. A negative value 
indicates that the value in base model is lesser than that in corresponding WH, MF 
and NT structures, while a positive value indicates otherwise. 
The general observation from this table is that restructuring the supply chain from 
the serial structure to any of the WH, MF and NT structures has no impact on the 
ordering pattern of option I. However this has an effect on option II and option III 
with the magnitude of change generally higher in option II than in option III. The 
direction of the change is that the ordering frequency is higher while the effective 
average order quantity is lower than in the serial structure.  
Therefore, understanding how the ordering pattern changes when restructuring is 
being considered in the supply chain is crucial for many organisations and supply 
chains to understand if there is need to change the shipping strategy. For example, 
the best shipping option may be selected based on the frequency of delivery and the 
capacity of the shipping mode. If the frequency of ordering then reduces and the 
quantity is increased, then the initial shipping strategy may no longer be the optimal 
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option. It may then be worthwhile to change the shipping strategy to best suit the 
current ordering pattern.  
Ordering Pattern in the Base model 
 Retailer Wholesaler Manufacturer 
 O R 
(%) 
EAOQ OR (%) EAOQ OR (%) EAOQ 
Option I 100 9.98 100 9.97 100 9.94 
Option II 89 11.28 62 16.00 49 20.36 
Option III 98 10.18 89 11.16 67 14.81 
Effect of WH on a serial Supply Chain 
Option I 0.00 0.00% 0.00 0.00% 0.00 0.00% 
Option II -0.10 0.11% -0.07 0.09% -0.13 0.21% 
Option III -0.02 0.02% -0.07 0.07% -0.08 0.10% 
Effect of MF on a serial Supply Chain 
Option I 0.00 0.00% 0.00 0.00% 0.00 0.00% 
Option II -0.10 0.11% -0.24 0.27% 0.01 -0.03% 
Option III -0.02 0.02% -0.09 0.09% -0.02 0.03% 
Effect of NT on a serial Supply Chain 
Option I 0.00 0.00% 0.00 0.00% 0.00 0.00% 
Option II -0.10 0.11% -0.25 0.29% -0.18 0.26% 
Option III -0.02 0.02% -0.07 0.07% -0.06 0.08% 
Table 4.2 Effect of supply chain structure on ordering pattern 
4.3.2 Effect of Structural Change on the Bullwhip Effect Inherent in Options I, 
II and III  
In terms of the change to bullwhip effect, the general observation from Appendix 4.3 
is that restructuring does not bring about any significant changes to the magnitude of 
order variance of each supply chain agent in option I but significant changes are seen 
in the order variances in option II and option III. The order variance of the retailer is 
slightly reduced under option II but increased slightly under option III for all WH, 
MF and NT supply chain structures. The WH structure significantly increases the 
order variance of the wholesaler and the manufacture under option II but it reduces 
the order variance of the wholesaler and increases that of the manufacturer in option 
III. The MF structure keeps the order variance of the wholesaler the same but 
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increases that of the manufacturer under both under option II and option III 
scenarios. The NT structure reduces the order variance of the wholesaler and 
increases that of the manufacturer under options II and III. For all supply chain 
structures considered, the highest percentage reduction in supply chain daily average 
inventory holding cost occurred under option II because of its inherent partial 
immunity to the bullwhip effect. 
Managerial Insight:  Restructuring the supply chain to the WH, MF and NT type 
structures alters the bullwhip dynamics of the supply chain by reducing the order 
variance at one tier and increasing it at another. The effect of this is a reduction of 
the total supply chain daily average inventory holding cost. This means that efforts to 
simplify the supply chain using WH, MF and NT strategies would reduce the total 
supply chain daily average inventory.   
4.3.3 Implication of Structural Change to the Supply Chain Performance under 
Options I, II and III scenario 
Having examined the changes to ordering pattern and bullwhip effect, the 
implication of these changes to supply chain cost performance is now examined. The 
magnitude of the difference between the cost performances of each structure to that 
of the base model is expressed as a fraction of the base model performance. In other 
words the difference between the performance of the other structures and the base 
model is divided by the performance of the base model. This relative comparison to 
that of the serial structure is termed ‘structure effect’. For example the WH-effect 
would be the difference between the performance of the Wholesaler supply chain 
structure and the base model expressed as a fraction of the base model performance. 
In the same light the MF-effect and the NT-effect are measured against the base 
model. This fractional difference (or percentage difference if multiplied by 100) is 
tested for significance at p<0.05. The idea for this comparison is to show, with 
confidence, whether supply chain reconfiguration from the base model to any of the 
other structure type is beneficial or detrimental to the performance of the supply 
chain as measured by the magnitude and the statistical significance of the percentage 
difference. For example if there is an obvious percentage change (be it positive or 
negative) but this change is not statistically significant at p<0.05, then the structure 
effect is said to be non-existent (no effect). The structure effect on each supply agent 
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for each of its performance measures (daily average holding, backlog and ordering 
costs) is computed as described above and shown in Table 4.3. 
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Base Model Performance  MF Effect (%) 
  Holding 
(£) 
Backlog 
(£) 
Ordering 
(£) 
Total 
(£) 
Fill Rate 
(%) 
 Holding Backlog Ordering Total Fill 
Rate 
Option I Retailer 0.04 140.04 54.83 194.90 0.42  -1nd 0 0nd 0nd 0 
Wholesaler 1.93 55.97 54.80 112.69 0.64  5nd 1nd 0nd 1nd 0 
Manufacturer 24.69 5.09 59.62 89.40 0.95  12nd 42nd 8 11 2 
Total 26.66 201.10 169.24 396.99   11 1 3 3nd  
             Option II Retailer 2.41 63.35 54.25 120.00 0.61  12nd -6 0nd -3nd -1 
Wholesaler 16.98 16.90 52.93 86.81 0.86  7 -9nd 0nd 0nd -1 
Manufacturer 39.21 9.07 54.68 102.96 0.92  22 22 4 13 2 
Total 58.60 89.32 161.85 309.77   17 -3 1 3  
             Option 
III 
Retailer 1.94 50.01 54.73 106.68 0.67  8 -2 0 -1 0 
Wholesaler 12.90 12.56 54.26 79.72 0.89  5 -3 0 0 0 
Manufacturer 56.60 0.60 56.30 113.50 0.99  6 68 6 6 0 
Total 71.44 63.17 165.28 299.90   6 -2 2 2  
nd- not statistically significant at p<0.05. 
Table 4.3 Structure effect in a no-breach-scenario 
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WH Effect (%)  Network Effect (%) 
  Holding Backlog Ordering  Total  Fill Rate  Holding Backlog Ordering Total Fill 
Rate 
Option I Retailer 40nd -3nd 0nd -2nd -1  42nd -3 0nd -2nd -1 
Wholesaler 76 -6nd 4 0nd -1  72 -6nd 0nd -2nd -1 
Manufacturer 11nd 40nd 0nd 5 2  11nd 38nd 0nd 5 2 
Total 16 -3 1 0nd   16 -3 0 0nd  
             Option II Retailer 13 -6 0nd -3 -1  24 -8 0nd -4 -2 
Wholesaler 45 -11 2 8 -1  48 -22 -1 5 -3 
Manufacturer 12 30 0nd 7 2  28 20 0nd 13 2 
Total 21 -3 1 3   34 -8 0 4  
             Option 
III 
Retailer 7nd 3nd 0nd 1nd 1  9nd 2 0nd 1nd 0 
Wholesaler 38 17 4 11 2  36 14nd -1 8 1 
Manufacturer 9 49nd 0nd 4 0  9nd 43nd 0nd 5 0 
Total 14 6 1 5   14 5 0 4  
nd- not statistically significant at p<0.05. 
Table 4.3 Continued 
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However for the fill rate performance, the difference is taken directly as is and not 
expressed as a fraction of the base model.  
The direction of the structure effect can be of a positive type or a negative one. A 
positive value reveals that the cost in the base model is higher than that of the 
corresponding structure indicating a beneficial structure effect while a negative value 
indicates a detrimental structure effect. Values with superscript ‘nd’ indicate that the 
fractional difference is not statistically significant at p<0.05 and therefore no effect is 
said to occur regardless of the magnitude of the fractional difference. Also, for the 
fill rate performance a positive value shows that the fill rate performance of the base 
model is lower than that of the other structures revealing a beneficial structure effect 
while a negative value is indicative of a detrimental effect. It is also important for 
each supply agent to understand which structure is most beneficial to their 
operational cost performance and where incentives may lie. If adopting any of the 
three proposed structures yields benefit to the supply chain, then that structure could 
be seen as a beneficial strategy which should only be adopted when all supply 
members are benefiting. However if some are not benefited the decision framework 
shown in Figure 4.1 can be followed to arrive at an ‘acceptance’, ‘rejection’ or 
‘acceptance after incentivisation’ decision. Therefore using Table 4.3, the structure 
effect on individual performance is discussed in the following subsections. 
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Figure 4.1 Single strategy acceptance decision framework in a non-breach 
scenario 
4.3.3.1 WH-Effect on supply agent individual performance 
From Table 4.3, it is shown that for ordering option I the WH structure has no effect 
on the total operating cost of the retailer and the wholesaler but significantly affects 
that of the manufacturer. However the positive effect on the manufacturer’s daily 
operating cost is not big enough to cause an overall supply chain performance 
improvement.  
Under option II, the WH structure had a significant effect on all supply agents daily 
cost performance although the retailer experienced an increase in cost performance 
while the wholesaler and the manufacturer experienced an improvement in cost 
performance. The aggregate of the improvement at the wholesaler and the 
manufacturer causes an overall positive effect on supply chain performance despite 
the negative impact on the retailer. Therefore incentive can be provided to the 
retailer by the wholesaler and the manufacturer if the retailer is to be persuaded to 
accept this type of structure. It is to be noted however that the wholesaler 
Is the aggregate supply chain performance improved by 
the change in strategy? 
Effect on supply chain agent 
Is the agent directly involved in 
the strategy change? 
Yes 
Negative effect 
No Yes 
No 
No effect Positive effect 
Accept 
strategy only 
after 
incentivisation 
Accept 
strategy only 
after 
incentivisation 
Accept 
strategy with 
no 
incentivisation 
Accept 
strategy with 
no 
incentivisation 
Reject 
strategy  
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experiences the greatest benefit from this structure type which appear plausible as 
the structure, in theory, should favour the wholesaler more. 
With option III, WH effect is not significant for the retailer but significant for the 
wholesaler and the manufacturer. Therefore the retailer can be further incentivised to 
encourage participation in this type of structure. Again, like under option II, the 
wholesaler is the highest cost improvement beneficiary of this type of structure. 
Comparing the effect of WH on the three ordering options, the general observation is 
that option III seems to benefit the most. 
4.3.3.2 MF-effect on supply agent individual performance  
The MF structure has no significant effect on the daily operating cost performance of 
the retailer and wholesaler under option I as shown in Table 4.3. The effect is 
however significant on the performance of the manufacturer but the improvement 
seen at the manufacturer is not large enough to cause a significant effect on supply 
chain cost performance although the supply chain cost improvement is noticeable at 
3% but not significant at p<0.05. The implication of this is that the retailer and the 
wholesaler would not be inclined to be associated with this structure type if the 
ordering policy is the base stock policy type. 
The effect under option II is similar to that under option I. The daily total operating 
cost of the retailer and the wholesaler are not significantly affected by a 
transformation from a serial structure to a MF structure type but that of the 
manufacturer is. Unlike the observation under option I, the improvement at the 
manufacturer is large enough to cause a significant improvement on the supply chain 
daily operating cost. 
Examining the effect under option III, the MF structure does not significantly affect 
the daily operating cost performance of the retailer and the wholesaler but 
significantly improves the performance of the manufacturer by 6%. The effect is 
however significant on the aggregate supply chain performance.  
Again the manufacturer benefits the most under this structure as expected, while the 
effect is not significant on the retailer and the wholesaler’s cost performance. The 
benefit to the manufacturer is however large enough to provide added cost incentive 
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to the retailer and the wholesaler. Comparatively, option III experiences the best cost 
performance under the MF structure of the three ordering policies.  
4.3.3.3 NT-effect on supply agent individual performance  
The daily operational cost performance of Option I is not significantly affected by 
structural change from serial to network type structure. It appears that although the 
network effect improves the manufacturer’s daily operational cost performance 
significantly by 5%, the retailer and the wholesaler on the other hand are not 
benefiting at p<0.05. The benefit to the manufacturer however appears to be 
inconsequential to the overall supply chain performance, therefore the retailer and 
the wholesaler would not be inclined to operate in such a structure. 
Clearly the network effect is quite beneficial under an option II scenario especially to 
the wholesaler and the manufacturer, with the most favoured agent being the 
manufacturer. It is however not favourable towards the retailer as there is a 4% 
increase in daily operating cost which is significant at p<0.05. Despite this negative 
effect on the retailer, the benefit generated towards the wholesaler and the 
manufacturer can still provide good incentives to cover the retailer’s increased cost, 
at the least. 
Of the three ordering policies, option III seems to be the best option for the network 
type structure when all supply chain agents are considered. The NT-effect produced 
a significant improvement in the daily operational cost performance of all supply 
agents under this ordering policy with the wholesaler receiving the most benefit. 
In general, the network structure is more favourable towards option III and II, with 
the wholesaler benefiting the most under option III and the manufacturer under 
option II. Option I however does not benefit from a transmogrification into a 
network structure as the effect experienced is not significant at p<0.05. 
4.3.3.4 General effect of structural change to the performance measures  
The holding cost, backlog cost and the ordering cost performances are affected in 
different ways depending on the structure and ordering policy of choice. The WH 
effect to options I, II and III is a reduction in holding inventory resulting in a reduced 
inventory holding cost performance of all supply chain agents. This reduction in 
holding inventory was significant enough to cause a reduction in fill rate 
performance especially for the retailer and the wholesaler. The reduction for the 
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manufacturer was not significant enough to cause a drop in fill rate performance; 
rather it was just enough to raise the fill rate performance of the manufacturer. This 
effect on fill rate performance means the backlog cost performance would be 
affected in a similar fashion as the better the fill rate the better the backlog 
performance and vice versa. The backlog cost for the retailer and the wholesaler was 
negatively affected by the WH structure under option I and II while that of the 
manufacturer was positively affected as suggested by the improvement in 
manufacturer’s fill rate performance. The effect on the overall cost performance for 
both retailer and wholesaler was insignificant because the rise in backlog cost was 
evened out by the reduction in holding cost. The effect of WH on option III was a 
reduction in holding cost and also backlog cost. The reason for this behaviour, 
contrary to that of options I and II, is that option III is a rather near-optimal policy 
where the ordering pattern is enough to ensure a good balance between holding cost 
and backlog cost performance  as revealed in section 4.2.  
4.3.4 Summary of Findings and Discussion 
This section provides an answer to Question 1b. 
Question 1b: How does supply chain structural reconfiguration alone affect the 
performance of the three ordering policies mentioned? 
From the study, one can infer that changing the structure can either provide benefit 
or not to supply chain cost performance depending on the existing ordering policy in 
the supply chain. The findings on the effect of structural reconfiguration on the 
bullwhip effect, ordering pattern and supply chain cost performance is summarised 
below: 
 Reconfiguring from a serial structure to any of the other three structures does 
not change the nature of bullwhip effect for all the three ordering policies 
investigated. The bullwhip effect in any of the new structures (WH, MF and 
NT) is minimal under option I, partial under option II and consistent under 
option III which is consistent with the findings in section 4.2, although the 
magnitude of order variance varies under each ordering policy depending on 
the type of supply chain structure. This consistency in result also validates 
the simulation model.  
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 The general effect of structural reconfiguration on the ordering pattern of the 
supply chain agents in options II and III scenarios is a reduction in the 
effective average order quantity (EAOQ) and a commensurate increase in 
ordering rate (OR). There is no apparent effect on the ordering pattern when 
the ordering policy is the parameter based policy (Base stock policy-option 
I). Therefore, from the result, one can infer that supply chains using the 
parameter based policy (base stock policy) need not change their shipping 
strategy when considering structural reconfiguration, but those using batch or 
combined batch-and-parameter based models should revisit their shipping 
strategy to adopt one that favours lesser order quantity placed more 
frequently. 
 At the supply chain level, a supply chain with the base stock policy (option I) 
does not enjoy any cost improvement benefit when considering supply 
reconfiguration from a serial type structure to WH, MF or NT structure types. 
Although under the MF structure, the supply chain operating cost is seen to 
reduce by 3%, this increase is not statistically significant at p< 0.05 
according to the t-test assessment. Options II and III on the other hand enjoy 
significant cost improvement benefit from supply reconfiguration into WH, 
MF and NT structure types. Interestingly, the WH structure favours option III 
more than option II while MF favours option II above option III. The NT 
structure favours option II and option III equally. 
 Changing the structure of a supply chain can be difficult especially for those 
organisations in existing serial structures. For a supply chain using batch 
ordering policy (e.g. optimal EOQ model) who wants to derive the benefit of 
structural change but does not want to go through the hassle of restructuring 
should consider only modifying its policy to the combined batch-and-
parameter based policy to reap similar benefits.  
A summary of the effect of structural reconfiguration on individual cost performance 
of supply agents and the supply chain as a whole is shown in Table 4.4. The symbol 
‘>’ indicates that the supply chain agent or the aggregate supply chain experience a 
beneficial effect when reconfiguration takes place, while the ‘<’ indicate a 
detrimental effect and as such there is no inclination to adopt that specific structure. 
The ‘-‘symbol indicates that the effect is not significant and hence the respective 
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supply agent would be indifferent to adopting such structure. Going by the decision 
framework in Figure 4.1, the result in Table 4.4 also indicate whether incentives can 
be provided for the non-benefiting supply chain agents as long as the overall effect 
of restructuring is positive. A beneficial effect or one where incentives can be 
provided is a good motivator for structural reconfiguration. To whom incentive is to 
be provided is also included in the last row of the table. The letters R refers to the 
retailer, W refers to the wholesaler and M refers to the manufacturer.  
 Option I Option II Option III 
 WH MF NT WH MF NT WH MF NT 
Retailer - - - < - < - < - 
Wholesaler - - - > - > > - > 
Manufacturer > > > > > > > > > 
Supply Chain - - - > > > > > > 
Acceptable? No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Incentivisation? No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Incentive to? None None None R W R R R,W R 
Beneficial effect (>), no significant effect (-), detrimental effect (<)  
Table 4.4 Effect and motivation for structural reconfiguration   
From the table it can be seen that only the manufacturer benefits from all types of 
structural reconfiguration under option I and no incentive can be provided to non-
benefiting members since the overall effect is nil. Therefore there is no motivation 
for reconfiguration under option I, at least for the retailer and wholesaler. There is 
overall benefit to the supply chain under options II and III for all types of structural 
reconfiguration. However incentives need to be provided to the 
retailer/wholesaler/both depending on which structure strategy is adopted.  
A summary of the answer to Question 1c is provided below: 
Question 1c: Considering the simplification strategy, where along the supply chain 
should simplification be carried out, at the wholesaler tier or at the manufacturer 
tier?  
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 From the result, the simplification strategy where the number of 
manufacturers are reduced is best suited for the base stock policy, although 
the benefit of this strategy is not statistically significant under the base stock 
policy.  
 For the batch ordering type e.g. optimal EOQ model, there is no preference as 
simplification at the wholesaler tier or the manufacturer tier yields the same 
benefit, however incentive has to be given to the retailer if the simplification 
is at the wholesaler tier, or to the wholesaler if the simplification is at the 
manufacturer tier.  
 The ordering policy that combines the batch order quantity and parameter 
determined e.g. modified base stock policy (option III), would benefit more 
from simplifying the wholesaler tier than simplifying the manufacturer tier 
and incentive has to be given to the retailer only in this strategy.  
A summary of the answer to question 1d is as follows: 
Question 1d: Which strategy offers more benefit, the simplification strategy or the 
networking strategy?  
 For the parameter based policies such as the base stock policy, again neither 
simplification nor networking strategies offer any significant benefit to the 
supply chain, hence adopting either of these strategies is basically futile.  
 For batch ordering policies such as the optimal EOQ model, the better 
strategy would be to share the orders between agents of the same tier rather 
than simplify the supply chain at either the wholesaler or the manufacture 
tiers, although the latter strategy still holds benefit. 
 For the combined policy type such as the modified base stock policy with 
EOQ component, the preferred strategy is the simplification strategy at the 
wholesaler tier rather than networking strategy. 
However it is not yet understood how the performance under the discussed structures 
would be changed if and when the supply chain engages in information sharing. To 
understand this, the information sharing level (ISL) effect on the base model is first 
discussed followed by an examination of how the structure effect under the ISL 
influence affects the performance of the supply chain as a whole and the 
performance of each individual agent. 
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4.4 EFFECT OF ISL ALONE ON A NON-INTEGRATED (NI) SERIAL 
SUPPLY CHAIN 
To understand how ISL affects supply chain performance, the performance of the 
serial supply chain under the three Integration levels RW, WM and RWM are 
compared to that of the non-integrated (NI) serial mode (which is also termed the 
‘base model’). The first step of examination again is to see how the ordering pattern 
and the bullwhip effect changes when you move from the NI mode to the other three 
integration modes. The second step of examination is to assess the implication of this 
change to supply chain cost performance at the operational level and at the supply 
chain level. 
4.4.1 Effect of ISL on Ordering Pattern  
The effect of information sharing on the ordering pattern of a serial supply chain is 
calculated in a similar way to Table 4.2 and presented in Table 4.5. The layout of the 
table has been described in section 4.3.1. Again, a negative value indicates that the 
value in non-integrated (NI) base model sharing is lesser than that in corresponding 
RW, WM and RWM information sharing modes, while a positive value indicates 
otherwise.  
It is clear from the result that regardless of the information sharing level, no change 
to ordering pattern occurs in the base stock policy (option I). However, there are 
noticeable changes in option II and option III for certain supply chain agents 
depending on the level of information sharing and the direction of change is in 
contrast to the direction of change caused by restructuring. Engaging in information 
sharing reduces the ordering rate of a serial supply chain with commensurate 
increase in effective average order quantity (EAOQ) while structural reconfiguration 
alone causes an increase in the ordering rate with a commensurate decrease in 
EAOQ. Again, under options II and III, the ordering pattern of the retailer is not 
perturbed by any level of information sharing.  
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NI-Serial Supply Chain 
 
Retailer Wholesaler Manufacturer 
 
OR (%) EAOQ OR (%) EAOQ OR (%) EAOQ 
Option I 100 9.98 100 9.97 100 9.94 
Option II 89 11.28 62 16.00 49 20.36 
Option III 98 10.18 89 11.16 67 14.81 
Effect of RW on Serial Supply Chain 
Option I 0.00 0% 0.00 0% 0.00 0% 
Option II 0.00 0% 0.12 -25% 0.00 0% 
Option III 0.00 0% 0.18 -26% -0.02 2% 
Effect of WM on Serial Supply Chain 
Option I 0.00 0% 0.00 0% 0.00 0% 
Option II 0.00 0% 0.00 0% 0.10 -24% 
Option III 0.00 0% 0.00 0% 0.12 -22% 
Effect of RWM on Serial Supply Chain 
Option I 0.00 0% 0.00 0% 0.00 0.00 
Option II 0.00 0% 0.12 -25% -0.06 12% 
Option III 0.00 0% 0.18 -26% -0.14 17% 
Table 4.5 Effect of ISL on ordering pattern in a serial supply chain 
Integration between the retailer and the wholesaler only (RW) significantly affect the 
ordering pattern of the wholesaler alone under option II but affects both the 
wholesaler and manufacturer under option III with the manufacturer only slightly 
perturbed. The integration between the wholesaler and the manufacturer (WM) only 
affects the ordering pattern of the manufacturer in the supply chain while the 
wholesaler and retailer are unperturbed. Under option II and option III, RWM being 
the integration between the retailer, wholesaler and manufacturer decreases the 
ordering rate of the wholesaler and manufacturer while increasing their respective 
EAOQ.  
Managerial Insight: Again understanding the direction of change due to 
information sharing is important in determining if the current shipping strategy needs 
to be changed based on the magnitude of change created by such information sharing 
initiatives. Hence a shipping option that favours more delivery quantities with less 
delivery frequency is ideal under information sharing modes for the affected parties. 
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4.4.2 Effect of ISL on Bullwhip Effect   
Regarding the bullwhip effect, Appendix 4.3 reveals that the order variance of the 
retailer in a non-integrated supply chain is unaffected when the supply chain engages 
in information sharing at any level. This is expected because the model assumption is 
that the retailer is always privy to market demand for all information and non-
information sharing scenarios. However the order variance of the wholesaler and the 
manufacturer is affected depending on the information sharing mode.  Engaging in 
information sharing at the RW level reduces the order variance of the wholesaler and 
manufacturer under option I scenario. Under option II scenario, the order variance of 
the wholesaler is increased while that of the manufacturer remains approximately the 
same. This implies that the manufacturer’s estimate of safety stock would be 
increased which may result in the manufacturer carrying more inventory than is 
actually needed. In option III, RW causes an increase in wholesaler’s order variance 
while that of the manufacturer is slightly reduced. Examining the effect of RW on 
the bullwhip effect using the result from the control theory calculation, it is found 
that RW does not change the bullwhip effect status in options I and II but the status 
of the bullwhip effect in option III is changed from full to partial bullwhip at the 
interface between the wholesaler and the manufacturer.   
Under the WM mode, the status quo is maintained with regards to the bullwhip 
effect, only the manufacturer’s order variance is altered in all three ordering policy 
scenarios. There is a slight reduction in manufacturer’s order variance in the option I 
scenario but in options II and III scenarios, there is a significant increase in 
manufacturer’s order variance.       
RWM being the full integration mode has the same effect as the RW mode on the 
retailer’s and the wholesaler’s order variances for all ordering policy scenarios. 
However, the manufacturer’s order variance is further reduced in the RWM mode 
compared to the RW mode for all three policies. Again RWM changes the bullwhip 
effect status of option III from full to partial at the wholesaler/manufacturer 
interface.  
Managerial Insight: engaging in information sharing also alter the bullwhip 
dynamics of the supply chain by increasing the order variance in certain tiers and 
reducing it or keeping it the same in others depending on the type/level of 
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integration. The WM only affects the order variance of the manufacturer while RW 
and RWM affect both wholesaler and manufacturer. Hence the manufacturer is the 
only one enjoying a consistent and significant reduction in holding inventory under 
all information sharing scenarios (except under option II in the RW mode) and this 
benefit is highest under the WM mode.  However, due to the accessibility to market 
demand information in the RW and RWM modes a better balance between what 
needs to be ordered to satisfy what has been demanded is kept.  
Having examined the changes to ordering pattern and bullwhip effect brought about 
by information sharing, the implication of these changes to supply chain cost 
performance is now examined. The magnitude of the difference between the cost 
performances of each ISL to that of the base model is expressed as a percentage of 
the base model performance 
4.4.3 Implication of ISL to a NI Supply Chain Performance under Options I, II 
and III scenarios 
In order to examine the influence of ISL on supply chain performance, the difference 
between the cost performance in the various information sharing mode and the NI 
mode, which can be found in Appendix 4.1, is expressed as a fraction of the NI mode 
performance while that of the fill rate performance is expressed as is and not as a 
fraction of NI mode. The result of this computation is shown in Table 4.6 which is 
similar to how Table 4.3 was generated. Looking at the Table 4.6, the section under 
NI represents the performance of the non-integrated supply chain expressed in 
pounds. However the sections labelled RW effect, WM effect and RWM effect 
represent the percentage change that has been computed as described above. 
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NI (in £)   RW Effect (in %) 
    
Holding 
(£) 
Backlog 
(£) 
Ordering 
(£) 
Total 
(£) 
Fill Rate 
(%)   
Holding 
(%) 
Backlog 
(%) 
Ordering 
(%) 
Total 
(%) 
Fill Rate 
(%) 
Option I 
Retailer 0.04 140.04 54.83 194.90 0.42   -86 17 0nd 12 5 
Wholesaler 1.93 55.97 54.80 112.69 0.64   -170 42 0 18 12 
Manufacturer 24.69 5.09 59.62 89.40 0.95   77 -424 0 -3nd -16 
Total 26.66 201.10 169.24 396.99     59 13 0 10   
Option 
II 
Retailer 2.41 63.35 54.25 120.00 0.61   -13 10 0nd 5 6 
Wholesaler 16.98 16.90 52.93 86.81 0.86   -23 42 1 4 5 
Manufacturer 39.21 9.07 54.68 102.96 0.92   -18nd 52 0nd -2nd 3 
Total 58.60 89.32 161.85 309.77     -19 20 0 2   
Option 
III 
Retailer 1.94 50.01 54.73 106.68 0.67   5nd -4 0nd -2 -1 
Wholesaler 12.90 12.56 54.26 79.72 0.89   3nd -18 2 -1nd -2 
Manufacturer 56.60 0.60 56.30 113.50 0.99   28 -109 -1 13 -1 
Total 71.44 63.17 165.28 299.90     23 -8 0 4   
nd indicates no significant difference at p<0.05 
Table 4.6 Effect of ISL on supply chain performance 
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WM Effect (in %)   RWM Effect (in %) 
Option I 
Retailer 3nd -3 0nd -2 -1   -150 28 0nd 20 8 
Wholesaler 12 -7 0nd -3 -2   -298 71 0 30 22 
Manufacturer 67 -88 0 13 -4   28 57nd 0 11 3 
Total 63 -6 0 1nd     5 41 0 21   
Option 
II 
Retailer 4 -3 0nd -1 -1   -11 10 0nd 5 2 
Wholesaler 8 -12 0nd -1 -1   -13nd 39 1 6 5 
Manufacturer 34 -73 2 7 -5   35 -16 -1 11 -1 
Total 25 -12 1 2     19 13 0 7   
Option 
III 
Retailer 12 -15 0nd -7 -3   7 -7 0nd -3 -1 
Wholesaler 19 -63 0nd -7 -6   9 -29 2 -2 -3 
Manufacturer 76 -2656 2 25 -14   58 -725 -3 24 -4 
Total 64 -49 1 5     48 -18 0 7   
nd indicates no significant difference at p<0.05  
Table 4-6 Continued
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Again, a negative value for the fractional change indicates that the cost under the 
information sharing mode is higher than under NI mode which is reflective of a 
poorer performance on the part of integrated mode and vice versa. A negative value 
for the fill rate difference is indicative of a poorer performance on the part of the 
integrated mode and vice versa. Therefore using Table 4.6, the ISL effect on 
individual performance is discussed in the following subsections. 
4.4.3.1 RW-effect on supply agent individual performance 
In a three tier supply chain, under option I scenario, integration between a retailer 
and its wholesaler would result in a 10% improvement in total supply chain cost 
performance which comes from significant reduction in manufacturer holding cost 
and retailer and wholesaler’s backlog cost with the reduction in backlog cost 
contributing the most. According to the t-test analysis for significance, RW in an 
option I scenario has significant positive effect on the retailer’s and the wholesaler’s 
operating cost performance while it does not have a significant effect on the 
manufacturer’s performance although the cost increase was 3%. Therefore the 
retailer and wholesaler can look for ways to incentivise the manufacturer perhaps by 
absorbing some of the manufacturer’s backlog cost. 
For the option II scenario, the effect of RW on a supply chain that uses the optimal 
EOQ policy (option II) is that the holding cost is increased for all supply members 
unlike the base stock policy (option I) where the increase is at the manufacturer tier 
only. However, the general observation for the retailer is that the backlog cost is 
significantly higher than its holding cost and the backlog cost of the wholesaler and 
the manufacturer. Since the overall reduction in backlog cost outweighs the overall 
increase in holding cost, the resultant effect of RW in a supply chain with optimal 
EOQ policy (option II) is 2% reduction in total supply chain cost which is 
statistically significant at p<0.05. However, like the observation with option I, the 
effect of RW under option II on the manufacturer is a 2% increase in total operating 
cost which is not significant at p<0.05. This increase in largely due to the effect of 
the holding cost as the 18% increase in holding cost has greater effect than the 52% 
reduction in backlog cost. Therefore the incentive to have or maintain a RW supply 
chain to the manufacturer would be to share the increase in holding cost with the 
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retailer and the wholesaler or not at all since the increase in cost is not statistically 
significant. 
Under option III, the manufacturer is able to experience a reduced total operating 
cost in the RW mode to the tune of approximately 13%. This is a different 
observation compared to option I and II where RW effect was somewhat negative. 
The retailer and wholesaler this time around observed a 2% and 1% increase in total 
operating cost respectively, both statistically significant at p<0.05. Therefore the 
effect of sharing information between the retailer and the wholesaler only without 
including the manufacturer in a supply chain using option III is a 4% reduction in 
total supply chain operating cost, although the retailer and wholesaler are worse off 
individually. If the RW mode is to be maintained, then incentives should go to the 
retailer and the wholesaler, perhaps the manufacturer can share or absorb their 
increased cost.  
It is clear from the results that benefits can be derived by all when RW is chosen 
provided incentive is provided to the non-benefiting counterpart.  
4.4.3.2 WM-effect on supply agent individual performance 
From Table 4.6, in option I scenario, the manufacturer was able to take advantage of 
the wholesaler’s inventory information with a 13% improvement in daily average 
operating cost while the retailer and wholesaler are 2% and 3% worse off 
respectively. The overall 1% better performance experienced by the chain is of 
course due to the effect of the improved manufacturer’s performance. For such a 
supply chain the wholesaler and the retailer would be better off being in a 
decentralised supply chain (NI mode). However since the benefit derived by the 
manufacturer is larger than the cost increase at the retailer and wholesaler, the 
incentive would be for the manufacturer to absorb some of those costs if the retailer 
and wholesaler are to agree on this information sharing mode. 
Under option II, the observed effect of WM on supply chain using the Optimal EOQ 
model (option II) is a consistent reduction in holding cost across all tiers of the chain 
and a commensurate increase in backlog cost across the board. On the individual 
note, the retailer and wholesaler both experienced a 1% increase in operating cost 
while the manufacturer benefited with a 7% reduction in operating cost. Again, the 
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incentive for such collaboration between wholesaler and manufacturer would be for 
the manufacturer to absorb some of the cost of the other two.  
As for the option III scenario, effectively there was a 5% improvement in the total 
supply chain operating cost solely due to the magnitude of the reduction in supply 
chain daily average holding cost of which the manufacturer was the biggest 
contributor. From the perspective of the supply chain agents, the retailer and 
wholesaler both experienced 7% increase in daily operating cost compared to the NI 
mode while the manufacturer benefited with a 25% reduction in daily operating cost. 
Again the manufacturer can incentivise the wholesaler and the retailer by absorbing 
some or all of their cost increase. 
Looking at the various observations under WM effect, there are certain inferences 
that can be drawn.  
 The manufacturer appears to be the only beneficiary of such integration and 
this benefit comes mainly in the holding cost reduction.  
 Examining the performance of individual members, the retailer and 
wholesaler are better off in a decentralised supply chain but the benefit of 
WM to the manufacturer means that they can operate at similar levels or even 
better as long as they receive good incentives from the manufacturer.  
 In summary one can see that the ‘WM-option III’ combination is more 
serving than the other options.  
4.4.3.3 RWM-effect on supply agent individual performance 
For option I scenario, the daily average total operating cost of the retailer and 
wholesaler was reduced by 20% and 30% respectively. This improvement was 
singularly as a result of the significant reduction in backlog cost, as the respective 
average holding cost was increased and the average ordering cost was unchanged. 
The manufacturer on the other hand experienced lesser holding cost and backlog cost 
compared to that of the NI mode. This observation appear contrary to the general 
observation under the other levels of integration where a decrease in holding cost is 
accompanied by a decrease in fill rate performance and an increase in backlog cost. 
The reason for this is perhaps due to the fact that the manufacturer was using the 
inventory position of the retailer and wholesaler in deciding when to order and what 
quantity to order thereby creating an optimal effect that led to reduction in both 
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costs. To explain it better the result in WM mode is compared with that of the RWM 
mode. In the WM mode the manufacturer’s decision is based only on the 
wholesaler’s inventory information and retailer’s order information. In contrast, the 
manufacturer’s decision in the RWM mode is based on the inventory position of the 
wholesaler and the retailer as well as real time demand information. The effect of 
this change sees the daily average holding cost in the WM mode rise from 
approximately £8 to £18 in the RWM mode. This rise in holding cost resulted in a 
reduction in backlog cost from approximately $10 in WM to $2 in RWM. Therefore, 
intrinsically, the observation remains true that holding cost rise result in backlog cost 
reduction and vice versa. Overall, there was marked improvement in cost 
performance for all agents in the RWM mode under ordering option I with the 
reduction in backlog cost being the sole contributor. 
For Option II, the retailer and wholesaler both saw a rise in holding cost and an 
expected fall in daily average backlog cost. As anticipated, the fill rate was better 
than the NI mode but same for the RW counterpart. For the manufacturer, the story 
changes as the holding cost was reduced by 35% while the backlog increased by 
16% in comparison to the NI mode. In summary, the retailer and wholesaler saw a 
rise in holding cost and fill rate with a fall in backlog cost, resulting in a 5% and 6% 
decrease in daily average operating cost respectively. The manufacturer was the 
biggest beneficiary with 11% reduction in daily average operating cost. Overall, the 
supply chain operating cost saw a 7% improvement in total cost performance. 
For Option III, due to the larger effect of the holding cost reduction over backlog 
cost increase, the overall supply chain operating cost was improved by 7%. However 
the individual performance of the retailer and the wholesaler was worse off by 3% 
and 2% respectively. The manufacturer on the other hand saw a 24% improvement in 
cost performance of which the improvement in manufacturer’s holding cost played 
the most part and this was solely responsible for the improved overall supply chain 
performance. For RWM to be acceptable to the retailer and the wholesaler, the 
manufacturer has to provide incentives to them by absorbing their cost increase or by 
any other means that will serve to protect them from this cost increase.  
On the one hand, under the RWM mode, the retailer and the wholesaler observed an 
increase in holding cost and a decrease in backlog cost which resulted in an 
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improvement in daily total average operating cost in the option I and II scenarios. 
Their fill rate was also improved under these two scenarios. Their performance was 
worse off under the option III scenario. However, of the three ordering options, the 
retailer experienced the least cost performance under option III while it was option I 
for the wholesaler. The manufacturer on the other hand saw a decrease in holding 
cost and an increase in backlog cost which resulted in an improvement in daily total 
average operating cost in the option II and Option III scenarios. However, under the 
option I scenario, the manufacturer saw a decrease in backlog cost instead of an 
anticipated increase. The reason for this has been explained earlier and this resulted 
in an improvement in operating cost which also represents the scenario where the 
operating cost of the manufacturer was least. In summary, the manufacturer benefits 
from RWM integration under all three ordering policies but the retailer and 
wholesaler only benefit under option I and II.  
4.4.3.4 General effect of information sharing adoption   
It is clear from the result that all three levels of integration would benefit the supply 
chain as a whole but not beneficial to everyone concerned. Some benefit more than 
others while in some cases, some do not benefit. The level of benefit, if any, is 
dependent on the ordering policy of choice. The retailer and wholesaler appear to 
have a worse performance under option III for all integration modes but they do well 
under policies I and II with the exception of WM integration type. The manufacturer 
on the other hand performs better under all integration forms but does particularly 
well under option III. The greater performance of the manufacturer under option III, 
contrary to what is obtainable at the retailer and wholesaler, actually improves the 
overall supply chain performance significantly better than under the other two 
policies. Therefore for a supply chain using ordering policy III, the incentive to 
adopt any level of integration would have to be provided by the manufacturer. 
Looking at the various combinations of integration and ordering policies, the supply 
chain state with the least cost performance is the RWM and option III combination.  
4.4.4 Summary of Findings and Discussion 
This section provides the answer to Question 1e: 
Question 1e: How does varying the level of information alone affect the 
performance of the three ordering policies mentioned? 
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From the control theory perspective, engaging in information sharing does not 
change the nature of bullwhip effect for options I and II. The order amplification is 
kept at the minimum under option I and option II consistently experienced partial 
bullwhip effect under all three information sharing modes (RW, WM and RWM). 
However the stabilising effect of the wholesaler under option II is particularly higher 
under RW and RWM modes. Also the nature of the bullwhip effect in option III is 
changed from being consistent in the NI mode to being partial under RW and RWM 
modes.  RW and RWM mode have one thing in common, the wholesaler is privy to 
market demand information and uses this real time information in its inventory 
decisions. It is therefore concluded that: 
 The stabilising effect of the wholesaler is more pronounced when the 
wholesaler using a batch ordering policy (e.g. optimal EOQ model) or a 
combined batch-and-parameter based ordering (e.g. modified base stock 
policy) is privy to, and uses, actual demand information.  
The general effect of information sharing on the ordering pattern of the supply chain 
agents using the shared information is an increase in the effective average order 
quantity (EAOQ) and a commensurate increase in ordering rate (OR). There is no 
apparent effect on the ordering pattern of any of the supply agents when the ordering 
policy is the parameter based policy (Base stock policy-option I), and regardless of 
the type of ordering policy, the retailer’s ordering pattern is not affected by all three 
information sharing modes. Therefore, from the result, one can infer the following:  
 Under the batch or combined batch-and-parameter based models, users of 
downstream inventory information should revisit their shipping strategy to 
adopt one that favours more order quantity placed less frequently while 
supply chains using the parameter based policy (base stock policy) need not 
change their shipping strategy when considering information sharing at any 
level.   
At the supply chain level, a supply chain with the base stock policy (option I) only 
benefits from information sharing when the wholesaler and/or the manufacturer uses 
retailer’s inventory information (which includes the market demand information). 
However the supply chain obtains benefit regardless of the mode of information 
sharing (RW, WM or RWM) under a batch or combined batch-and-parameter based 
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ordering policy. Interestingly, RW and RWM favours option I more than the other 
two policies while WM mode favours option III more. 
A summary of the effect of adopting various information sharing strategies on 
individual supply agent and the supply chain as a whole is shown in Table 4.7.  
 Option I Option II Option III 
 RW WM RWM RW WM RWM RW WM RWM 
Retailer > < > > < > < < < 
Wholesaler > < > > < > < - < 
Manufacturer - > > - > > > > > 
Supply Chain > - > > > > > > > 
Acceptable? Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Incentivisation? No No No No Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
Incentive to? None None None None R,W None R,W R,W R,W 
Beneficial effect (>), no significant effect (-), detrimental effect (<)  
Table 4.7 Effect and motivation for information sharing adoption 
The following conclusions are drawn: 
 The RW strategy can be adopted in option I and II scenarios without any 
consideration for giving incentives to non-benefiting members. However, in 
the option III scenario, RW can still be adopted but the responsibility of 
incentive giving lies with the manufacturer.  
 The WM strategy is not likely to be acceptable by the retailer and wholesaler 
as the overall benefit of the strategy is not large enough to incentivise both 
the retailer and wholesaler for option I while the manufacturer would have to 
incentivise both downstream agents under option II and III for the WM 
strategy to be acceptable.  
 The RWM strategy is completely acceptable by all supply chain agents and 
no incentivisation is required under option I and II scenarios. However, under 
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option III, the retailer and wholesaler are less inclined to adopt RWM 
strategy unless the manufacturer can provide certain incentives to justify their 
involvement.   
The observations and implications of the result discussed in sections 4.2 and 4.3 is 
only applicable under a non-information sharing scenario. The observations for the 
various ISL in section 4.4 is only applicable in a serial supply chain structure. 
However when the supply chain engages in information sharing, regardless of the 
information sharing level (ISL), the implication to the supply chain in section 4.4 
does not hold true for all supply chain structure scenario under each ordering option. 
This is because each structure provides benefit to certain supply chain agents and do 
not favour others. This has been discussed in section 4.3. In the same light various 
ISLs provide benefit to some agents and not others and the level of benefit depends 
on the ordering option of choice. This has also been discussed in section 4.4. 
Therefore one observes a cancellation, repelling, corroborating or worsening of 
effect on individual agent’s performance when the ISL effect is superimposed on the 
structure effect. The cancellation and repelling effect can either be positive or 
negative. Positive cancellation (CA+) means the resultant effect is beneficial 
produced from a positive ISL and negative Structure or a negative ISL and a positive 
Structure effect. A negative cancellation (CA-) occurs when the resultant effect is 
negative produced either from a positive ISL and negative Structure effect or vice 
versa. A negative repelling effect (R-) occurs when the positive effect of both ISL 
and Structure produces a resultant negative effect. On the other hand a positive 
repelling effect (R+) occurs when the negative effect of both ISL and Structure 
produces a resultant positive effect. Worsening effect (W) is generated when the 
resultant effect is negative which is produced from both negative ISL and Structure 
effects and a corroborating effect (CO) is felt when the resultant effect is positive 
produced from a positive ISL and a positive Structure effect.  
4.5 INTERACTION BETWEEN THE INTEGRATION EFFECT AND 
STRUCTURE EFFECT 
The relative performance of each supply chain agent under each integration mode for 
all four supply chain structures is assessed here. The idea for this comparison is to 
show whether the interaction between the integration effect and the structure effect is 
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beneficial or detrimental to the performance of the supply chain as measured by the 
magnitude of the percentage change. Therefore it might be wise, considering certain 
ordering policies, to engage in one and not the other or engage in both to reap greater 
benefits. The relative performance of the integration mode to the non-integrated 
mode for each structure is derived by computing the difference between the cost 
performances of each structure in the integration mode to that of the NI mode from 
Table 4.1. This difference is then expressed as a percentage of the NI-base model 
performance. In other words the difference between the performance of the 
structures in all the integration mode and the NI-base model is divided by the 
performance of the NI-base model. The result of this computation can be found in 
Appendix 4.4. A positive value reveals that the effect is beneficial while a negative 
value indicates a detrimental effect on cost performance. From the table, the first 
three rows show a summary of the singular effect of restructuring from a non-
integrated serial structure (base model) to WH, MF and NT structures and the next 
three rows summarises the singular effect of information sharing when a non-
integrated serial structure (base model)  engages in RW, WM and RWM integration 
modes respectively. The next set of rows summarises the effect of jointly engaging 
in information sharing and restructuring.  
The nature of interaction effect of each integration level with each structure is 
depicted with the following symbols CO, CA+, CA-, R+, R- and W, and is also 
shown in Appendix 4.4. These have been defined earlier in the last paragraph of 
section 4.4.4 and are descriptive of the nature of the interaction effect but ultimately 
the interest lies in whether the interaction effect is beneficial or not. The CO, CA+, 
and R+ symbols are all beneficial effects but CA-, R- and W are all detrimental to 
supply chain cost performance.  
The main decision framework for combining any ISL strategy with any supply chain 
reconfiguration strategy is shown in Figure 4.2. Whatever the decision is, it is also 
important to know where the need for incentives lie. Consequently the decision 
summary is shown in Table 4.8 for each combination of ISL and supply chain 
structure. Symbol R in the table represents the retailer while W and M represent the 
wholesaler and manufacturer respectively. The subsequent sections 4.5.1, 4.5.2, 4.5.3 
summarises the answer to Question 1f. 
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Question 1f: What is the interaction effect of supply chain structure and information 
sharing level on batch ordering, parameter based and the combined ordering 
policies? 
 
Figure 4.2 Combined strategy acceptance decision framework in a non-breach 
scenario  
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RW WM RWM 
  
WH MF NT WH MF NT WH MF NT 
Option I 
Interaction effect CO CO CA+ CO CO CA+ CO CO CA+ 
Significant? Yes Yes Yes No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Acceptable? Yes Yes Yes No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Alternative - - RW NI NI NI - - RWM 
Incentive to? M M - - - - - - - 
Option II 
Interaction effect CO CO R- CO CO CO CO CO R- 
Significant? Yes Yes No Yes No Yes Yes Yes No 
Acceptable? No Yes No Yes No No Yes Yes No 
Alternative WH - NT - MF NT - - RWM 
Incentive to? R R R R W R - R - 
Option III 
Interaction effect CO CO CO CO CO CO CO CO CO 
Significant? Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Acceptable? Yes Yes No Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Alternative - - NT - WM - - - RWM 
Incentive to? R R,W R R R,W R,W R R,W R,W 
Table 4.8 Decision making for adopting ISL and supply reconfiguration as a worthwhile strategy
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4.5.1 Interacting effect of ISL and supply chain structure under parameter 
based ordering policy 
Under normal circumstances, the base stock policy does not enjoy a cost 
improvement benefit from structural simplification only, but the result in Appendix 
4.4 shows that when any of these strategies is combined with an information sharing 
strategy that includes the retailer’s inventory information (RW or RWM), the cost 
performance of base stock policy is improved, although incentive has to be given to 
the manufacturer under both RW and RWM information sharing strategy. The 
benefit of sharing retailer’s information with the wholesaler and/or manufacturer 
alone is greater than the benefit of combining this strategy with the networking 
strategy, hence this combination is not acceptable. It is also apparent that the base 
stock policy will not benefit from WM information sharing strategy either alone or in 
combination with other structural reconfiguration strategies. 
4.5.2 Interacting effect of ISL and supply chain structure under batch ordering 
policy 
Under the batch ordering scheme such as the optimal EOQ model, the only 
acceptable interaction that does not require incentivisation is the one involving 
wholesaler simplification (WH) and full information sharing (RWM). The other 
situation where the combined or synergic benefit of information sharing strategy and 
structural reconfiguration is greater than the individual benefit is found under the 
following combinations; RW + MF; WM + WH; RWM + WH, and under these 
combinations, the retailer requires incentivisation. 
4.5.3 Interacting effect of ISL and supply chain structure under batch-and-
parameter based ordering policy 
With the combined policy (option III), an information sharing strategy that includes 
sharing the retailer’s inventory information with the wholesaler and/or manufacturer 
is not a good match with the networking strategy. The supply chain is better off 
either undertaking the network reconfiguration alone or undertaking the full 
information sharing strategy or combining networking reconfiguration with WM 
information sharing strategy. On the other hand, the wholesaling simplification 
strategy combines well with either RW or RWM with the retailer requiring 
incentivisation. The only time when information sharing between the wholesaler and 
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the manufacturer only produces a combined benefit is when the structural 
reconfiguration strategy is of the wholesaling simplification type.  
4.6 DECISION MAKING FOR THE COMBINED IMPROVEMENT 
STRATEGIES  
Having considered the performance of the supply chain under various ordering 
policies, integration levels and supply chain structures, the supply chain manager of 
course would be interested in knowing which scenarios represent the best option 
with the least cost performance. Given the same ordering option, if one must decide 
which integration level and structure to adopt, then the following recommendation is 
given in Table 4.9 based on the overall best performance. The scenario with the least 
average daily operating cost represents the best scenario amongst alternatives. As it 
is reasonable that two separate performance improvement strategies may be adopted 
one at a time, the other one adopted at a later time in the future, the ideal thing would 
be to select the best alternative in each improvement category. The supply chain may 
decide to select the best structural reconfiguration alternative first and then the best 
information sharing strategy later in the future or vice versa. However this stepwise 
adoption of the two best alternatives in their respective categories may not ultimately 
produce the best cost performance in the long run. It is therefore important to know 
which combination of information sharing and structural reconfiguration represents 
the best option in the long run and then perhaps adopt that combination in a step 
wise manner.  
For instance Table 4.9 clearly shows that for a parameter based policy such as the 
base stock policy, the two best options amongst alternatives are manufacturing 
simplification and full information sharing. The adoption of both strategies, either 
stepwise or at once, would produce a positive synergic effect more beneficial than 
their respective individual performances. Although the best synergy for the 
parameter based policy comes under the combination of full integration and 
wholesaling simplification strategies, this performance is only 0.1% better off which 
is not significant at p<0.05. Therefore the supply chain using the base stock policy 
may still go ahead with the original option of full information sharing and 
manufacturing simplification as this is the better option if stepwise adoption is 
considered. Clearly for the batch ordering policy such as the optimal EOQ model, 
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although the individual best performance comes under networking and full 
integration separately, the best option on the long run would be the combination of 
manufacturing simplification and full integration strategies as the performance here 
is  11.3% better than the original option. Under the combined policy mode, the 
decision would be to adopt both wholesaling simplification and information sharing 
between the wholesaler and the manufacturer only as opposed to the full information 
sharing strategy because of the significant 1.3 % improvement in performance.   
 Structure ISL  Good 
synergy? 
Best 
Alternative 
% 
difference 
Decision 
Option I MF RWM Yes RWM+WH  0.1%nd RWM +MF  
Option II NT RWM No RWM+MF 11.3% RWM+MF 
Option III WH RWM Yes WM+WH 1.3% WM+WH 
Table 4.9 Decision making for combined strategies under each ordering policy 
4.6 CONCLUSION 
This study has corroborated the assertion that incorporating strategies to reduce the 
bullwhip effect does not necessarily constitute improvement in supply chain cost 
performance as previously established by Chen and Samroengraja (2004). In fact, as 
the results suggest, the policy with the lowest bullwhip effect (option I- parameter 
based ordering policy) has higher supply chain cost than that with higher bullwhip 
effect (option II- batch ordering policy). In addition, the study included the 
wholesaler tier in the simulation modelling, which was not included in Chen and 
Samroengraja (2004), and found evidence to support the claim of Baganha and 
Cohen (1998) that the wholesaler has a stabilising effect on bullwhip effect but this 
claim does not always apply, at least, to the combined batch-and-parameter based 
policy type (option III). 
The results also suggest that a policy with a higher ordering rate (OR) and lower 
EAOQ (Case-2) performs better than a policy with lower OR and higher EAOQ 
(Case-1) under normal circumstances, but there exists a point along the continuum 
between Case-1 and Case-2 where performance is optimal (or at least near optimal). 
In summary, this study has substantiated the argument that the direction and 
magnitude of benefit derived from information sharing will depend on the operating 
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condition of the supply chain (ordering policy and supply chain structure) and each 
tier of the supply chain is affected differently. This study has also shown that, since 
ISL and structural reconfiguration are both supply chain improvement strategies, 
both can be adopted at once or in a piece meal manner. However piece meal 
adoption needs to be carefully considered as the synergy of the two improvement 
strategies may have a less beneficial effect or even a negative effect altogether.  
Effectively, under the parameter based policy, a piecemeal adoption can either start 
with full information sharing and then manufacturing simplification or vice versa but 
preferably the former. However, under the batch ordering system, the piecemeal 
adoption should start with full information sharing and then manufacturing 
simplification. On the other hand, under the combined policy, the wholesaling 
simplification strategy should be adopted first and then the sharing between the 
wholesaler and the manufacturer alone. 
4.6.1 Managerial Implication  
Information sharing, be it full (RWM) or partial (RW or WM), is not always 
beneficial to the supply chain and some members are even worse off than when 
information was not shared. The benefit of course is determined by the ordering 
policy of choice and the structure of the supply chain, as this study has shown. In a 
decentralised supply chain where each tier or agent in each tier has autonomy over 
its decisions and can decide to share information with the upstream agent in order to 
improve its own operation, it is particularly important for supply chain managers to 
know how such information sharing affects them even if they are not directly 
involved in the sharing. This knowledge is key so as to be able to demand for 
incentives if such information strategy has a detrimental effect on one’s operation. 
Therefore the implementation of any information sharing strategy should be fully 
assessed (especially for non-participating members) before undertaking it at any 
level.  
There has been recent call for simplifying the supply chain as the growing level of 
interdependence between organisations, especially in a supply chain setting, is 
becoming increasingly problematic for effective management. Supply chain 
managers should also bear in mind the effect of structural improvement in the supply 
chain and how the benefit of any current information sharing strategy might be 
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affected as this study has shown that under certain ordering policies, some supply 
structures do not combine well with certain information sharing strategies. 
4.6.2 Need for Further Research 
The decisions made in this chapter might be premature as the supply chain is subject 
to disruption and when this occurs the anticipated benefit may no longer be viable. 
Therefore what was perceived to be an optimal supply chain scenario may not be in 
the face of a disruption. It was necessary to conduct the experiments in the non-
breach scenario (as done in this chapter) so that the impact of information security 
breach can be assessed by comparing this to the performance in the breach scenarios. 
The next study therefore takes a look at the impact of disruptions caused by 
information security breach on supply chain performance and includes this in the 
final decision making. The next chapter critically examines this to see how the 
anticipated benefit of information sharing or supply chain restructuring diminishes or 
is validated under information security breach disruption.  
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Chapter 5 THE IMPACT OF INFORMATION SECURITY BREACH 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
It has been established in the previous chapter that under a non-breach scenario, two 
types of strategies: supply chain structural reconfiguration strategies and information 
sharing strategies, hold benefit to the supply chain depending on the ordering policy 
of choice. These two strategies have been dubbed improvement strategies but this 
has been examined under normal circumstances i.e. no disruption. However, in most 
real life operations, disruption is inevitable and it is still not clear from past literature 
how the landscape of the benefit of either or both improvement strategies changes in 
the face of disruption. It is therefore imperative that the evaluation of these two 
improvement strategies be done with consideration for the impact of such 
disruptions. 
The flow of information within the supply chain is crucial to the timely flow of 
materials across the supply chain. Any disruption in this flow of information would 
create a disruption in the flow of materials and hence have an impact on performance 
of the supply chain. Information security breach causes disruption in the flow of 
information and this is increasingly inevitable as the level of sophistication and 
depth of perpetration is known to increase year in year out. This study therefore aims 
to establish the nature of the impact of information security breach on supply chain 
performance under the scenarios established in the previous chapter. This study 
posits that the assessment of the impact of information security breach may 
ultimately affect the proclivity of the supply chain to adopt some of the promising 
improvement strategies discussed in the previous chapter.  
5.1.2 Research Motivation and Research Questions 
The magnitude and direction4 of breach impact would depend on the nature of 
the breach, hereafter called breach profile, and the type of ordering policy being used 
in the supply chain. The profile of a breach is conceptualised in this thesis as the 
level of frequency of occurrence (RoC) of the breach and the severity/disruption 
duration of the breach when it occurs. A less disruptive but less recurring breach is 
                                                 
4 Direction refers to whether the effect is positive or negative. 
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classified as having a breach profile 1 (BP1). From Table 3.2 in section 3.4.1, it is 
clear that IBMS and PT belong to this class. A less disruptive but highly recurring 
breach is termed breach profile 2 (BP2) with AOW a very good example, while a 
highly disruptive but less recurring breach is classified as breach profile 3 (BP3) 
with SFDD a very good example, shown previously in Table 3.2. Generally BP1 and 
BP2 are classified as less disruptive breaches but BP2 is typically a highly recurring 
breach. On the other hand BP3 is also classified as a highly disruptive breach. These 
three profiles would affect the supply chain in different ways but this has not been 
established in past literature.  
First this chapter examines the level of impact information security breach has on 
supply chain performance and then evaluates how the impact of a breach at one end 
of the supply chain is transmitted to members of the same supply chain existing in 
upstream end. The transmission of impact is called the reverberating effect of the 
breach. This is defined as the condition where the breach occurring at the 
downstream negatively impacts the performance of supply agents as one goes 
upstream. The question here is;  
Question 2: Does the impact of information security breach increase or decrease as 
one goes upstream?  
Secondly, this chapter evaluates how the RoC level and the disruption duration level 
of the breach affect supply chain performance at an operational level (individual 
agent performances) and a strategic level (supply chain performance). Hence the 
following question: 
Question 3: What is the effect of increasing the RoC or disruption duration from low 
to high on the impact a breach has on supply chain performance? 
This knowledge is also important in order to efficiently and effectively incorporate 
the right risk management measures and to have them at the appropriate levels. Risk 
management measures cover three main aspects: prevention & deterrence; detection 
& recovery, and corrective measures. Disruption duration is a function of level of 
security breach corrective measures (otherwise called mitigation measures) and RoC 
is indicative of the required level of security breach prevention & deterrence 
measures (otherwise called prevention measures). Therefore if a change in disruption 
duration from low to high have greater negative effect than that of RoC for any 
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supply chain scenario, then IT priority would be on corrective measures, otherwise 
the priority would be prevention & deterrence.   
Thirdly, this chapter examines whether the improvement strategies (structural 
reconfiguration and information sharing) prescribed in the previous chapter can 
benefit the supply chain in a breach scenario.  
Question 4: Are the improvement strategies beneficial to the supply chain especially 
under disruption brought about by information security breach? 
The best solution to avoiding or reducing the impact of information security breach 
of course would be to have appropriate levels of prevention and deterrence; detective 
and recovery, and corrective measures. However, if an improvement strategy or 
combination of improvement strategies is found to reduce the impact of a breach on 
the base model, then such strategy or combination of strategies is said to have a 
mitigating effect and can be used as a breach impact reduction (or mitigation) 
strategy. If this impact is made worse, however, such strategy or combination of 
strategies is considered to have an exacerbating effect. If no effect on the impact is 
observed then the effect is said to be of the stabilising type. 
5.1.1 Nature of Breach Occurrence 
The knowledge of how each ordering policy, structure and information sharing 
scenario are impacted by each breach profile and the extent of the impact to all 
agents in the supply chain is crucial to the formation or fostering of any supply chain 
partnership. It has not been shown which ordering policy would be most resilient5 to 
security breach and which one would be the best cost performer under various 
breach circumstances. It is also not fully known how various operating conditions 
mitigate this impact. 
It is important to keep in mind that the assumption in our model is that when a 
security breach occurs at the retailer’s end, the information system that allows 
customers to place demand becomes unavailable and the breach disruption duration 
represents the amount of time it takes to rectify the problem caused by the breach. 
                                                 
5 Most resilient here means least affected by security breach impact in terms of percentage increase in 
operating cost. 
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The assumption is that the end customer waits till the retailer’s system is restored 
and places it demand. Therefore demand is not actually lost during the disruption 
period but only delayed. During this period the retailer is unable to know what the 
actual demand would be. The retailer then assumes the demand for that day is zero 
but continues to forecast demand based on moving average forecasting technique. It 
is important to state at this juncture that the cost being investigated in this study are 
those directly related to inventory management and not to other functions in the 
business. Therefore the total cost of information security breach may be significantly 
higher than those mentioned here. This is one of the scope and limitation of the 
research. 
5.1.3 Structure of This Chapter 
The rest of this chapter is sequenced as follows. Section 5.2 discusses the anatomy of 
a security breach using the serial supply chain scenario with no information sharing 
(also called the base model) for all three ordering options. Subsequently, the breach 
mitigating, exacerbating and stabilising effect (MES effect) of restructuring from a 
serial structure to the other structure types alone is examined in 5.3 and the MES 
effect of the various information sharing levels alone is evaluated in 5.4. Section 5.5 
then examines how the interaction effect of structure and ISL mitigates, exacerbates 
or stabilises the impact of security breach.  
5.2 ANATOMY OF A BREACH IMPACT 
To start with, this study aims to understand how each ordering policy responds to 
security breach impact. To estimate the impact of information security breach for 
each ordering policy, the performance in the non-breach scenario (in chapter 4) is 
compared to the performance in the breach scenario. First, the difference between the 
cost performance in the breach scenario and the non-breach scenario is calculated 
and expressed as a percentage of the cost performance in the non-breach scenario. 
However the impact of breach on the fill rate performance is taken directly as the 
difference between fill rate performance in breach scenario and the non-breach 
scenario and not expressed as a fraction of non-breach scenario performance.  
The percentage difference is termed ‘breach impact’ and the direction of the breach 
impact can be of a positive type or a negative one. A negative value reveals that the 
cost in the breach scenario is higher than that of the corresponding non-breach state 
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indicating that a poorer performance occurs when there is a breach while a positive 
value indicates a better performance when breach occurs. 
This impact is tested for significance at p<0.05. The reason for this test is to show 
whether breach impact is statistically significant at p<0.05 or not. If the magnitude of 
the breach impact is not statistically significant at p<0.05, then the breach impact is 
said to be non-existent and this is identified with superscript ‘nd’. Otherwise the 
breach impact is said to be existent and significant. The breach impact on each 
supply agent for each of its performance measures (daily average holding, backlog, 
ordering costs and fill rate) and that on the entire supply chain is computed for each 
ordering policy under the serial non-information sharing scenario, the base model.  
The impact of all four information security breaches on the base model under each 
ordering policy is shown in Figure 5.1. It is clear from Figure 5.1 that the various 
information security breaches have varying impact on the supply chain depending on 
the profile of the breach and the ordering policy being used in the chain.  
 
Figure 5.1 Effect of ordering option on breach impact on supply chain with no 
integration 
Recall System Failure and Data Destruction (SFDD), Attack on The Web (AOW), 
Infection by Malicious Software (IBMS) and Physical Theft (PT) are the four 
information security breach being studied. SFDD (BP3) appear to increase the 
operating cost for all ordering options while AOW (BP2), IBMS (BP1) and PT 
(BP1) actually decreases the supply chain daily average operating cost under options 
I and III while that of option II is increased.  
-20%
-10%
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
SFDD AOW PT IBMS
%
 in
cr
e
as
e
 in
 c
o
st
Breach Impact Comparison
Option I
Option II
Option III
136 
 
The reason for the above observation requires further analysis. Therefore, the 
analysis will start with an examination of how the ordering pattern of each policy is 
changed to cope with the effect of the breach profile which is an indication of the 
flexibility of the policy to breach, defined here as ‘breach resilience’. Then the effect 
of the breach profile on cost performance is examined to understand where risk 
management priorities lie. To understand the effect of the breach profile, one needs 
to know what the effect of increasing one element of the breach profile would be. In 
other words what is the effect of a high disruption duration or what is the effect of a 
high rate of occurrence (RoC)? BP1 has the same breach recurrence rate as BP3 but 
BP3 has significantly higher disruption duration than BP1. Hence the effect of 
having a higher Disruption duration can be assessed when you compare the impact 
of BP1 to that of BP3.  In the same light BP1 has the same disruption duration with 
BP2 but BP2 has a significantly higher recurrence rate than BP1. Consequently the 
effect of having a higher recurrence rate can be assessed when the impact of BP2 is 
compared to that of BP1. IBMS and PT belongs to the BP1 category, although PT 
has a slightly higher RoC than IBMS. AOW and SFDD belong to BP2 and BP3 
respectively.  
5.2.1 Impact on Ordering Pattern 
The change in ordering pattern is conceptualised as the change in ordering frequency 
and effective daily average order quantity. The change brought about by information 
security breach on the effective average order quantity (EAOQ) is calculated by 
taking the difference between the EAOQ in the breach state and the corresponding 
non-breach state and this is expressed as a percentage of the non-breach state. Since 
the ordering rate is originally measured in percentage, the difference due to 
information security breach is computed as is and not expressed as a percentage of 
the non-breach state. The result of this computation for the parameter based ordering 
policy (option I), batch ordering policy (option II) and batch-and-parameter based 
policy (option III) is shown in Table 5.1, 5.2, 5.3 respectively. The original values 
for each supply agent in the non-breach state is included in the first row in each 
table. The changes to the original values brought about by each security breach 
(measured in percentage) is included in the subsequent rows and labelled 
accordingly.  
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OPTION I 
 
Retailer Wholesaler Manufacturer 
 
OR % EAOQ OR % EAOQ OR % EAOQ 
NB 100 9.98 100 9.97 100 9.94 
 Breach Impact 
AOW 19.97 -25.01% 19.97 -25.14% 19.97 -25.02% 
IBMS 1.28 -1.30% 1.28 -1.31% 1.28 -1.32% 
PT 1.99 -2.04% 1.99 -2.06% 1.99 -2.07% 
SFDD 6.40 -6.89% 6.40 -7.00% 6.40 -7.05% 
Table 5.1 Effect of security breach on the ordering pattern of the base stock 
policy (option I) 
 
OPTION II 
 
Retailer Wholesaler Manufacturer 
 
OR % EAOQ OR % EAOQ OR % EAOQ 
NB 89 11.28 62 16.00 49 20.36 
 Breach Impact 
AOW 0.03 0.02% 0.04 0.01% -0.04 0.14% 
IBMS 0.00 0.00% -0.01 0.00% -0.03 0.02% 
PT 0.00 -0.01% -0.01 0.00% -0.02 0.01% 
SFDD 0.29 -0.01% 0.08 0.21% 0.01 0.35% 
Table 5.2 Effect of Security breach on Option II ordering pattern 
 
OPTION III 
 
Retailer Wholesaler Manufacturer 
 
OR % EAOQ OR % EAOQ OR % EAOQ 
NB 98 10.18 89 11.16 67 14.81 
 Breach Impact 
AOW 19.24 -24.46% 15.98 -21.95 9.04% -15.66 
IBMS 1.17 -1.21% 0.93 -1.07 0.61% -0.94 
PT 1.86 -1.95% 1.50 -1.73 0.87% -1.35 
SFDD 6.28 -6.89% 5.74 -7.01 4.33% -7.10 
Table 5.3 Effect of security breach on Option III ordering pattern 
5.2.1.1 Parameter based ordering policy (option I) 
The dynamic nature of the parameter based policy such as the base stock policy 
(option I) where the order quantity can be large or small depending on the how far 
the inventory position is from the order-up-to level makes it a very flexible policy to 
uncertainties as suggested by the low bullwhip effect discussed in the previous 
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chapter. The ordering pattern is changed to cope with the effect of security breach 
whereby order quantity is increased to cope with the sudden demand increase that 
the breach creates (recall the assumption in section 5.1.2), which then results in 
lower ordering rate. From Table 5.1, one can see that there is a noticeable change in 
ordering pattern of all supply chain agents due to the influence of a security breach. 
An interesting observation here is that the increase in ordering rate and effective 
order quantity is similar for all members despite the fact that the breach occurred at 
the retailer. This shows that a breach regardless of its profile has a consistent 
reverberating effect on the ordering pattern for all associated supply chain agent 
using parameter based ordering (base stock policy). Examining the effect a breach 
with high RoC would have on the ordering pattern is done by comparing the effect of 
BP1 (low RoC) to BP2 (High RoC) and that of disruption duration is done by 
comparing the effect of BP1 (low disruption duration) to BP2 (high disruption 
duration). This examination shows that both disruption duration and RoC of a breach 
have the same effect on the ordering pattern of the parameter based ordering policy 
but the magnitude of effect of RoC is greater. 
5.2.1.2 Batch ordering policy (option II) 
In contrast to the effect of security breach under the base stock policy (option I), the 
ordering pattern of the supply chain using optimal EOQ model (option II) appear to 
be unperturbed to a large extent by the breaches as shown in Table 5.2. There seems 
to be negligible alteration in the pattern with which supply chain agents place their 
orders. In other words the reaction of batch ordering policy to security breach is 
minimal or non-existent and as such little or no flexibility is inherent in it. In 
addition there is no apparent breach reverberating effect on the ordering pattern of 
supply agents as one goes upstream the chain. It is also evident that higher RoC and 
disruption duration have no effect on ordering pattern. 
5.2.1.3 Combined batch-and-parameter based policy (option III) 
The effect of security breach on the ordering pattern of the retailer using option III is 
similar to that produced in option I. However the reverberating effect to the 
wholesaler and the manufacturer tells a different story and this is shown in Table 5.3. 
Common trends emerge for all security breach type. Like option I, the change in 
ordering pattern here shows the flexibility inherent in option III. Unlike option I 
where the same change occurred throughout the supply chain, the percentage change 
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in ordering pattern (i.e. the ordering rate and the effective order quantity) decreases 
as you go upstream. Higher RoC and higher disruption duration produces bigger 
changes in ordering pattern with RoC having the greater effect. This seems plausible 
as the order size in option III is determined by how far the inventory position is from 
the re-order point and a simple economic order quantity is included. Just like option 
I, option III ensures to bring the inventory position back to the desired position as 
quickly as possible but with an additional EOQ giving it a better capacity to respond 
to increased demand. It is to be reminded that the EOQ calculation here is simplistic 
(i.e. one batch) and not optimal like option II (2.236 batches). Therefore, option III 
combines the flexibility of option I and the advantage of bigger order quantity of 
option II. Judging from the level of change produced by option III in response to the 
security breaches, one could infer that the ordering policy has some resilience. 
However, since the change in ordering pattern is lesser in magnitude to that of option 
I, one would expect that the level of security breach resilience would be less than 
that of option I. An analysis of the cost impact would serve to confirm this 
supposition. 
5.2.2 Impact on Cost Performance 
The impact of security breach for each ordering option is computed as described in 
the opening paragraph of section 5.2 and shown in the subsequent tables for the 
various ordering options. The tables include the result of the performance in a non-
breach scenario which is labelled ‘No breach’ and the impact of each breach type is 
labelled accordingly.  
5.2.2.1 Parameter based ordering policy 
Since the base stock policy inherently increases the order quantity and reduces the 
ordering frequency to cope with the security breach effect, one would expect a 
proportional decrease in daily average ordering cost. This is because a decrease in 
ordering frequency decreases the total fixed ordering cost which should result in a 
decrease in daily average ordering cost. This is confirmed in Table 5.4 as there was a 
2% (AOW), 1% (SFDD), 0.22% (PT), and 0.14% (IBMS) reduction in daily average 
ordering cost respectively. This order coincides with the order of ordering rate 
reduction AOW>SFDD>PT>IBMS. Those of PT and IBMS approximates to zero as 
the change in ordering pattern was very little. 
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Table 5.4 Cost impact of security breach on option I ordering policy (negative 
indicates increase while positive indicate a decrease) 
The result in Table 5.4 also suggests a breach increases the daily supply chain 
holding cost and a proportional decrease in supply chain daily backlog cost, although 
this might be different for the respective supply chain agents. The reason for this 
observation stems from our assumption in the model that during a breach, the retailer 
does not receive any demand information and consequently fulfils only the 
outstanding backlogs during this period. This breach period creates a somewhat 
‘pseudo-respite period’ for the retailer and wholesaler where all the outstanding 
backlog can be fulfilled and any excess inventory received from the upstream agent 
during this time is stored, hence the increase in holding cost. After the disruption 
period the demand information accumulated during this period suddenly becomes 
available and the flexibility of the base stock policy ensures that the supply chain is 
able to recover from the increased demand shock by placing orders which reflect the 
current state of the operation. The percentage increase in holding cost however is 
    
Holding 
£ 
Backlog £ Ordering £ Total £ 
Fill 
Rate % 
No 
Breach 
Retailer 0.04 140.04 54.83 194.90 0.42 
Wholesaler 1.93 55.97 54.80 112.69 0.64 
Manufacturer 24.69 5.09 59.62 89.40 0.95 
Total 26.66 201.10 169.24 396.99   
BREACH IMPACT (Percentage change in cost) 
    Holding  Backlog  Ordering  Total  
Fill 
Rate % 
SFDD 
Retailer -18311 17 1 9 5 
Wholesaler -595 18 0 -1 4 
Manufacturer -39 -226 1 -23 -9 
Total -105 11 1 -1   
AOW 
Retailer -9705 34 2 23 10 
Wholesaler -520 49 2 16 14 
Manufacturer -21 65 3 0 3 
Total -71 39 2 16   
IBMS 
Retailer -217 5 0 4 1 
Wholesaler -27 7 0 3 2 
Manufacturer -2 -3 0 -1 0 
Total -4 6 0 3   
PT 
Retailer -311 7 0 5 2 
Wholesaler -42 11 0 5 3 
Manufacturer -3 -3 0 -1 0 
Total -6 8 0 4   
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highest at the retailer and lowest at the manufacturer for all the security breach 
examined, which indicates that the breach reverberating effect on holding cost 
reduces as one goes up the chain 
Looking at the performance at the operational level of individual agents we see this 
impact varies depending on the profile of the breach, that is, the rate of occurrence 
(RoC) and the disruption duration. The effect of RoC on all supply agents is quite 
similar as their daily average operating cost performances improved with increased 
RoC with the manufacturer not faring as well as the other two agents. The only 
difference in the observation for the manufacturer compared to those of the retailer 
and the wholesaler is that BP1 had a negative impact on the backlog cost of the 
manufacturer whereas the impact was positive on the retailer and wholesaler’s 
backlog. This observation at the manufacturer is due to the assumption that the 
manufacturer has a production lead time of 3 days and transportation lead time of 2 
days which means it takes the manufacturer a total of 5 days to get the product to the 
wholesaler. Therefore there is no ‘pseudo-respite time’ for the manufacturer to fill 
outstanding backlogs. Under BP2 (AOW) however, the manufacturer experienced a 
positive effect in its backlog. This is because BP2 (AOW), being a highly frequently 
occurring breach, creates a sort of learning curve effect where its repetitive nature 
causes the order quantity at each ordering point to be larger than its less repetitive 
counterpart (IBMS and PT) thus making the manufacturer carry more inventory. 
This increases the fill rate ability of the manufacturer and hence improves its backlog 
performance than any other breach type. However the balance between the improved 
backlog and increased holding cost does not yield a positive benefit, hence zero 
effect of BP2.  
Examining the influence of disruption duration, it is obvious that significantly 
increasing the disruption duration improves the daily average operating cost 
performance of the retailer but this improvement is not as large as the effect of RoC. 
However, the effect of disruption duration on the performance of the wholesaler and 
manufacturer is a worsening effect. The effect of the longer disruption period in BP3 
results in higher holding cost as inventory is held for longer period while the pipeline 
inventory satisfies the pre-existing backlog. This causes an improvement in the 
backlog cost of the retailer and the wholesaler but the increase in holding cost 
outweighs the decrease in backlog cost for the wholesaler. The manufacturer’s 
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backlog is worsened than under BP3. The obvious reason for this is that the 
manufacturer does not enjoy the pseudo-respite period that the retailer and the 
wholesaler enjoys. Since the disruption period in BP1 (IBMS) is only one day, the 
effect on backlog cost is only a 3% increase. However, the disruption period in 
SFDD is 5 days creating a bigger effect on backlog cost increase (at 226%).  
However the impact on the total supply chain daily operating cost is either positive 
or negative depending on the profile of the breach under the base stock policy. BP1 
and BP2 both have an oddly positive effect on the total supply chain daily operating 
cost with BP2 having the highest positive benefit. Consequently the effect of RoC is 
an increase in positive benefit to the supply chain. On the other hand, BP3 had a 
negative effect, therefore comparing BP1 to BP3 suggest that the effect of disruption 
duration is a worsening of supply chain daily average operating cost performance as 
shown in Table 5.4.  
The general observation under the parameter based ordering policy such as the base 
stock policy is that the reverberating effect of BP1, BP2 and BP3 increases as one 
goes upstream the chain, although BP1 and BP2 have an oddly positive effect on 
retailer and wholesaler’s performance. It is also clear that increasing RoC of a breach 
produces a resultant positive effect on supply chain daily total operating cost while 
disruption duration produces a resultant negative effect. 
5.2.2.2 Batch ordering policy (option II) 
Although being an optimal EOQ model under normal circumstances, the order 
quantity produced under option II is somewhat the same and does not change 
significantly to cope with the effect of the breach. This means that the effect of the 
pseudo-respite period would be negated by the inability of the policy to increase 
order quantity to satisfy the relatively large demand coming in after the disruption 
duration. Therefore, in contrast to option I where the pseudo-respite period effect led 
to a reduction in backlog cost, the inflexibility or lack of resilience of option II 
would result in a backlog cost rise. The impact of each security breach on supply 
chain using option II ordering policy is shown in Table 5.5. The performance under a 
non-breach scenario and the percentage rise or fall in cost performance and fill rate 
performance under each security breach is shown. 
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Table 5.5 Cost impact of security breach on Option II ordering policy (negative 
indicates increase while positive indicate a decrease) 
Suffice to say that the ordering cost is expected to stay the same if no changes occur 
to the rate and quantity of the orders. Considering that there was no change in 
ordering pattern, the daily average ordering cost of all supply chain agents was not 
impacted by any of the security breaches. The impact of all the security breaches, 
however, was a rise in total supply chain holding cost and backlog cost. The level of 
impact again differs for each supply chain agent depending on the profile of the 
breach. Also, the reverberating effect tends to decrease as one goes further upstream. 
Again, to examine the effect of RoC on individual performance, it is evident that that 
increasing the RoC of the breach worsens the performance of the retailer but has no 
apparent effect on the performance of the wholesaler and manufacturer. On the other 
hand, increasing the disruption duration worsens the performance of all supply 
agents with the retailer worse off and the manufacturer least affected. However, 
    Holding £ Backlog £ 
Ordering 
£ 
Total £ 
Fill 
Rate % 
No 
Breach 
Retailer 2.41 63.35 54.25 120.00 0.61 
Wholesaler 16.98 16.90 52.93 86.81 0.86 
Manufacturer 39.21 9.07 54.68 102.96 0.92 
Total 58.60 89.32 161.85 309.77   
BREACH IMPACT(Percentage change in cost) 
    Holding  Backlog  Ordering  Total  
Fill 
Rate % 
SFDD 
Retailer -327 -225 0 -125 -29 
Wholesaler -27 -100 0 -25 -11 
Manufacturer -4 -35 0 -4 -3 
Total -24 -182 0 -57   
AOW 
Retailer -29 -41 0 -22 -8 
Wholesaler -3 -9 0 -2 -1 
Manufacturer 0 3 0 0 0 
Total -2 -30 0 -9   
IBMS 
Retailer -15 -5 0 -3 -1 
Wholesaler -1 -4 0 -1 -1 
Manufacturer 0 -2 0 0 0 
Total -1 -5 0 -2   
PT 
Retailer -18 -10 0 -6 -2 
Wholesaler -2 -7 0 -2 -1 
Manufacturer 0 -2 0 0 0 
Total -1 -8 0 -3   
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examining the effect of the breach profile on supply chain performance, it is clear 
that disruption duration has a very large effect on supply chain performance than 
RoC with both producing a negative effect.  
In conclusion, the breach reverberating effect diminishes under BP1, BP2 and BP3 
as one goes upstream the chain. Increasing the RoC only negatively affects the 
performance of the retailer and this effect produces a resultant negative effect on the 
entire supply chain performance while increasing the disruption duration of the 
breach increases the negative impact a breach has on the supply chain and all its 
members.  
5.2.2.3 Combined batch-and-parameter based policy (option III) 
The impact of each security breach on supply chain using option III ordering policy 
is shown in Table 5.6. Like option I, BP2 and BP3 caused a very significant 
reduction in the ordering rate of option III which led to a significant reduction in the 
daily average ordering cost of supply agents. On the other hand, the reduction of the 
ordering rate due to BP1 is not large enough to offset a change in daily average 
ordering cost of the supply chain under the combined batch-and-parameter based 
ordering policy (III). Considering the impact of these breaches on other cost 
performance measures (as shown in Table 5.6), the holding cost of all supply agents 
was increased, as expected, but the effect on backlog differed based on the breach 
profile.  
In general the combined batch-and-parameter based ordering policy behaves like the 
parameter based policy under information security breach but retains the optimality 
that the additional EOQ component provides. Therefore the impact of a security 
breach on its performance is generally in between the performance of parameter 
based and batch ordering policies under the same breach.  
The main observation here (Table 5.6) is that increasing the RoC negatively affects 
the performance of all the supply agents, although the effect is not very large. An 
increase in the disruption duration on the other hand negatively affects supply 
agents’ performances and this effect is greater than the effect of RoC. Interestingly, 
the reverberating effect of a breach of the type BP1 increases only slightly, as one 
goes up the chain while BP2 and BP3 increases and then decreases after the 
wholesaler tier.  
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Table 5.6 Cost impact of security breach on option III ordering policy (negative 
indicates increase while positive indicate a decrease) 
5.2.3 Summary of Findings and Discussion   
This study has shown that priorities as to which element of the breach profile 
(disruption duration or RoC) should be addressed depends on the ordering policy of 
choice. This would also inform which aspect of risk management measures to 
prioritise. For a parameter based ordering policy, increased RoC only increases the 
positive effect of a breach on the performance of the parameter based ordering policy 
while disruption duration increases the negative effect. Therefore supply chain 
priority for such parameter based ordering policy would be to focus on reducing the 
disruption duration of a breach, hence breach correction or mitigation would be a 
priority. The priority for a supply chain with batch ordering policy and that for a 
combined batch-and-parameter based ordering is also breach mitigation as disruption 
duration had a greater effect on breach cost impact than RoC. 
    
Holding 
£ 
Backlog £ 
Ordering 
£ 
Total £ 
Fill 
Rate % 
No 
Breach 
Retailer 1.94 50.01 54.73 106.68 0.67 
Wholesaler 12.90 12.56 54.26 79.72 0.89 
Manufacturer 56.60 0.60 56.30 113.50 0.99 
Total 71.44 63.17 165.28 299.90   
  
BREACH IMPACT(Fractional change in cost) 
    Holding  Backlog  Ordering  Total  
Fill 
Rate  
SFDD 
Retailer -621 -12 1 -17 -3 
Wholesaler -129 -78 0 -33 -7 
Manufacturer -13 -1475 1 -14 -8 
Total -51 -39 1 -20   
AOW 
Retailer -553 21 2 1 5 
Wholesaler -116 33 1 -13 3 
Manufacturer -10 68 2 -4 0 
Total -44 24 2 -5   
IBMS 
Retailer -37 7 0 3 2 
Wholesaler -9 8 0 0 1 
Manufacturer -1 -15 0 0 0 
Total -3 7 0 1   
PT 
Retailer -50 8 0 3 2 
Wholesaler -14 11 0 0 1 
Manufacturer -1 -16 0 -1 0 
Total -5 9 0 1   
146 
 
The breach cost impact reverberating effect differs for the three ordering options 
considered. The effect consistently increases for all three breach profiles considered 
under the parameter based policy while the effect consistently decreases under the 
batch ordering policy. Under the combined policy however, the reverberating effect 
increases slightly when faced with breach of type BP1 and the effect increases and 
then decreases at the manufacturer. Therefore supply chains using the parameter 
based ordering would be more wary of information security breach occurring 
downstream in the supply chain than those using batch ordering policy. In a supply 
chain using the combined policy type, the wholesalers should be particularly wary of 
information security breach occurring downstream. In all, members of the supply 
chain existing in the upstream part of the supply chain would be affected by 
information security breach occurring at the downstream side of the chain due to the 
reverberating effect of the breach. This study therefore calls for better cooperation 
among supply partners and supports the claim that information security breach 
incidence and data should be shared between supply chain partners. This would help 
the non-breached, but affected, partners better prepare for eliminating or reducing 
the reverberating effect of such breach. 
Finally, recall from the previous chapter that under normal circumstances (i.e. no 
security breach), the batch ordering policy performs better than the parameter based 
ordering policy. However in this chapter, the result has shown that the parameter 
based policy outperforms the batch ordering policy when breach RoC is high (BP2) 
or disruption duration is high (BP3). However when the breach is of the type BP1, 
the batch ordering policy still outperforms the parameter based ordering policy. The 
combined batch-and-parameter based policy performs best in both breach and non-
breach situations. So far the performance of each ordering policy under information 
security breach has been assessed in a serial non-information sharing scenario (i.e. 
the base model). The next section evaluates the effect supply chain structural 
reconfiguration strategy has on the impact of information security breach. The 
question here is; can structural reconfiguration be used as a cost mitigation strategy 
even under disruption situations caused by information security breach?  
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5.3 STRUCTURE EFFECT ON BREACH IMPACT 
To estimate the mitigating effect of supply chain structure on the impact of security 
breach, the difference between the impact of security breach on the base model and 
that of the reconfigured scenario relative to the base model is computed. First the 
impact of security breach on the base model is calculated and expressed as a 
percentage (as explained in section 5.2). Then the impact of security breach on the 
reconfigured scenario relative to the base model is computed (also expressed in 
percentage). The difference between these two percentages is an estimation of how 
much reduction in breach impact can be derived when structural reconfiguration is 
adopted. This method of computation is used because it ensures that all the breach 
impacts computed have a common relative point (the base model with no breach) 
which makes the impact mitigation percentage comparison between structures more 
direct and accurate. This percentage difference is termed ‘structure effect on breach 
impact’ (SEOBI) and is tested for significance at p<0.05 to show whether the effect 
of SEOBI is statistically significant at p<0.05 or not. If the SEOBI is not significant 
at p<0.05, then SEOBI is said to be non-existent. Otherwise the effect is said to be 
existent. The direction of the effect on operating cost can be of a positive type 
(mitigating), a negative type (exacerbating) or neither (stabilising). A negative value 
reveals an exacerbating effect while a positive value indicates a mitigating effect. A 
non-significant value shows that the structure effect is of a stabilising nature 
regardless of it being either positive or negative. The SEOBI on each supply agent 
for each of its performance measures (daily average holding, backlog, ordering 
costs) and that on the entire supply chain is computed for each ordering policy. 
However all the tables shown in this section only include the effect on total daily 
average operating cost of each agent (R- retailer, W- wholesaler, M- manufacturer) 
and not the individual daily average costs. The values with superscript ‘nd’ indicate 
that the percentage difference is not statistically significant at p<0.05.  
5.3.1 WH Structure Effect on Breach Impact 
The result shown in the Table 5.7 is the percentage change between the performance 
of a serial chain under security breach and that of a wholesaler structure type under 
security breach.  
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SFDD 
 
R. Cost % W. Cost % M. Cost % SC Total % 
option I -4 6 19 4 
option II 60 21 10 32 
option III 10 30 13 16 
 
AOW 
 
R. Cost % W. Cost % M. Cost % SC Total % 
option I -10 -2nd 5 -5 
option II 8 9 7 8 
option III -4 13 4 4 
 
PT 
 
R. Cost % W. Cost % M. Cost % SC Total % 
option I -5 -2nd 6 -2nd 
option II 0nd 9 7 5 
option III -1nd 11 4 4 
 
IBMS 
 
R. Cost % W. Cost % M. Cost % SC Total % 
option I -4 -1nd 6 -1nd 
option II -1nd 9 7 4 
option III 0nd 11 4 4 
nd- means no significant difference at p<0.05 
Table 5.7 Percentage change in impact due to wholesaling simplification 
5.3.1.1 Influence of WH under Option I Scenario 
As revealed in Table 5.7, the WH structure has a mitigating effect under option I 
when a very disruptive security breach (BP3) is encountered with a 4% reduction in 
SFDD breach impact. However, WH effect makes the impact of a less disruptive but 
highly recurring breach (BP2) on supply chain performance worse than it would be 
in a serial supply chain i.e. exacerbating effect. The exacerbating effect under the 
less disruptive and less recurring breaches PT and IBMS (BP1) is not significant, 
hence considered to be a stabilising effect. Therefore WH structure has a stabilising 
effect on less disruptive, less recurring breaches but when the RoC is at higher levels 
an exacerbating effect is seen.   
At the operational level, the WH structure has an exacerbating impact on the 
retailer’s total operating cost performance under highly disruptive and less disruptive 
breaches. However, the WH-exacerbating effect is not increased with increasing 
disruption duration but increasing the RoC does. For the wholesaler, WH structure 
has a mitigating effect under a highly disruptive breach and a stabilising effect under 
a less disruptive breach. The stabilising effect is not affected by increasing the RoC 
of the breach. The impact of both highly disruptive and less disruptive (but highly 
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occurring) breaches on the manufacturer’s total operating cost performance is 
mitigated under WH structure. This mitigation effect is seen to increase as the 
disruption period increased (between IBMs and SFDD). RoC however does not seem 
to have any impact on the mitigating effect of WH structure on manufacturer’s total 
operating cost performance.  
5.3.1.2 Influence of WH under Option II Scenario 
At the supply chain level, the WH structure appears to hold significant benefit over 
the serial structure both in no-security breach and security breach scenarios. Under 
all the security breach scenarios considered, a WH-mitigating effect is observed as 
shown in Table 5.7. The mitigating effect is highest under a more disruptive breach 
(SFDD) than a less disruptive one (IBMS). Comparing the mitigating effect under 
AOW (8%), PT (5%) and IBMS (4%) reveal that increasing the RoC increases the 
mitigation WH structure stand to offer.  
At the operational level, the retailer enjoys a mitigation of the impact of a very 
disruptive breach on its daily operating cost performance under WH structure. For 
less disruptive breaches such as IBMS and PT, an exacerbating effect is felt at the 
retailer’s end, however not significant (stabilising effect). The exacerbating effect, 
although insignificant, is seen to reduce as RoC increases. However, this changes to 
a mitigating effect when RoC is significantly increased as in the case of AOW 
breach (at approximately 8% mitigation). The wholesaler and the manufacturer on 
the other hand enjoys a mitigation effect regardless of the breach type. They both 
enjoy higher mitigation levels under a more disruptive breach (SFDD) than less 
disruptive ones. The mitigation level is however not significantly affected by RoC 
increase. 
5.3.1.3 Influence of WH under Option III Scenario 
The WH structure is also favourable towards ordering policy of the type ‘option III’ 
in the event of the security breaches mentioned. As shown in Table 5.7, regardless of 
the nature of the breach, the WH structure has a mitigating effect on the magnitude 
of the impact of highly disruptive and less disruptive breaches. Higher levels of 
mitigation occur when the breach is highly disruptive than when the breach is less 
disruptive. A higher level of RoC does not seem to congruently affect the mitigation 
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level, although this appear to reduce with increasing RoC. However the rate of 
change of the mitigation level does not correspond with the rate of change of RoC.  
At the operational level of the supply chain, mitigating effect is only seen to occur 
under a highly disruptive breach (10%) at the retailer’s end while the effect to the 
retailer’s daily operating cost is of an exacerbating nature under a less disruptive 
breach. Although the exacerbating level under PT and IBMS is insignificant at 
p<0.05, the level is however significant under a breach with much higher RoC 
(AOW). Therefore for a less disruptive breach, the exacerbating effect is 
insignificant at lower RoC but become significant with significantly higher RoC. On 
the hand, the wholesaler and the manufacturer both enjoy a WH-mitigation of 
security breach impact on their respective daily operating cost performance. While 
they both enjoy increased mitigation under a highly disruptive breach (comparing 
SFDD to IBMS), the mitigation level enjoyed by both agents is unaffected by 
increased RoC. Therefore, for the wholesaler and manufacturer, RoC has no effect 
on the magnitude of mitigation derivable from a WH structure.  
5.3.1.4 Summary and Implication of Finding 
This section has established that reconfiguring the supply chain from the serial 
structure to the WH configuration can provide benefit both in a security breach 
scenario and in a non-security breach scenario. This benefit of course depends on the 
ordering policy of choice and the profile of the breach.  
Under option I scenario, WH effect is inconsequential when a breach of the type BP1 
occurs but becomes disadvantageous when the breach in question has a high 
recurrence rate. However, it provides a mitigation benefit when the disruption 
duration of the breach is high. Therefore the implication of this to the IT manager is 
that when WH structure is adopted, then more focus is needed in breach prevention 
and deterrence rather than breach mitigation measures. 
For option II and III, WH effect provides mitigation benefits to the supply chain. 
Even in the event of that the disruption duration or recurrence rate of the breach 
increases significantly, WH structure provides increased mitigation benefit. 
Therefore the cost benefit from reconfiguration can be used to upgrade or augment 
existing risk prevention and mitigation tools that were previously unaffordable. This 
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in turn would help prevent future attack from occurring or mitigate it better when it 
occurs and further cost savings can be derived. 
5.3.2 MF Structure Effect on Breach Impact 
The values presented in in Tables 5.8 represent the percentage increase (if negative) 
or decrease (if positive) in impact cost due to the Manufacturing Structure (MF) 
effect.  
 
SFDD 
 
R. Cost % W. Cost % M. Cost % SC Total % 
option I -4 2nd 25 4 
option II 60 13 15 32 
option III 8 18 16 14 
 
AOW 
 
R. Cost % W. Cost % M. Cost % SC Total % 
option I -12 -8 11 -6 
option II 8 1nd 13 8 
option III -1nd 6 9 5 
 
PT 
 
R. Cost % W. Cost % M. Cost % SC Total % 
option I -3nd -2nd 11 1nd 
option II 0nd 0nd 13 4 
option III -3 0nd 6 2 
 
IBMS 
 
R. Cost % W. Cost % M. Cost % SC Total % 
option I -2nd -1nd 11 1nd 
option II -1nd 0nd 13 4 
option III -2nd 0nd 6 2 
nd- means no significant difference at p<0.05 
Table 5.8 Percentage change in impact due to manufacturing simplification 
5.3.2.1 Influence of MF under Option I Scenario 
Considering the profile of a security breach in terms of the disruption duration and 
the frequency with which the breach occurs (also known as RoC), the mitigating role 
of MF structure is more favourable towards the disruption duration than RoC. In fact 
as Table 5.8 suggest, MF effect responds negatively to increasing RoC. From the 
result it is apparent that under high RoC, the stabilising effect of MF diminishes and 
an exacerbating effect is seen. Based on disruption duration, MF structure tend to 
have a mitigating influence on the impact a highly disruptive breach has on supply 
chain daily operating cost. The stabilising effect of MF structure under BP1 
improves and becomes a mitigating type under BP3, confirming that MF effect is 
more favourable towards a breach with higher disruption duration. 
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Looking at the performance of individual supply chain agents under security breach, 
the retailer is not favoured under the MF structure effect. The performance of the 
retailer is worsened under the MF structure revealing that MF has an exacerbating 
effect on how security breach impacts the retailer. In fact this performance is made 
worse under higher levels of disruption duration and RoC. Interestingly for the 
wholesaler, a statistical test shows MF structure has a stabilising effect on the impact 
of a highly disruptive breach. In other words increasing the disruption duration has 
no impact on the stabilising effect of the MF structure on wholesaler daily operating 
cost performance. RoC however has an impact on the stabilising effect of MF. The 
MF effect on the performance of the wholesaler under a breach of type BP1 is of a 
stabilising nature, however this stabilising effect diminishes as RoC increases 
significantly resulting in an exacerbating effect. The manufacturer on the other hands 
benefits from the MF effect especially under a more highly disruptive breach. The 
MF structure has a mitigating effect on the impact of security breach on 
manufacturer’s daily operating cost. The level of mitigation is unaffected by varying 
levels of RoC but is increased under higher disruption duration. 
5.3.2.2 Influence of MF under Option II Scenario 
At the strategic level (that is the supply chain level), a mitigation of the impact of 
security breach on supply chain cost performance is observed regardless of the 
security breach profile as shown in Table 5.8. The more disruptive the breach the 
better the mitigation effect derivable and the higher the RoC the higher the 
mitigation level.  
At the operational level (that is the individual supply chain agent level), the retailer 
either experiences a stabilising effect or a mitigation effect depending on the profile 
of the breach. For a less disruptive breach such as PT and IBMS, the retailer 
experiences a stabilising effect. However this stabilising effect transmogrify into a 
mitigating type when the RoC is significantly increased as in AOW (8%). For the 
more disruptive breach type (SFDD) a mitigation effect is observed at the retailer’s 
end. The MF effect changes from a stabilising nature to a mitigation type when the 
disruption duration of the breach increases significantly as revealed by the 
comparison between the influences on IBMS (stabilisation at 1%) and SFDD 
(mitigation at 60%). The influence on the wholesaler breach performance again 
depends on the profile of the breach. This influence is positive for a more disruptive 
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breach and neutral for a less disruptive type. Therefore, regardless of the RoC level 
of the less disruptive breaches, MF consistently had a stabilising effect on the impact 
of this breach type on wholesaler daily operating cost performance. However, this 
influence goes from a stabilising 0% under IBMS (a less disruptive breach) to a 
mitigating 13% under SFDD (a more disruptive breach). This again shows that the 
wholesaler enjoys greater mitigation influence when the disruption duration is 
increased and maintains a stabilising effect even if the RoC is increased 
significantly. 
The manufacturer enjoys a mitigation of the impact of security breach under the MF 
structure. The mitigating influence of MF on the impact of security breach on the 
manufacturer’s daily operating cost is not significantly perturbed by increasing RoC 
and increasing disruption duration. As shown by the result the mitigation level 
remains at the same level for AOW, PT and IBMS, while there is only a slight 
increase in mitigation level between IBMS and SFDD and this slight increase is not 
commensurate with the increase in disruption duration. 
5.3.2.3 Influence of MF under Option III Scenario 
The supply chain enjoys an improved cost performance in the event of a security 
breach when the MF structure is preferred over the serial structure type as shown in 
Table 5.8. Regardless of the breach profile, a mitigation effect is observed on supply 
chain performance; meaning the worse the breach gets, the better is the derived 
benefit. Worsening the breach by increasing the RoC or the disruption duration 
further increases the benefit derived from MF structure. Although a slight increase in 
RoC (comparing IBMS and PT) does not change the level of mitigation, however, a 
significant increase in RoC level produces a reasonable increase in mitigation effect.  
There is no tangible effect of MF structure on the impact of less disruptive breaches 
on the retailer’s daily operating cost performance, however for more disruptive 
breaches the effect is tangible. Increasing disruption duration means the MF structure 
is able to provided added benefit to the retailer with structure influence going from 
stable under BP1 to higher mitigation under BP2. Increasing RoC has no consistent 
effect on the influence MF has on retailer’s cost impact. There is tangibility in the 
effect disruption duration and RoC has on the way MF influences the wholesaler’s 
cost impact. Increasing breach RoC slightly does not change the level of influence 
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MF has on wholesaler’s performance, however, a significantly elevated RoC 
produces a marked improvement in MF mitigation effect. Again, the wholesaler in 
the MF structure reacts much better than one in the serial counterpart to increased 
disruption duration of information security breach. For the manufacturer however, a 
step change in RoC only slightly improves the mitigation effect of MF structure. 
Increased disruption duration from one day to five days changes the level of 
mitigation on manufacturer’s cost impact from 6% to 16%.  
5.3.2.4 Summary and Implication of Finding 
Like the WH structure, the MF structure also influences the way the supply chain 
reacts to demand and also to information security breach. The result has further 
strengthened the argument that ‘susceptibility’ of an ordering policy to structural 
change determine how much breach impact mitigation the supply chain is able to 
enjoy when such structural changes are made. Under the manufacturing structure, 
option I was the least susceptible to structural and option II was the most susceptible 
while option III was median susceptible in a non-breach scenario. The result from 
this section has shown that the mitigation level of MF configuration towards option 
II performance is highest followed by option III with option I deriving the least 
benefit, confirming the argument. 
It has also been established that reconfiguration from a serial structure into a 
manufacturing structure holds benefit to the supply chain in a non-breach and breach 
scenarios. In the breached scenario, the level of benefit depends on the ordering 
policy and the breach profile. 
Under option I, changing to a MF structure ensure that the supply chain would enjoy 
a reduction in impact cost when a more disruptive breach occurs although the MF 
structure has no significant effect when the breach in question is of a less disruptive 
type. However, under option I, the MF structure is not able to provided benefit to the 
supply chain and in fact exacerbates the impact cost when the breach recurrence rate 
is significantly high. This therefore implies that upon changing to this structure type, 
the prevention and deterrence measure would require more focus than they would in 
a serial chain.  
For option II and III, MF structure brings about a mitigation of breach cost impact 
for the supply chain. Therefore, cost benefit of MF structure under security breach 
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exists regardless of the breach profile whether disruption duration or RoC is high or 
low. The implication of this therefore is that the impact cost benefit derived can be 
redirected towards improving IT security which will yield added benefits on the long 
run. 
5.3.3 Network Structure Effect on Breach Impact 
This section evaluates how the magnitude of security breach impact is changed by 
network reconfiguration under the three ordering options. The network effect (NT-
effect) on breach impact is shown in Table 5.9. 
  SFDD   
 R. Cost % W. Cost % M. Cost % SC Total % 
option I -4 4 19 3 
option II 58 16 15 32 
option III 9 27 13 15 
  AOW   
 R. Cost % W. Cost % M. Cost % SC Total % 
option I -10 -4 5 -5 
option II 7 6 12 9 
option III -4 11 5 3 
  PT   
 R. Cost % W. Cost % M. Cost % SC Total % 
option I -5 -4 6 -2 
option II -1nd 6 13 5 
option III -1nd 7 4 3 
  IBMS   
 R. Cost % W. Cost % M. Cost % SC Total % 
option I -4 -4nd 5 -2nd 
option II -2nd 5 13 5 
option III -1nd 7 5 3 
nd- means no significant difference at p<0.05 
Table 5.9 Percentage change in impact due to network configuration 
5.3.3.1 Influence of Network Structure under Option I Scenario 
Under the network structure, the impact of the security breach on supply chain cost 
performance is only alleviated when the breach has a higher level of disruption 
duration as shown in Table 5.9. This is seen in SFDD where the influence of NT-
structure is a mitigation type at 3% compared to IBMS which is of a stabilising 
nature at -2%. However, the influence becomes an exacerbating type when the RoC 
of the breach increases as evidenced by the result of AOW, PT and IBMS. 
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A similar trend is observed for the wholesaler where N-effect causes a mitigation of 
the impact a highly disruptive breach (SFDD, 4%) has on wholesaler’s daily 
operating cost performance. The effect on the less disruptive breach type (IBMS, -
4%) is not significant but is significant under high RoC (AOW, -4%). Therefore, 
under this structure, the wholesaler should be more wary of increase in RoC rather 
than disruption duration. The retailer does not benefit from the N-effect and in fact 
the N-effect makes impact worse when disruption duration and RoC are increased as 
the result suggest. The manufacturer on the other hand enjoys a mitigation benefit 
from the N-structure configuration. The benefit to the manufacturer’s daily operating 
cost performance increases under increased disruption duration but this benefit 
appears unperturbed by increasing RoC.  
5.3.3.2 Influence of Network Structure under Option II Scenario 
At the supply chain level, the effect of reconfiguration from a serial structure to a 
network structure brings benefit to the way the supply chain is impacted by security 
breach. The impact of information security breach on a supply chain with network 
type configuration would fare better than one with serial configuration. This 
observation is evidenced from the result in Table 5.9 where the percentage change in 
impact from serial to network structure is positive for all the security breach types. 
That is, NT-effect on supply chain cost performance is of a mitigation nature rather 
than stabilisation or exacerbation nature. It is also clear that the level of mitigation is 
in turn influenced by the profile of the breach in terms of disruption duration and rate 
of occurrence (RoC). The mitigating effect of NT-structure in seen to increase 
significantly under a breach with higher disruption duration when the result for 
IBMS (5%) is compared to that of SFDD (32%). In the same light the mitigating 
effect also increase under increased RoC when IBMS (5%), PT (5%) and AOW (9%) 
are compared. 
At the operational level in the supply chain, the benefit to the retailer only comes 
when the breach is more disruptive and highly prevalent. N-effect has a stabilising 
influence on the way the retailer’s daily operating cost is impacted by less disruptive 
and less frequently occurring breaches in a serial supply chain.  However when the 
breach is more disruptive or recurring, the benefit to the retailer is increased and a 
good mitigation level is seen especially when the breach is more disruptive. The 
story is somewhat different for the wholesaler. Although the wholesaler enjoys a 
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mitigation of the security breach impact cost, this mitigation level only significantly 
increased under increased disruption duration but not RoC. Therefore, there is no 
increased N-effect benefit to the wholesaler under increased breach RoC, or at least 
the step increase in RoC is not commensurate with the increase in benefit. A similar 
observation to that of the wholesaler is found at the manufacturer’s end. Although 
there is an observed mitigation effect on manufacturer’s daily operating cost 
performance, the level of mitigation is not commensurate to the level of increase in 
disruption and RoC levels. Therefore there is no apparent increase in benefit to the 
manufacturer if the profile elements of the breach (that is disruption duration and 
RoC) is raised.      
5.3.3.3 Influence of Network Structure under Option III Scenario 
The influence of the network structure on option III is also shown in Table 5.9. A 
mitigating effect is observed at the supply chain level for all breach types. This 
mitigation level is increased between IBMS (3%) and SFDD (15%). Confirming that 
an increased disruption duration does not worsen the role N-effect plays in 
mitigating breach cost impact, but in fact reveals that N-effect has higher 
counteracting effect. The result also shows that the mitigation level is not 
significantly changed between IBMS (3%), PT (3%) and AOW (3%). Confirming 
that the counteracting effect of N structure is not affected by increased RoC. 
For the retailer, the N-effect stabilises the impact of a less disruptive breach type on 
its daily operating cost performance. However this stabilisation diminishes when the 
RoC of the breach increases and an exacerbating effect is observed. For a more 
disruptive breach, the observed stabilising effect of the network structure is 
strengthened and the breach impact is further absorbed by the structure creating a 
mitigating effect. The wholesaler and the manufacturer both enjoy a mitigation of the 
impact of security breach on their daily operating cost performance. Both agents also 
enjoy an increase in the mitigation level in the event of increased disruption duration. 
However the benefit to the manufacturer appear to be unaffected by increased RoC 
while that to the wholesaler is. The wholesaler enjoys better performance under a 
breach with significantly high RoC as shown by the AOW result. 
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5.3.3.4 Summary and Implication of Finding 
This section further validate the argument that supply structure play a mitigation role 
on the way security breach impact the supply chain.  
Under ordering option I, the network structure has an exacerbating effect on supply 
chain performance when faced with a less disruptive breach and this negative effect 
increases when RoC increases. This effect however diminishes and becomes a 
mitigating effect when the breach becomes more disruptive. The implication of this 
is that upon transformation into the network structure, more attention need to be paid 
to improving the breach prevention and deterrence strategy than breach correction 
strategy.  
With option II, the N-effect result in a mitigation of security breach impact on supply 
chain performance and the level of mitigation increases when faced with more highly 
disruptive or recurring breach. Consequently, the IT manager need not worry about 
raising IT security effort because of structural change. In fact reconfiguring the chain 
into a network type structure generates benefits that can be redirected into fortifying 
IT security.  
For option III, the network structure improves the response of the supply chain to 
breach impact by mitigating the cost impact. The level of mitigation increases when 
the disruption duration of the breach significantly increases but the remains at the 
same level when RoC significantly increase instead. This implies that the mitigated 
cost can be re-invested into improving the security level. 
5.3.4 Summary of Findings and Discussion  
The decision framework of whether to accept the improvement strategy as breach 
cost impact mitigation strategy for each supply agent is shown in Figure 5.2.  
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Figure 5.2 Single strategy acceptance decision framework in a breach scenario 
First the cumulative effect of structural reconfiguration on breach impact for each 
scenario is computed and if this computation is positive then the strategy has a 
mitigating effect and is therefore acceptable, otherwise it is not acceptable. The 
reverberating effect is understood by computing the cumulative effect of the 
improvement strategy for each supply agent and then examining if this increases or 
decreases along the supply chain. If the reverberating effect decreases but is still 
significant upstream, then perhaps the retailer should immediately notify the 
upstream partners of any breach so they can quickly respond to the effect such 
breach might have. This is known as information security breach (ISB) sharing. If, 
on the other hand, the reverberating effect of the breach increases or if the impact 
experienced at the retailer is less than that experienced upstream, then the affected 
party should be provided with some form of breach impact incentive in addition to 
the incentive that ought to be provided under normal circumstances considering the 
type of improvement strategy. This should also be done in addition to timely sharing 
of security breach information. However if the impact upstream is not significant 
then no incentivisation or ISB sharing from the retailer is required. Therefore 
reverberating effect has implication to ISB and incentivisation decision within the 
Does the improvement strategy have a mitigating 
effect on breach cost impact? 
Reverberating effect on 
supply chain agent? 
Is the agent directly involved 
in the strategy change? 
Yes 
Increasing effect 
No Yes 
No 
Decreasing effect 
No effect 
Accept 
strategy 
with only 
ISB sharing 
Accept 
strategy with 
incentive and 
ISB sharing 
No ISB 
sharing or 
incentivisat
ion 
Accept 
strategy  
Reject 
strategy  
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supply chain. On the other hand understanding the effect of high RoC and disruption 
duration is important to knowing where Information security management (ISM) 
priorities lie. If a change in disruption duration from low to high has a greater 
negative effect than that of RoC for any supply chain scenario, then IT priority 
would be on corrective measures (C), otherwise the priority would be prevention & 
deterrence (P&D). 
The summary of the result is shown in Table 5.16. The decision to accept an 
improvement strategy is based on whether the aggregate benefit derived from the 
non-breach scenario (n-BS) and the breach scenario (BS) is positive or not and the 
implication to ISB sharing; additional breach impact incentivisation; and information 
security management (ISM) priority is also indicated. The general observations are 
listed below: 
 Structural reconfiguration by itself does not mitigate the impact information 
security breach has on supply chain performance for a parameter based 
policy (option I) but instead makes it worse. The only exception is the MF 
structure where benefit is derivable and the retailer needs to share ISB 
information with the wholesaler. 
 Reconfiguration will prove beneficial to batch ordering systems (option II) 
and batch-and parameter based policy (option III) in a security breach 
scenario but ISM focus should be on prevention and deterrence rather than 
corrective measures. In addition, there is no need for ISB sharing and 
incentivisation after a security breach. 
 Similar to the non-breach scenario, the serial structure is again preferred 
under parameter based ordering policy while the networking strategy and the 
wholesaling simplification strategy are the best cost performers under batch 
and batch-and-parameter based policies respectively. 
 ISM priority would be to focus more on prevention and deterrence when any 
of the structural reconfiguration strategies is adopted. 
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 Option I Option II Option III 
 WH MF NT WH MF NT WH MF NT 
n-BS 
Benefit 
0% 3% 0% 3% 3% 4% 5% 2% 4% 
BS Benefit -3% 1% -6% 50% 48% 51% 29% 22% 25% 
Total 
Benefit 
-3% 4% -6% 53% 51% 55% 34% 24% 29% 
Acceptable? No Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
ISB sharing 
with? 
- W W - - - - - - 
Incentive 
to? 
- - - - - - - - - 
IT priority P&D P&D P&D P&D P&D P&D P&D P&D P&D 
Table 5.10 Summary and implication of supply reconfiguration to information 
security breach impact 
5.4 INFORMATION SHARING LEVEL EFFECT ON BREACH IMPACT 
Information sharing level has been established in the previous chapter to provide 
benefit for certain supply chain members which can be shared with non-benefiting 
counterparts. The magnitude or direction of such benefit may be compromised by the 
incidence of information security breach. For all the benefits and performance 
improvement brought about by information sharing in a non-breach scenario, this 
study aims to determine whether this benefits are still applicable in a breach scenario 
and how the landscape of benefit changes. This study propose that based on the 
magnitude and direction of breach impact, the decision to engage in any level of 
information integration should not be taken until after breach impact considerations. 
To estimate the benefit of information sharing, if any, in the face of security breach, 
the performance under an information sharing mode with breach is compared to that 
under a non-information sharing mode (NI-base model) with breach. The analyses 
here is similar to that in section 5.3, the only difference is that information sharing 
level (ISL) influence on breach impact is being considered instead of structure effect. 
Therefore the tables used in this section are derived in a similar fashion to those in 
section 5.3. Again, the influence of information sharing level on information security 
breach impact is examined to see if it is of a mitigating, exacerbating or stabilising 
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nature. A mitigating effect is such that the breach cost impact in a supply chain that 
has engaged in information sharing is significantly lower (at p<0.05) than that of the 
non-information sharing counterpart. An exacerbating effect is seen when the breach 
impact in the information sharing mode is significantly higher (at p<0.05) than that 
of the base model. A stabilising effect on the other hand occurs when there is no 
significant difference (at p<0.05) between the breach impact in both information 
sharing and non-information sharing scenarios. The values with superscript ‘nd’ 
indicate that the percentage difference is not statistically significant at p<0.05.  
The pattern of analysis has been established throughout section 5.3. Therefore in this 
section the summary of the finding is given without going into details of how the 
analysis is done as this has been established already. Consequently, for each ISL, the 
MES effect is identified followed by the response of ISL to changing breach profile. 
In conclusion, the effect of increasing disruption duration and RoC is identified and 
the implication to information security management and supply chain inventory 
management is drawn.  
5.4.1 Influence of RW on Breach Impact 
The influence of having a RW level of information sharing when four main types of 
breach occurs is revealed in Table 5.11. Its effect on each supply agent and the total 
effect on supply chain operating cost for each ordering policy type is shown. Under 
the highly disruptive breach, RW mitigates the breach impact on an option I supply 
chain but the effect on the wholesaler and retailer is of the stabilising type while the 
manufacturer enjoys mitigation. In this case, RW mitigates the impact only at the 
upstream of the supply chain. Under a less disruptive breach however, RW mitigates 
the impact on supply chain operating cost with the retailer and wholesaler this time 
enjoying a mitigation while the manufacturer is unperturbed at p<0.05. Here RW has 
no significant influence on the impact of a less disruptive breach on the performance 
of the upstream part of the chain. The result in Table 5.11 suggest that RW is not 
very favourable to the supply chain when the breach is very disruptive (SFDD) but 
better mitigation is derived when the supply chain experiences a less disruptive kind. 
Examining the disruption duration effect and the RoC effect, the higher the 
disruption duration of a breach the lesser the derived benefit from RW configuration. 
The higher the RoC of a less disruptive breach, the lesser the derived benefit, 
although the margin is not very high. However the manufacturer appear to enjoy 
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more mitigation form RW when the RoC increases significantly. The implication of 
this finding is that although RW mitigates the impact of security breach on option I 
supply chain, more effort should be put in the breach mitigation than in the 
prevention measures.   
 
SFDD 
 
R. Cost % W. Cost % M. Cost % SC Total % 
option I 0nd 0nd 8 2 
option II 22 -8 -14 2nd 
option III -8 -1nd 10 1nd 
 
AOW 
 
R. Cost % W. Cost % M. Cost % SC Total % 
option I 6 2 12 6 
option II 12 -6 -2nd 2nd 
option III 4 0nd 13 6 
 
PT 
 
R. Cost % W. Cost % M. Cost % SC Total % 
option I 10 15 -1nd 9 
option II 7 4 -3nd 3 
option III -3 -2 13 3 
 
IBMS 
 
R. Cost % W. Cost % M. Cost % SC Total % 
option I 10 15 -2nd 9 
option II 6 4 -2nd 3 
option III -3 -2 13 3 
nd- means no significant difference at p<0.05 
 Table 5.11 Percentage change in impact due to RW ISL for all three ordering 
policy scenarios 
Under option II scenario, the impact of the more disruptive and less recurring breach 
(SFDD) and the more recurring and less disruptive breach (AOW) on total supply 
chain performance were stabilised at p<0.05. Interestingly, the impact of the less 
disruptive and less recurring breaches (PT and IBMS) were mitigated with RW 
information sharing level. At the operational level, RW mitigates the impact of a 
highly disruptive breach on the retailer’s average daily operating cost performance 
but the impact on the wholesaler and the manufacturer was in fact exacerbated. 
However, for the less disruptive breaches the retailer and wholesaler enjoys a 
mitigation while the manufacturer experiences a stabilising effect. When the RoC 
increases (as in the case of AOW), the obvious effect is on the wholesaler 
performance as it changes from mitigation to exacerbation. Overall, for breaches 
with high disruption duration and high RoC, RW does not provide any breach impact 
mitigation but it is only beneficial when the breach is less disruptive and has a low 
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recurring rate. Consequently the breach management effort need not be increased 
due to RW reconfiguration. However, any further efforts, if any, should be geared 
towards improving both prevention and mitigation measures.    
For option III, RW stabilises the impact of a very disruptive breach on supply chain 
performance but mitigates the impact when the breach is less disruptive. When the 
less disruptive breach becomes more recurring the mitigation benefit of RW 
increases. At the operational level, the impact of a highly disruptive breach on the 
retailer, wholesaler and manufacturer is exacerbated, stabilised and mitigated 
respectively by RW. Under the less disruptive breach scenarios (PT and IBMS), the 
effect of RW is of the exacerbating type on the retailer and the wholesaler while the 
manufacturer enjoys a mitigation benefit. It is therefore apparent that the mitigation 
benefit enjoyed in a less disruptive breach scenario is as a result of the benefit to the 
manufacturer alone. However when the RoC of the breach increases significantly, 
the retailer appear to benefit from RW with a mitigation effect while the wholesaler 
enjoys a stabilising effect. Overall, the supply chain enjoys higher benefit under high 
RoC but reduced benefit under high disruption duration. Consequently for an option 
III supply chain, any efforts towards information security breach management under 
an RW ISL should prioritise mitigation over prevention. 
5.4.2 Influence of WM on Breach Impact 
The result of the MES effect of an integration between the wholesaler and the 
manufacturer only on individual and collective performance is shown in Table 5.12. 
For option I, the WM mode of integration appear to be beneficial only to the 
manufacturer depending on the breach profile. The mitigation of the less disruptive 
breach (IBMS) impact is about 13 % for the manufacturer while the effect is an 
exacerbation of the retailer and the wholesaler’s cost performances. When the 
disruption duration is increased significantly, the effect of WM is slightly reduced 
for all supply chain agents. On the other hand, if the RoC is increased significantly, 
then the effect becomes a stabilisation on the retailer and the manufacturer’s 
performance but that of the wholesaler is exacerbated further. Looking at the supply 
chain performance, it is seen that there is still a mitigation of breach impact by WM 
when the disruption duration of the breach increases. However the breach impact is 
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made worse when the RoC is very high. Consequently, engaging in WM ISL 
requires increased effort in breach prevention measures. 
 
SFDD 
 
R. Cost % W. Cost % M. Cost % SC Total % 
option I -2 -4 12 1 
option II -4 -5 7 0nd 
option III -7 -7 22 4 
 
AOW 
 
R. Cost % W. Cost % M. Cost % SC Total % 
option I -2nd -7 0nd -3 
option II -2 -1 7 1 
option III 0 -2 16 6 
 
PT 
 
R. Cost % W. Cost % M. Cost % SC Total % 
option I -2 -3 13 1 
option II -2 -1 8 2 
option III -6 -6 25 6 
 
IBMS 
 
R. Cost % W. Cost % M. Cost % SC Total % 
option I -2 -3 13 1 
option II -2 -1 8 2 
option III -6 -6 25 6 
nd- means no significant difference at p<0.05 
Table 5.12 Percentage change in impact due to WM ISL for all three ordering 
policy scenarios 
In the option II scenario, under a less disruptive breach (IBMS), the mitigation effect 
of the WM mode on the total supply chain breach impact comes solely from the 
mitigation of the manufacturer’s breach impact while the retailer and the wholesaler 
experienced an exacerbating effect. This effect is worsened for each supply chain 
agent when the breach becomes more disruptive but the overall effect to the supply 
chain performance is reduced from mitigation under the less disruptive kind to 
stabilisation under the more disruptive kind. However increasing the RoC instead 
has little effect on the level of influence WM has on the overall supply chain and the 
individual agents. To conclude, increasing disruption duration and RoC has little 
effect on supply chain breach impact. Therefore no added effort is required in 
information security management when the supply chain engages in WM mode. The 
breach mitigation measures should however be given priority if any effort is to be 
put into IT security management.   
Under option III, it is evident that WM provides greater benefit to the manufacturer 
in the breach scenario than in options I and II scenarios. Examining the influence of 
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WM under a less disruptive and less recurring breach scenario, an exacerbating 
effect of the breach impact occurs at the retailer and the wholesaler while the 
manufacturer enjoys a mitigating effect. This of course results in the entire supply 
chain enjoying a mitigation benefit from WM ISL. However when the disruption 
duration is increased significantly, the retailer and the wholesaler still experience an 
exacerbating effect but this effect is slightly better than in the less disruptive breach 
scenario. The manufacturer still enjoys a mitigation benefit under an increased 
disruption duration but this benefit is less than the benefit in the less disruptive 
breach scenario. On the other hand, if the RoC alone is significantly increased, then 
the exacerbating effect in the less recurring scenario on both the retailer and the 
wholesaler is significantly reduced in the highly recurring scenario with the retailer 
now enjoying a small mitigation benefit and the wholesaler experiencing only a 
small exacerbating effect. The manufacturer experiences a reduction in the 
mitigation benefit provided by WM when the RoC increases significantly. However, 
the effect of increasing the RoC to levels similar to that of AOW does not change the 
WM effect on the overall supply chain breach impact, only on individual agents. In 
summary, WM offer mitigation benefits when a less disruptive and less recurring 
breach occurs and yet still offer mitigation benefits to breach impact when disruption 
duration and RoC are significantly increased. Consequently, for an option III supply 
chain, engaging in WM does not mandate an increased information security effort. 
However priority should be given to breach mitigation as WM produces a better 
mitigation when RoC increases than when disruption duration increases.  
5.4.3 Influence of RWM on Breach Impact 
The effect of having a full integration scenario, where all members of the chain are 
able to utilise the real time market demand data and other associated inventory 
information, on breach impact is shown in Table 5.13. From the table, it is evident 
that, under the base stock policy (option I), RWM effect on the impact of a less 
disruptive and less recurring information security breach (IBMS or PT) for all supply 
chain members is of the mitigation type. However this effect is lower, but still 
mitigating, when the breach becomes either highly disruptive or highly recurring for 
the retailer and the wholesaler. The manufacturer on the other hand experiences a 
stabilising effect instead when the disruption duration or the RoC increases 
significantly. Consequently under the RWM information sharing level, the impact of 
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a security breach is lesser here than in a non-information sharing mode under the 
same operating conditions, and the mitigation effect is higher when the breach is less 
disruptive and less recurring. Therefore moving from a non-integrated supply chain 
to a RWM integration level does not require any additional information security 
management efforts.  
  SFDD   
 R. Cost % W. Cost % M. Cost % SC Total % 
option I 4 5 4nd 4 
option II 21 -1nd -11 4nd 
option III -10 -4 18 2 
  AOW   
 R. Cost % W. Cost % M. Cost % SC Total % 
option I 8 6 -3nd 5 
option II 11 2 -2nd 4 
option III 3 1 19 9 
  PT   
 R. Cost % W. Cost % M. Cost % SC Total % 
option I 17 25 10 18 
option II 7 6 11 8 
option III -4 -2 24 7 
  IBMS   
 R. Cost % W. Cost % M. Cost % SC Total % 
option I 18 26 10 19 
option II 6 6 11 8 
option III -4 -3 24 7 
nd- means no significant difference at p<0.05 
Table 5.13 Percentage change in impact due to RWM ISL for all three ordering 
policy scenarios 
For option II scenario, the effect of RWM on total supply chain breach impact is an 
8% mitigation when the breach is less disruptive and less recurring (IBMS) and all 
individual members of the chain enjoy mitigation as well. When the disruption 
duration is significantly increased (as in SFDD), the wholesaler and the manufacturer 
experiences a worsened RWM effect with an ensuing stabilisation and exacerbating 
effect respectively while the retailer on the other hand enjoys increased benefit. The 
resultant effect of having a significantly increased disruption duration on supply 
chain daily total average operating cost is that the RWM effect becomes of the 
stabilising type. A significant reduction in the RoC, however, only reduces and not 
diminishes the mitigating effect of RWM on total supply chain cost. The RWM 
effect on the manufacturer is diminished under this condition and becomes of a 
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stabilising nature while the retailer and wholesaler enjoys an increase and decrease 
respectively. Obviously from the result, there is no additional security measures 
required when the supply chain engages in RWM level as the impact of security 
breach is mitigated or at least stabilised even under increased disruption duration or 
RoC. However priority should be given to fortifying the breach corrective measures 
over the prevention and deterrence type, if at all any improvement in IT security is to 
be done. 
Under option III, only the manufacturer enjoys a mitigation effect from RWM 
adoption while the retailer and the wholesaler both experiences an exacerbating 
effect when the breach is less disruptive with low RoC. The mitigation enjoyed by 
the manufacturer is large enough to produce a resultant positive effect on the total 
supply chain breach impact. Under significantly high disruption duration, the effect 
is made worse on the retailer and the wholesaler while the mitigation of the impact 
on the manufacturer is reduced but still high enough to ensure a resultant mitigating 
effect on the supply chain as a whole. Under significantly high RoC, however, there 
is an observed increase in RWM benefit to all supply chain agents as they enjoyed a 
mitigation effect, with the manufacturer seeing the highest benefit. Hence the supply 
chain as whole experiences an increased mitigation effect from RWM when the RoC 
is significantly increased. Consequently the recommendation is similar to that given 
in option II. Breach mitigation measures should be prioritised over preventive 
counterparts if any effort is to be driven towards IT security improvement. 
5.4.4 Summary of Findings 
The effect of each information sharing level (ISL) under information security breach 
scenario has been shown to differ for each supply chain agent and this effect changes 
based on the profile of the breach. It is clear from the result that for option I, RWM 
benefits the supply chain more than RW or WM does under a less disruptive and less 
recurring security breach scenario. However RW appears to fare better than RWM 
when the RoC is significantly high but RWM triumphs when the disruption duration 
is significantly high. WM appears to be the worst performer than the other two in a 
breach scenario. Under option II, RWM seems to outperform RW and WM in all 
scenarios of low or high disruption duration and RoC. Option III presents a different 
observation to those of options I and II. Here, RWM fares better than RW and WM 
under less disruptive and less recurring breach. However when the disruption 
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duration significantly increases, WM fares better than the other two in this category 
while RWM outperforms the other two under significantly increased RoC. 
However a decision has to be made on which single ISL would be best suited to each 
ordering policy as only one ISL can be adopted at any particular time. Hence the 
strategy acceptance framework prescribed in Figure 5.2 can be applied here and the 
summary of the evaluation is shown in Table 5.14.  
 Option I Option II Option III 
 RW WM RWM RW WM RWM RW WM RWM 
n-BS 
Benefit 
10% 1% 21% 2% 2% 7% 4% 5% 7% 
BS Benefit 26% 0% 45% 10% 4% 24% 14% 22% 25% 
Total 
Benefit 
36% 1% 66% 12% 6% 31% 18% 27% 32% 
Acceptable? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
ISB sharing 
with? 
- W - W, M W - W W W 
Incentive 
to? 
- W - M - - - W - 
IT priority C P&D C C C P&D C C C 
Table 5.14 Summary and implication of information sharing level to 
information security breach impact 
The general observations here are as follows: 
 RWM mode is the preferable sharing mode regardless of the type of ordering 
policy be it parameter based or batch ordering or the combination of both. 
 Additional breach incentivisation is required for the wholesaler when the 
sharing mode does not include sharing the retailer’s information under a 
parameter based or combined parameter based ordering policy. 
 Under the batch ordering system, further incentivisation and ISB sharing can 
be prevented when the RW supply chain includes the manufacturer in 
information sharing. 
This decision, according to this study, would differ under various supply chain 
structures. Having examined the isolating effect of structure and ISL separately, the 
next section takes a closer look at the joint effect under a breach scenario. 
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5.5 INTERACTION EFFECT BETWEEN ISL AND SUPPLY CHAIN 
STRUCTURE ON BREACH IMPACT 
The magnitude of the interaction effect of ISL and structure on a breach with low 
disruption duration and low RoC, BP1 (IBMS), is shown in Appendix 5.1. That of a 
SFDD, AOW, PT and the aggregate effect under all four breaches is also shown in 
Appendix 5.1. The values in this Appendix are computed as described in section 5.3. 
A positive value reveals that the effect is beneficial while a negative value indicates 
a detrimental effect on cost performance. The nature of the interaction effect is 
shown in Appendix 5.2 and a detailed comparison between the state of interaction 
effect in a non-breach scenario and that in the various breach scenarios is also 
established in Appendix 5.2. 
RW and RWM both represent a scenario where the retailer’s inventory (including 
market demand) information is shared with upstream agents and examining the 
performance of RWM relative to RW is indicative of the effect of extending the 
information sharing to the manufacturer. WM represent the scenario where the 
retailer’s information is not shared but the only partnership is between the wholesaler 
and the manufacturer. Therefore WM is indicative of the effect of not including 
retailer’s information (especially market demand information) in the information 
sharing. 
The combined strategy acceptance decision framework established in Figure 4.2 is 
applied here along with the framework shown in Figure 5.2. A summary of the 
aggregate benefit in a breach and non-breach scenario is shown for each combination 
scenario in the subsequent tables under each ordering policy. If the individual 
strategy performance is better than the performance of the combined strategies then 
such individual strategy would be considered the best alternative. Also included in 
the tables are the implication of such combinations or best alternative to supply 
partnership and ISM priorities. The decisions here are quite similar to the decisions 
in a non-breach scenario but the decision changes for some combinations after 
breach impact considerations. Those combinations or scenarios where the decision in 
a non-breach setting is different from information security breach settings is marked 
with an ‘*’ symbol. 
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5.5.1 Summary and Implication of Interaction Effect under Parameter based 
ordering 
Table 5.15 shows the summary of the acceptance and implication of the interaction 
effect on parameter based ordering policy (base stock policy) both under non-breach 
and breach scenarios.  
 RW WM RWM 
 WH MF NT WH MF NT WH MF NT 
n-BS 
Benefit (%) 
12.3 12.5 4.2 2.2 2.8 1.1 23.4 23.5 14.4 
BS Benefit 
(%) 
34 33 4 2 -4 -4 64 65 34 
Total 
Benefit (%) 
46.3 45.5 8.2 4.2 -1.2 -2.9 87.4 88.5 44.4 
Acceptable? Yes Yes Yes Yes* No No Yes Yes Yes 
Best 
Alternative 
- - RW -* MF* WM* - - RWM 
ISB sharing 
with? 
- - M W W W - - M 
Breach 
Incentive 
to? 
- - M - - - - - M 
IT priority P&D P&D P&D P&D P&D P&D P&D P&D P&D 
Table 5.15 Summary and implication of interaction effect in a parameter based 
ordering system 
Under the parameter based policy, the benefit of combining the simplification 
strategy with sharing retailer’s inventory information almost doubles when this 
information is extended to the manufacturer. Combining the networking strategy 
with sharing retailer’s inventory information increases the benefit by more than 5 
folds when the manufacturer is included. However, the manufacturer would require 
some form of incentivisation due to the negative impact of breach and would also 
require ISB sharing from the retailer. There is no benefit observed when 
manufacturing simplification or networking is combined with information sharing 
that does not include retailer’s inventory information. However, some benefit is 
derivable when the wholesaling simplification is used instead.  
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Under each information sharing scenario, the wholesaling simplification strategy is 
best suited to RW and WM but the manufacturing simplification strategy is best 
suited to RWM. On the other hand, for supply chains pre-existing in wholesaler, 
manufacturer or network type structure would be most benefited by full information 
sharing strategy (RWM). Since more benefit is derived under BP3 than BP2, the 
priority of information security management would be breach prevention and 
deterrence over correction. 
5.5.2 Summary and Implication of Interaction Effect under Batch Ordering 
Policy 
Table 5.16 shows the summary of the acceptance and implication of the interaction 
effect on batch ordering policy (optimal EOQ model) both under non-breach and 
breach scenarios.  
For a batch ordering system, the combination of any of the information sharing and 
structural reconfiguration strategies will produce improved cost performance 
especially in a breach scenario. Including the manufacturer in the information 
sharing strategy significantly increases the benefit of sharing the retailer’s inventory 
information in combination with any structural reconfiguration strategies. 
Information sharing that does not involve retailer’s information (WM mode) proves 
to be somewhat equally beneficial to the supply chain when combined with structural 
reconfiguration.  
Supply chains existing in RW and RWM modes are best to adopt manufacturing 
simplification while WM supply chains are best to adopt wholesaling simplification. 
On the other hand, those pre-existing in Wholesaler and manufacturer type structures 
would be best served by adopting a full information sharing strategy (RWM) but 
those in network type structure would benefit more alone than in combination with 
any information sharing strategy. 
The general implication of security breach to a batch ordering system is to focus 
more on breach prevention and deterrence than breach corrective measures. 
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 RW WM RWM 
 WH MF NT WH MF NT WH MF NT 
n-BS 
Benefit (%) 
2.9 5.6 -3.9 4.5 1.3 3.5 9 9.3 -1.9 
BS Benefit 
(%) 
50 58 27 53 39 48 66 69 36 
Total 
Benefit (%) 52.9 63.6 23.1 57.5 40.3 51.5 75 78.3 34.1 
Acceptable? Yes* Yes Yes* Yes Yes* Yes* Yes Yes Yes* 
Best 
Alternative 
WH - NT - MF NT - - NT* 
ISB sharing 
with? 
M - W - - - - - W 
Breach 
Incentive 
to? 
M - W - - - - - W 
IT priority P&D P&D P&D P&D P&D P&D P&D P&D P&D 
Table 5.16 Summary and implication of interaction effect in a batch ordering 
system 
5.5.3 Summary and Implication of Interaction Effect under Combined Batch-
and-Parameter based ordering 
Table 5.17 shows the summary of the acceptance and implication of the interaction 
effect on combined batch-and-parameter based ordering policy (modified base stock 
policy) both under non-breach and breach scenarios. Under the combined ordering 
policy type, information sharing at any of the discussed levels combined with any of 
the structural reconfiguration strategies would provide benefit to the supply chain 
especially under security breach scenarios. Again the supply chain benefits more 
when the manufacturer is included in the sharing of retailer’s inventory information. 
Information sharing that does not involve retailer’s information (WM mode) provide 
more benefit than one that involves retailer’s information especially in wholesaler or 
network type structure. 
For supply chains currently in the RW or RWM mode of information sharing should 
consider manufacturing simplification while those existing in the WM should 
consider wholesaling simplification strategy. 
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 RW WM RWM 
 WH MF NT WH MF NT WH MF NT 
n-BS 
Benefit (%) 
5.9 8 1.7 11 4.8 8.1 9.7 10.3 4 
BS Benefit 
(%) 
38 45 1 56 35 46 50 51 30 
Total 
Benefit (%) 43.9 53 2.7 67 39.8 54.1 59.7 61.3 34 
Acceptable? Yes Yes Yes* Yes Yes* Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Best 
Alternative 
- - NT - -* - - - -* 
ISB sharing 
with? 
- - M - W - - - W 
Breach 
Incentive 
to? 
- - M - W - - - W 
IT priority P&D P&D P&D P&D P&D P&D P&D P&D P&D 
Table 5.17 Summary and implication of interaction effect in a batch-and-
parameter based ordering system 
On the other hand, supply chains existing in the wholesaler or network type structure 
should consider the WM information sharing mode while those in existing MF 
structure should consider full information sharing mode (i.e. RWM). For supply 
chains willing to reconfigure the supply chain and adopt a new information sharing 
strategy, the best option would be to adopt a wholesaling simplification strategy 
along with information sharing between the wholesaler and the manufacturer only.   
Again, the general implication of security breach to a combined batch-and-parameter 
based ordering system is to focus more on breach prevention and deterrence than 
breach corrective measures. 
5.6 DECISION MAKING FOR THE COMBINED IMPROVEMENT 
STRATEGIES 
Considering the impact various information security breaches can have on supply 
chain performance, the decision is to adopt the two best improvement strategies (i.e. 
structural reconfiguration and information sharing) that will provide the best cost 
performance both in a non-breach and breach scenarios. Adopting both strategies at 
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the same time may be too overwhelming, therefore stepwise adoption may be the 
reasonable format for adoption. In stepwise adoption, the temptation might be to 
choose the individual best in each improvement category, however the individual 
best in each category does not correspond to synergy best when combined in the 
same supply chain. Therefore the decision to adopt should be based on a long term 
view that is if both would be adopted on the long run or if it is going to be just one 
improvement strategy. If the long term view is to adopt only one strategy, then the 
individual best would be ideal here. However, if both would be adopted on the long 
run, then the synergy best is more desirable than the combination of individual best. 
Having decided on the synergy best, this synergy could be decoupled and adopted in 
a stepwise manner as the supply chain chooses. 
Table 5.18 shows the individual best for each improvement strategy under each 
ordering policy. The synergy between the two individual best is examined in the 
fourth column to see if it produces a positive result in the long run. The synergy of 
the two individual best is compared with the best alternative (i.e. synergy best) for 
each ordering policy in the sixth column to establish if there is a significant 
difference between the two synergy scenarios. Then the final decision as to which 
synergy of structure and information sharing level would be best suited for each 
ordering policy is determined. 
 
Structure 
Best 
ISL 
Best 
Good 
synergy? 
Best 
Alternative 
% 
difference 
Decision 
Option I MF RWM Yes RWM+MF - RWM+MF 
Option II NT RWM Yes RWM+MF 44.2% RWM+MF 
Option 
III 
WH RWM Yes WM+WH 7.3% WM+WH 
Table 5.18 Decision making for combined strategies under each ordering policy 
with breach impact considerations 
Although, the best cost performance in a non-breach scenario was under RWM in 
conjunction with wholesaling simplification, the decision was to select RWM and 
manufacturing simplification instead because there was no significant difference 
between the two combinations and the fact that manufacturing simplification and full 
integration (RWM) represented the individual best scenarios which means a stepwise 
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adoption can be done without compromising on optimal synergy between the two 
improvement strategies. Evaluating the impact of various breach scenarios has made 
the decision a bit clearer. The clear choice for parameter based policy of the base 
stock type is the combination between RWM and manufacturing simplification 
strategy as the result in Table 5.18 indicate.  
Under the batch ordering and combined batch-and-parameter based ordering 
systems, the synergy between the individual best does not correspond to the synergy 
best. Therefore a long term view would see the adoption of RWM and manufacturing 
simplification over RWM and networking strategy for a batch ordering system. The 
long term view for a combined batch-and parameter based ordering system would be 
the combination of WM and wholesaling simplification strategy instead of the 
combination of wholesaling simplification and full integration strategy. 
5.7 CONCLUSION AND MANAGERIAL IMPLICATION 
This study has shown that, for the most part, structural reconfiguration and/or 
information sharing is beneficial both in a non-breach scenario and in a breach 
scenario. The impact of information security breach on supply chain performance 
will depend on the frequency of occurrence and the disruption duration of the breach 
when it occurs and different ordering policies are affected in different ways. The 
impact of information security breach increases along the upstream of the supply 
chain for a parameter based ordering system while this decreases as one goes 
upstream for a batch ordering system. The increasing impact has implication to 
supply chain members and some form of incentive should be provided as the breach 
did not occurs upstream but downstream and upstream agents should not have to pay 
dearly for disruption at the downstream end of the supply chain.  
This study also provides justification for information security breach  (ISB) sharing 
which has been called for by a few authors and has indicated where ISB priorities lie 
within the supply chain given various scenarios. 
It has been demonstrated that the impact of information security breach, however, 
can be mitigated by improvement strategies such as supply reconfiguration and 
information sharing as shown in this study. The impact of security breach is 
significant enough to affect supply chain decisions with regards to information 
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sharing level choice or supply chain structure preference and it has been established 
that the decision to opt for certain ISL and structure combinations should not be 
taken without disruption impact considerations.  
This study has also shown that these improvement strategies could be used as part of 
breach impact management strategy in addition to the ISM measures as they reduce 
the impact information security breach would otherwise have on a normal serial 
supply chain without information sharing. 
The supply chain stands to benefit from a significant improvement in performance 
when these two strategies are used as long as the use and adoption is well informed. 
The study has highlighted the best information strategy given a specific supply chain 
structure and also the best structural reconfiguration strategy given a specific 
information sharing level that may be pre-existing in the supply chain. It has been 
shown that certain strategies fare better alone while others that are otherwise 
detrimental may yet prove beneficial when combined with other strategies.  
So far this study has shown that supply chain improvement strategy decisions should 
not be made without information security breach considerations as disruption in 
information flow has huge implication to material flow which affects supply chain 
performance. However the author further posits that apart from the direct cost impact 
information security breach has on the supply chain inventory management 
performance, these breaches also introduce uncertainties in the supply chain. These 
uncertainties make it difficult to ascertain what future breach impact would be on the 
supply chain and hence might affect future performance of the supply chain. Due to 
the uncertainties associated with information security breach impacts and the indirect 
cost implication of this, the supply chain decision of which ordering policy, structure 
and/or information sharing level to adopt should not be made on only cost impact 
alone. The next study therefore incorporates the uncertainties of breach impact in 
making a final decision and this is discussed in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 6 : ENTROPY ASSESSMENT OF INFORMATION SECURITY 
BREACH AND THE DECISION FRAMEWORK 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
The previous chapter has established that information security breach has a direct 
impact on the cost of managing inventory in the supply chain and that the magnitude 
and direction of this impact depends on the profile of the breach and the prevailing 
supply chain conditions (ordering policy, supply structure and ISL). This cost impact 
is quite uncertain in itself and the complexity of the operating condition of the 
supply chain could exacerbate this uncertainty and make it more difficult for supply 
chain managers to predict future impact. Being able to predict future impact is a 
form of control that any manager would like to have as this control is key to effective 
management. The presence of uncertainties makes management control all the more 
difficult. Higher levels of uncertainties mean higher level of controls is required 
while lower uncertainties require lesser control measures. This is considered in this 
study to be another form of security breach impact.  
6.1.1 Research Motivation 
This study uses the Theory of Entropy to capture breach impact uncertainties and 
provide an indication of the level of monitoring and review control required in the 
supply chain, if this needs to be increased or decreased. According to a guide written 
in 2010 by a group of the leading risk management organisations in the UK, The 
association of insurance and risk managers (AIRMIC); public sector risk 
management association (Alarm); and the institute of risk management (IRM), the 
need for monitoring and review is to ensure that that organisation can learn from past 
experience by monitoring risk performance (AIRMIC et al., 2010) and so they can 
reduce or eliminate future occurrence of a breach. Increasing the control level will 
incur additional cost and this should be judged based on the cost effectiveness which 
relates to the cost of increasing the control level compared to the derived risk 
reduction benefit. Therefore, a supply chain with high entropy would require high 
monitoring and review control levels because of the high uncertainty associated with 
predicting future impact, while that with low entropy would require low level of 
control. The impact of security breach on supply chain inventory management has 
been conceptualised in this study as a combination of the direct cost impact and the 
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indirect cost impact in the form of uncertainties. This approach has not been seen in 
past literature, at least to the author’s knowledge.  
The concept of entropy assessment itself is not novel as it has been used in other 
unrelated studies (Sivadasan et al. 2002) but this study is the first one to adapt it to 
information security breach impact studies. Apart from the uniqueness of the type of 
entropy assessment used here, this study purports to make further contribution to 
theory and practice by evaluating how structural reconfiguration and information 
sharing adds or reduces breach impact uncertainties and what the implication of this 
is to decision making. 
6.1.2 Structure of Chapter 
The rest of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 6.2 examines the level of 
uncertainty introduced by information security breach in a serial supply chain with 
no information sharing under all three ordering policy scenarios (base model). In 
section 6.3 and 6.4, the effect of structural reconfiguration and information sharing 
on uncertainty level is discussed respectively and the cost implication is shown along 
with an explanation of the decision framework. Section 6.5 examines the level of 
uncertainty associated with each breach when structural reconfiguration is combined 
with information sharing and its implication to cost and the decision framework 
which includes cost impact assessment and entropy assessment is drawn and 
explained. 
6.2 ENTROPY ASSESSMENT OF BREACH IN THE BASE MODEL 
The total entropy used in this assessment is obtained by the addition of the two types 
of entropy discussed in the methodology chapter which are nature entropy (for 
measuring nature uncertainty, NU) and extent entropy (for measuring extent 
uncertainty, EU). The NU is the uncertainty associated with not knowing whether 
there would be a negative impact or not, that is the 50/50 chance of a negative 
impact. This is also known as the uncertainty associated with knowing the ‘nature’ of 
the impact. The closer the probability of in-control (i.e. no negative impact observed) 
is to 50%, the closer NU is to 1. Also the further the probability of in-control  is from 
50% either increasing or decreasing, the closer NU is to 0. Hence the lower the NU 
score the more certain you are of either experiencing a negative impact or not, the 
higher the score the less certain you are. The EU on the other hand is the uncertainty 
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associated with the number of countable states of the impact when it is negative. 
This is also known as the uncertainty associated with knowing the ‘extent’ of the 
negative impact. Higher scores occur when the impact is spread over several 
countable states, and lesser scores occur over fewer countable states. Consequently 
the higher the probability of experiencing a negative impact over just one single state 
or none at all, the closer EU is to 0. The total entropy (TE) is the sum of nature 
entropy and extent entropy and this is used in this study’s assessment. The entropy 
values themselves are additive. 
To understand the landscape of breach impact uncertainty, the NU, EU and TE 
values of each performance measure (on-hand inventory and backlog quantity) is 
aggregated for each supply agent and for the entire supply chain. The TE values of 
each perfromance measure anf for each supply agent are categorised as low, medium 
and high uncertainty and ranked 1, 2, and 3 respectively as explained in section 3.8 
of the methodology chapter. 
6.2.1 Anatomy of the Breach Impact Uncertainty Associated with Ordering 
Option I 
The entropy estimate for the two kinds of breach impact uncertainties of each breach 
type in an ordering option I supply chain is shown in Figure 6.1. It is clear from the 
figure that IBMS introduces the greatest level of uncertainty as evidenced by having 
the highest total entropy while AOW possess the least level of uncertainty. The 
uncertainty associated with predicting the nature of the impact whether the breach 
will be a positive one or a negative one (NU) is highest under IBMS followed by PT 
with AOW having the least. This of course is not surprising as the impact cost of 
IBMS on supply chain operational cost is marginal and therefore more difficult to 
ascertain if future attack will have a positive impact or a negative one. With PT 
having a higher cost impact than IBMS, the NU result shows that there is more 
certainty in predicting the nature of the future impact of PT than with IBMS. The 
certainty of the impact nature therefore increases as you go from IBMS to PT and to 
AOW and finally to SFDD. However the uncertainty associated with not knowing 
the extent of negative impact when the impact is negative (EU) is highest under 
SFDD followed by AOW. The EU value for IBMS and PT on the other hand is zero 
implying that the negative impact experienced occurred over only one countable 
state and not several states as those of SFDD and AOW suggest.  
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Figure 6.1 Level of supply chain uncertainty associated with each breach under 
Option I (SNC=EU; SINC=NU) 
 
 
Figure 6.2 Level of uncertainty faced by supply agents for each breach under 
Option I 
At the operational level, Figure 6.2 shows the total entropy level for each supply 
chain agent introduced by each security breach type. AOW, PT and IBMS breach 
types are considered less disruptive breaches because their disruption duration only 
last for an average of 1 day, while SFDD is considered highly disruptive because its 
disruption duration lasts for an average of five days. The impact of the less 
disruptive breaches (AOW, PT and IBMS) on the wholesaler performance is known 
with certainty, because the total entropy value is zero, and future impact is highly 
predictable. Their impact on the retailer and manufacturer however, is not quite 
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certain and therefore unpredictable. However, for the more disruptive breach with 
high disruption period (SFDD), there is reasonable amount of uncertainty in 
predicting future impact on all supply chain agents performance. Table 6.1 reveals a 
more complete picture of the entropy values for each security breach and the 
associated uncertainties for each supply chain member. The retailer apparently faces 
only one type of uncertainty which is that associated with not knowing the nature of 
the impact whether positive or negative (NU) for all security breach type. Although 
the value of the uncertainty associated with the NUmber of countable states of the 
impact when it is negative (EU) for all the security breaches is zero, the fact that the 
value of NU is greater than zero means the retailer experienced some negative 
impact in certain replication scenarios but this negative impact all occurred within 
one countable state. Hence the value of zero for EU here means that the retailer is 
very certain of the extent of the negative impact and is sure the future impact will 
exist within this state only. The uncertainty associated with not knowing the nature 
of the impact whether positive or negative is 0.72 for the retailer and this comes 
solely from the holding inventory performance. The value for its average backlog 
quantity performance were zero which means that retailer is certain of the nature of 
impact on backlog quantity performance. It can be seen from Appendix 4.1 that the 
impact of all four breach type was positive on the backlog cost performance of the 
retailer. Therefore given the same supply chain condition, the results of the NU 
suggest that the future cost impact of SFDD, AOW, IBMS and PT on the retailer’s 
backlog cost will be positive. However, the impact of these breaches on its holding 
cost performance is quite uncertain and this uncertainty remains the same when the 
RoC or the disruption duration of the breach is increased or decreased. 
Under SFDD breach the wholesaler is exposed to EU in its holding inventory 
performance with a value of 0.87. This seems to be the only type of uncertainty the 
wholesaler is faced with. This means that the predictability of the future impact of 
this breach on the holding inventory cost is uncertain with regards to the extent of 
negative impact. 
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Breach 
Entropy 
Index 
Retailer Wholesaler Manufacturer SC 
Hold Backlog R Total Hold Backlog W Total Hold Backlog M Total Sum Total 
SFDD 
NU 0.72 0.00 0.72 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.15 0.15 0.88 
EU 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.87 0.00 0.87 0.15 0.00 0.15 1.02 
TE 0.72 0.00 0.72 0.87 0.00 0.87 0.15 0.15 0.31 1.90 
            
AOW 
NU 0.72 0.00 0.72 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.72 
EU 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.26 0.00 0.26 0.26 
TE 0.72 0.00 0.72 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.26 0.00 0.70 1.42 
            
IBMS 
NU 0.99 0.00 0.99 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.99 
EU 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
TE 0.99 0.00 0.99 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.99 
            
PT 
NU 0.84 0.00 0.84 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.92 0.92 1.75 
EU 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
TE 0.84 0.00 0.84 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.92 0.92 1.75 
Table 6.1 Entropy assessment of supply chain performance for option I under information security breach
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Consequently, the impact will always be negative on holding cost but the extent of 
impact is uncertain. However the predictability of its impact on the wholesaler’s 
backlog cost and ordering cost is quite certain. The NU and EU value for the backlog 
and the average order quantity is zero, which means the impact on backlog will 
always be positive and that on order quantity will always be negative and exist 
within only one countable state. For IBMS, PT and AOW, the predictability of their 
impact is certain for all three performance measures. The NU and EU value for the 
holding inventory, backlog and average order quantity is zero. The interpretation of 
this result, in combination with the result in Appendix 4.1, is that the impact of 
IBMS, PT and AOW will always be negative for the holding cost and this cost will 
exist within only one countable state. For the backlog cost and ordering cost, their 
impact will always be positive. Therefore comparing IBMS, PT and AOW, we see 
that the predictability of the impact on all three performance measures are very 
certain and the level of certainty remain the same even when the rate of occurrence 
of the breach is increased. From IBMS and SFDD, we see that increasing the 
disruption duration only increases the uncertainty associated with the extent of the 
impact on holding cost performance.    
The holding cost performance of the manufacturer is affected by RoC and disruption 
duration as the result suggest. The NU of the impact of the less disruptive breaches 
on manufacturer’s holding inventory performance is zero while the EU depends on 
the breach profile. The level of EU is not changed when there is a slight increase in 
RoC as shown by comparing IBMS and PT, but this uncertainty increases when 
there is significant increase in RoC although this uncertainty is still generally low. A 
similar observation is found for the disruption duration effect. The EU increases as 
you increase the disruption duration, although this is still categorised as low. For the 
manufacturer’s backlog performance the uncertainty associated with breach impact 
is solely NU as opposed to EU for holding cost. The value of NU decreases from 1 in 
IBMS to 0.92 in PT and even further to zero in AOW. Therefore, the level of NU 
decreases when the RoC increases but the EU remains the same at the zero level. 
Also, increasing the disruption duration also reduces the NU, meaning the more 
disruptive the breach, the more certain you are of whether future breach impact will 
be either positive or negative.  
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6.2.2 Anatomy of the Breach Impact Uncertainty Associated with Ordering 
Option II 
The type and level of uncertainty associated with the impact of each security breach 
on supply chain performance is shown in Figure 6.3. It is clear from the figure that 
the uncertainty associated with IBMS and PT is solely due to NU and does not 
include EU (EU). The impact of SFDD and AOW both face nature and extent 
uncertainties. While AOW faces low EU and high NU, SFDD faces a high EU and a 
low NU. Figure 6.4 reveals where the uncertainty hotspots lie within the supply 
chain. For the less disruptive breaches, the impact uncertainty is lowest at the retailer 
and this increases as one move upstream. However for the more disruptive breach 
(SFDD), the impact uncertainty is highest at the retailer and lowest at the wholesaler. 
Looking at the uncertainty associated with each performance measure for each 
supply chain agent paints a more holistic picture of the uncertainty hotspots and this 
is shown in Table 6.2.  
From Table 6.2, it is evident that the uncertainty of the nature of the impact of the 
less disruptive breaches on retailer’s holding inventory performance is low while that 
of the EU is nil. For the more disruptive breach, the NU is nil while that of the extent 
of negative impact is low. Therefore one is less certain of the nature of security 
breach impact for the less disruptive type and more convinced of the extent of 
negative impact. The retailer’s backlog performance faces only NU under PT and 
IBMS but faces only EU under AOW and SFDD. Recall from Appendix 4.1 that the 
impact of SFDD and AOW is significantly large in percentage and in magnitude. 
Therefore there is higher certainty in predicting the nature of future impact than in 
predicting the extent of negative impact on retailer’s backlog performance. However, 
there is higher uncertainty in predicting the extent of impact of SFDD on supply 
chain daily average operating cost than in predicting that of AOW.  
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Figure 6.3 Level of supply chain uncertainty associated with each breach under 
Option II (SNC=EU; SINC=NU) 
 
Figure 6.4 Level of uncertainty faced by supply agents for each breach under 
Option II  
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Breach 
Entropy 
Index 
Retailer Wholesaler Manufacturer SC 
Hold Backlog R Total Hold Backlog W Total Hold Backlog M Total Sum Total 
SFDD 
NU 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.84 0.26 1.10 1.10 
EU 0.26 2.68 2.94 0.35 0.57 0.92 0.14 0.00 0.14 4.01 
TE 0.26 2.68 2.94 0.35 0.57 0.92 0.98 0.26 1.24 5.10 
            
AOW 
NU 0.35 0.00 0.35 0.62 0.57 1.19 1.00 0.98 1.98 3.52 
EU 0.00 0.50 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.50 
TE 0.35 0.50 0.86 0.62 0.57 1.19 1.00 0.98 1.98 3.52 
            
IBMS 
NU 0.35 0.76 1.12 0.87 0.76 1.63 1.00 1.00 2.00 4.75 
EU 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
TE 0.35 0.76 1.12 0.87 0.76 1.63 1.00 1.00 2.00 4.75 
            
PT 
NU 0.50 0.26 0.77 0.94 0.57 1.51 0.98 0.97 1.95 4.23 
EU 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
TE 0.50 0.26 0.77 0.94 0.57 1.51 0.98 0.97 1.95 4.23 
Table 6.2 Entropy assessment of supply chain performance for option II under information security breach 
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The uncertainties associated with the nature and extent of security breach impact on 
wholesaler’s holding inventory performance is similar to that of the retailer, only 
higher. IBMS, PT and AOW only pose a NU to holding cost of the wholesaler while 
SFDD only poses an EU. Therefore more information is required in controlling the 
nature outcome of the less disruptive breaches while more information is required to 
gain control over the more disruptive types. For the wholesaler’s backlog 
performance, the uncertainty associated with the impact of the less disruptive 
breaches is only of the NU type while SFDD is only of the EU type. 
The NU value for the less disruptive breaches on Manufacturer’s holding inventory 
performance is either maximum or near maximum. A value of 1 indicates that half of 
the replication scenario was positive impact and the other half was negative. This 
shows there is the highest uncertainty in predicting the nature of the future impact of 
AOW, PT and IBMS on manufacturer’s holding inventory performance. However a 
EU value of zero reveals that the extent of negative impact is highly predictable. For 
the more disruptive breach type, SFDD, the NU is also quite high and the extent of 
negative impact is known with a reasonably good level of certainty as EU value is 
quite low. Like the holding inventory performance of the manufacturer, the impact of 
the AOW, PT and IBMS on manufacturer’s backlog performance indicates near 
maximum uncertainty in knowing the nature of impact and zero uncertainty (i.e 
maximum certainty) in predicting the extent of negative impact. For SFDD, the 
result shows that the extent of future impact is highly predictable but that of the 
nature of future impact is somewhat uncertain. 
6.2.3 Anatomy of the Breach Impact Uncertainty Associated with Ordering 
Option III 
Clearly from Figure 6.5, the aggregate EU value for the supply chain increases as the 
RoC of the breach increases, however, the NU value decreases as RoC increases. 
Consequently, increasing the RoC of a breach increases the EU of the impact but 
decreases the NU. We also see by comparing IBMS and SFDD that increasing the 
disruption duration increases the EU but reduces the NU. Therefore the negative 
impact of a breach with an increased disruption period on supply chain performance 
will be less predictable, and you can be more certain of the nature of its impact, than 
that of a less disruptive one. At the supply chain agent level, Figure 6.6 reveals that 
the uncertainty of predicting the impact of security breach is highest at the 
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manufacturer for all breach type. However, between the retailer and the wholesaler, 
the profile of the breach determines which one is greater. Again, a clearer picture is 
painted by Table 6.3 showing where these uncertainties lie.  
 
Figure 6.5 Level of supply chain uncertainty associated with each breach under 
Option III (SNC=EU; SINC=NU) 
 
Figure 6.6 Level of uncertainty faced by supply agents for each breach under 
Option II
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Breach 
Entropy 
Index 
Retailer Wholesaler Manufacturer SC 
Hold Backlog R Total Hold Backlog W Total Hold Backlog M Total Sum Total 
SFDD 
NU 0.00 0.15 0.15 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.15 0.15 0.30 
EU 0.15 0.00 0.15 0.50 0.00 0.50 0.77 0.00 0.77 1.42 
Total 0.15 0.15 0.30 0.50 0.00 0.50 0.77 0.15 0.92 1.72 
            
AOW 
NU 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.15 0.00 0.15 0.15 
EU 0.62 0.00 0.62 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.86 0.00 0.86 1.48 
Total 0.62 0.00 0.62 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.01 0.00 1.01 1.63 
            
IBMS 
NU 0.00 0.26 0.26 0.00 0.35 0.35 0.57 0.96 1.53 2.14 
EU 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Total 0.00 0.26 0.26 0.00 0.35 0.35 0.57 0.96 1.53 2.14 
            
PT 
NU 0.00 0.26 0.26 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.26 1.00 1.26 1.52 
EU 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.15 0.00 0.15 0.15 
Total 0.00 0.26 0.26 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.41 1.00 1.41 1.67 
Table 6.3 Entropy assessment of supply chain performance for option III under information security breach 
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For the retailer’s holding inventory performance, there is no uncertainty associated 
with predicting the nature of impact for all considered breach types. However SFDD 
and AOW have associated EU with EU greater in AOW than in SFDD. There is no 
uncertainty in predicting the extent of future impact on retailer’s backlog 
performance for all security breach type, but there exist a low level of uncertainty in 
predicting the nature of future impact with AOW having no uncertainty at all.  
The wholesaler under option III experiences no uncertainty, nature or extent, in the 
area of holding inventory for the less disruptive breaches but experiences only a low 
level of EU under the more disruptive breach. For the wholesaler’s backlog 
performance, only the IBMS breach has an associated NU while the other breach 
types have zero uncertainty associated with them.  
There is of course greater uncertainties at the manufacturer’s end than the rest of the 
supply chain. Comparing the entropy scores of AOW, PT and IBMS, we see that as 
RoC increases, the NU decreases and the EU increases for the manufacturer’s 
holding inventory performance. For the disruption duration effect on the holding cost 
performance uncertainty, increasing the duration of disruption leads to reduction in 
NU and increase in EU. With respect to the manufacturer’s backlog performance, the 
uncertainty associated with the breach impact is mainly due to the nature type and 
not the extent type. IBMS and PT poses the highest NU uncertainty while SFDD 
poses a low uncertainty and AOW poses no uncertainty at all. 
6.3 STRUCTURE EFFECT ON UNCERTAINTY LEVEL OF BREACH 
IMPACT 
The result of the entropy values of each performance measure for all three supply 
chain agents under the structure scenarios for ordering options I, II and III are 
categorised and rated as explained in the methodology chapter (section 3.8.5). The 
rating outcome can be found in Appendix 6.1. The detailed analysis in section 6.2 
was to provide a sense of how to critically analyse the entropy assessment at the 
operational level by decomposing the entropy measures and examining how each 
performance measure is affected and the implication thereof. However in this 
section, the aim is to establish how the entropy level (uncertainty category) changes 
from the base model to the other structure types. Therefore the relative change in 
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uncertainty level when each structure scenario is compared with the base model 
scenario for all three ordering options is the primary concern here.  
This relative change is obtained by noting what the uncertainty rating in the base 
model is and computing how much higher or lower the rating of the corresponding 
structure is. For instance if the uncertainty rating in the base model is 1 (i.e. low 
uncertainty) and the rating in, say, the WH structure is 2 (i.e. medium uncertainty), 
the relative change is 1-2 = -1 (minus means increase in uncertainty). This means 
that WH structural reconfiguration increases the impact uncertainty by one level 
(from low to medium). If the rating in the WH structure was 3 (i.e. high uncertainty) 
then the relative change is 1-3 = -2, meaning wholesaling simplification would 
increase the uncertainty by two levels (from low to high). The sign indicate the 
direction of the change while the values indicate the magnitude of the change. A 
positive value means the structure effect reduces the uncertainty level while a 
negative value indicates otherwise. A value of zero reveals that structural 
reconfiguration does not affect the level of uncertainty.   
6.3.1 Entropy Analysis of WH Effect 
The result of the relative change in uncertainty level due to wholesaling 
simplification can be found in Table 6.4.  
From the table, the influence of WH on uncertainty level is of an exacerbating nature 
(up one level) to the supply chain under less disruptive breaches (BP1) but becomes 
a stabilising effect when RoC of breach is greatly increased. However, the 
wholesaling simplification strategy has an uncertainty mitigation benefit with one 
level decrease in uncertainty level. At the operational level, the wholesaler 
experiences a similar effect while the retailer is unperturbed by the strategy. The 
manufacturer, under this strategy, however is unperturbed by a less disruptive breach 
but appear to have lower uncertainty level with the strategy when RoC and 
disruption duration are high. Decomposing the result by examining the NU (nature 
uncertainty) and EU (extent uncertainty) performance reveals that the uncertainty 
mostly associated with this structure is of the nature type, although this is 
categorised as low. Therefore it can be concluded that changing to a WH structure 
configuration under the base stock policy (option I) does not add to the supply chain 
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complexity and better control can be derived when breaches with high disruption 
duration and RoC occur. 
 
SFDD 
 
Retailer Wholesaler Manufacturer SC Total 
option I 0 1 1 1 
option II 0 1 0 0 
option III 1 0 0 1 
 
AOW 
 
Retailer Wholesaler Manufacturer SC Total 
option I 0 0 1 0 
option II 0 0 0 0 
option III 0 0 0 1 
 
PT 
 
Retailer Wholesaler Manufacturer SC Total 
option I 0 0 0 0 
option II 0 0 0 0 
option III 0 -1 0 0 
 
IBMS 
 
Retailer Wholesaler Manufacturer SC Total 
option I 0 -1 0 -1 
option II 0 0 0 0 
option III 0 0 0 0 
Table 6.4 WH effect on information security breach impact uncertainty level 
Under the batch ordering system, wholesaling simplification strategy does not add to 
supply chain complexity and a stabilising effect is achieved under all breach 
scenarios. The wholesaler, however, enjoys a reduction in uncertainty by one level 
under BP1. The other agents experience an uncertainty level stabilising effect.  
For the combined policy, the uncertainty associated with the impact of BP1 on the 
supply chain is stabilised under the WH strategy and there is further reduction of 
uncertainty by one level under BP2 and BP3. However the retailer benefits more 
under BP3 and the wholesaler benefit less under PT and the manufacturer is 
unperturbed.  
6.3.2 Entropy Analysis of MF Effect 
The result of the relative change in uncertainty level due to wholesaling 
simplification can be found in Table 6.5.  
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SFDD 
 
Retailer Wholesaler Manufacturer SC Total 
option I 0 0 1 1 
option II 0 1 0 0 
option III 0 0 -1 0 
 
AOW 
 
Retailer Wholesaler Manufacturer SC Total 
option I 0 0 1 0 
option II 0 0 0 0 
option III 1 0 1 1 
 
PT 
 
Retailer Wholesaler Manufacturer SC Total 
option I 0 0 0 0 
option II 0 0 0 0 
option III 0 0 0 0 
 
IBMS 
 
Retailer Wholesaler Manufacturer SC Total 
option I 0 -1 -1 -1 
option II 0 0 0 0 
option III 0 0 0 0 
Table 6.5 MF effect on information security breach impact uncertainty level 
Simplifying the manufacturer tier in a supply chain using parameter based ordering 
result in an increase in uncertainty by one level from nil to low under BP1 but in a 
BP2 scenario the uncertainty level remains the same. However, under a BP3, the 
simplification strategy reduces the uncertainty by a level from low to nil. At the 
operational level, the uncertainty level at the retailer is unperturbed by this 
simplification strategy but the manufacturer and wholesaler are affected differently 
depending on the profile. 
Manufacturing simplification in a batch ordering supply chain does not affect the 
uncertainty level of the supply chain regardless of the breach profile. The supply 
agents are also not affected, except for the wholesaler where uncertainty is reduced 
by a level.   
With the combined policy type, simplifying the ‘make’ process, i.e. manufacturing 
tier, does not change the impact uncertainty level in the supply chain  under any 
security breach scenario except for a decrease in uncertainty when the breach has 
high RoC. At the supply agent level, the uncertainty level of the manufacturer is 
increased by a level under BP3 but reduced by a level under BP2. Hence there is 
observed benefit for the manufacturer from simplifying the make process only under 
breach with high RoC. 
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6.3.3 Entropy Analysis of NT Effect 
The result of the relative change in uncertainty level due to wholesaling 
simplification can be found in Table 6.6.  
NT SFDD 
 
Retailer Wholesaler Manufacturer SC Total 
option I 0 1 1 1 
option II 0 1 0 0 
option III 1 0 0 1 
 
AOW 
 
Retailer Wholesaler Manufacturer SC Total 
option I 0 0 1 0 
option II 0 0 0 0 
option III 0 0 0 1 
 
PT 
 
Retailer Wholesaler Manufacturer SC Total 
option I 0 0 0 0 
option II 0 0 0 0 
option III 0 -1 0 0 
 
IBMS 
 
Retailer Wholesaler Manufacturer SC Total 
option I 0 -1 0 -1 
option II 0 0 0 0 
option III 0 0 0 0 
Table 6.6 MF effect on information security breach impact uncertainty level 
Networking, as defined in this study, increases the total supply chain uncertainty 
associated with the impact of a breach of the type BP1 under a parameter based 
policy. The effect under a BP2 is of a stabilising type and that under BP3 is a 
mitigating type with one level decrease in uncertainty. The wholesaler is affected in 
a similar way but the retailer is unaffected under any of the breach profiles. The 
manufacturer on the other hand benefits under BP2 and BP3 with a level reduction in 
uncertainty under both profiles. 
Again the supply chain is unperturbed when networking is undertaken in a batch 
ordering supply system. The wholesaler can only benefit with a level reduction in 
uncertainty when the disruption duration is high. 
Considering a supply chain using the combined batch-and-parameter based ordering 
policy, the effect of networking stabilises the impact uncertainty of a breach with 
profile of the BP1 type but brings about a reduction in uncertainty by one level under 
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BP2 and BP3. The uncertainty level of the impact of any breach on manufacturer’s 
performance under this strategy is not affected.  
6.3.4 Summary and Cost Implication of Entropy Change Due to Structural 
Reconfiguration 
The increase in uncertainty level means the new reconfigured supply chain structure 
needs to increase its monitoring and review level to match the uncertainty level in 
the pre-existing serial structure. This would require additional cost to the supply 
chain. A decrease in uncertainty level as a result of reconfiguration means the new 
supply chain structure can afford to either maintain the status quo or reduce the 
monitoring and review effort. This means the reconfigured supply chain can save 
cost that would have been needed by the pre-existing serial structure to increase its 
monitoring level to the one found after reconfiguration. Therefore the cost of 
additional monitoring and review should be compared to the mitigation benefit 
provided by the new structure. If the additional cost due to increased uncertainty is 
larger than the mitigation benefit derivable, then the new structure is considered 
unproductive and should be disqualified. However if the additional cost in 
monitoring and review as a result of increased uncertainty is less than the mitigation 
benefit, then the proposed new structure is considered productive and a decision can 
be made to reconfigure into this structure.  
It is imperative for any organisation, given its specific needs for security, to 
implement proper security control measures or countermeasures. These include but 
not limited to Personnel Security; Physical and Environmental Protection; 
Contingency Planning; Configuration Management; Maintenance; System and 
Information Integrity; Media Protection; Incident Response; Awareness and Training 
(Ouyang, 2012b). These controls also have various sub categories of controls and 
they all require monitoring and review. Examples of some of the monitoring and 
review measures extracted from Ouyang (2012b) include: 
– Monitor & track inventory & maintenance records 
– Monitor & track service level and mean time between failure (MTBF) 
of system or components  
– Contingency plan testing which includes walkthroughs (tabletop 
exercise), checklist, simulation, or full interruption test, 
– Ensure remote maintenance is performed under monitor & control, 
and it is executed in accordance to change control process 
– Ensure only authorized personnel can access systems 
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– Keep track of authorized 3rd party maintenance personnel and 
document actions performed. 
– Ensure timely maintenance 
– Define & monitor service level agreements (SLAs) 
– Keep or arrange supply chain of spare parts for mission critical 
components. 
– Issuance of security alerts and advisories (situation awareness) 
periodically and as at when required 
– Information records handling and retention 
– System log retention 
– Monitor user access (non-privilege & privilege). 
– Security functionality verification 
– Security audits for compliance. 
– Periodic security assessments (to identify potential vulnerabilities & 
mitigate potential exposure). 
– Periodically reviewing levels of security response measures to 
maintain security posture. 
According to a classification by Alshboul (2010), when an organisation implements 
0-49% of the measures and countermeasures, the security level is said to be high. 
When it implements 50-79% or 80-100% then the security level is considered 
moderate or high respectively. Since each breach is unique in the way it is 
perpetrated, the focus of monitoring and review measures would also be unique or 
specific to each breach. The specificity of monitoring and review activities means 
there would be different measures or controls for different breach types. To know the 
exact requirement i.e. the level of control required is essential. The argument here is 
that since entropy level is reflective of the amount of information needed to manage 
and control a particular system, acquiring this information will incur certain costs. It 
therefore follows that higher entropy means higher level of information required to 
have control over the system (i.e. higher monitoring and review level), hence higher 
associated cost. Since the actual cost of increasing monitoring and control level 
would vary for different organisations, the following assumptions are made to help 
quantify this cost implication: 
Let;  
S = the cost associated with monitoring and controlling the SFDD breach, 
A= the cost associated with monitoring and controlling the AOW breach, 
P = the cost associated with monitoring and controlling the PT breach, and 
I = the cost associated with monitoring and controlling the IBMS breach. 
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The logic follows that a level increase in uncertainty (low to medium or medium to 
high) corresponds to a level increase in the monitoring and control level required to 
match the new level of uncertainty. If the cost associated with increasing the 
monitoring and control by one level is represented by subscript 1 and an increase by 
two levels is represented by subscript 2,  then Si, Ai, Pi, Ii are the average daily cost 
associated with increasing the monitoring and review by i level needed for SFDD, 
AOW, PT and IBMS respectively.  
where i = 1, 2, 3. 
For example, S1 would be the daily average cost associated with increasing the 
monitoring and review level of SFDD by one, while P2 would be that for increasing 
the monitoring and review level of PT by two.  
The result in Table 6.7 reveals the cost implication of structural reconfiguration from 
a serial type to a wholesaler, manufacturer and network types based on the 
monitoring and review level change required. The result in the table shows the cost 
associated with each entropy level increase or decrease for all breach types and the 
cost of all the breaches is added up to give the total cost which is also termed the 
structural reconfiguration uncertainty cost implication.  A positive value indicates a 
cost savings as a result of reduction in monitoring and review level while a negative 
value indicates an additional cost required as a result of increased monitoring and 
review level. 
It is clear from Table 6.7 that, under the parameter based policy such as the base 
stock policy (option I), structural reconfiguration in the supply chain would have a 
cost implication with magnitude S1-I1 which can be cost saving (if S1>I1) or added 
cost (if S1<I1) regardless of the reconfiguration type. On the other hand, under a 
batch ordering system (option II), structural reconfiguration strategy neither requires 
additional monitoring and review cost nor saves the supply chain the associated cost. 
Under the combined policy system (option III), cost savings equivalent to one level 
decrease can be derived under SFDD and AOW breach when wholesaling 
simplification or networking strategy is adopted but manufacturing simplification 
only saves cost when AOW breach is concerned.  
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  Monitoring and Review Cost Implication 
Option I WH MF NT 
SFDD S1 S1 S1 
AOW - - - 
IBMS -I1 -I1 -I1 
PT - - - 
Extra Cost Saving S1 - I1  S1 - I1 S1 - I1  
    
Option II WH MF N 
SFDD - - - 
AOW - - - 
IBMS - - - 
PT - - -  
Extra Cost Saving  - -  -  
    
Option III WH MF N 
SFDD S1 - S1 
AOW A1 A1 A1 
IBMS - - - 
PT - - - 
Extra Cost Saving  S1 + A1  A1  S1 + A1 
Table 6.7 Cost implication of structural reconfiguration effect on uncertainty 
level 
6.3.5 Decision Framework for Supply Chain Structure Reconfiguration 
Remember this study is trying to assess the benefit of restructuring to information 
security impact and what is being examined is the relative performance of each 
structure to a serial type structure.  The question then begs which would be the ideal 
configuration to choose and what ‘extra’ control would be needed or not needed 
when restructuring takes place. The word ‘extra’ was carefully selected because the 
serial supply chain has pre-existing security control priorities depending on the 
ordering policy, however the effect of changing the structure is examined to see how 
the control level and priority changes in a reconfigured setting. Therefore the 
decision framework combines the direct cost impact assessment and indirect cost 
impact (entropy level change) assessment in deciding which structure holds the best 
benefit. The combined assessment can be found in Table 6.8. To arrive at the best 
decision, the following steps are taken: 
i. Compute the benefit of the improvement strategy in a non-breach 
scenario.  
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ii. Compute the mitigation benefit of the improvement strategy under 
various information security breach scenarios. 
iii. Compute the aggregate benefit by adding the improvement benefit in a 
non-breach scenario and the various breach scenarios. 
iv. Estimate the aggregate cost implication of changing the monitoring and 
review level in the supply chain (if cost implication is positive, then it is 
considered cost saving benefit; but if cost implication is negative, then it 
is considered to be an additional cost). 
v. Compute the overall benefit by adding i, ii, iii and iv. 
vi. To decide on the ideal configuration the one with the highest cost benefit 
is selected 
The aggregate structural reconfiguration benefit in a non-breach scenario (n-BS) and 
in various breach scenarios (BS) under each ordering policy has been established in 
section 5.3.4. This is extracted and included in Table 6.8. A 1% increase or decrease 
in benefit is equivalent to £3.97 (for option I); £3.10 (for option II); £3.00 (for option 
III). 
From Table 6.8, it is clear that, under the parameter based policy, the WH and NT 
structures exacerbates the aggregate daily cost performance of the supply chain in 
both non-breach and breach scenarios by 3% and 6% respectively while MF 
improves it by 4%. Entropy assessment however indicate that the effect of all three 
strategies is similar with an implied cost of S1 - I1. Therefore, the MF structure can be 
adopted if and only if 4% + S1 is significantly greater than I1. Otherwise the serial 
structure is better off than when reconfiguration into any of the structures discussed.  
Under the batch ordering system, the supply chain need not worry about changing 
the monitoring and review level and the final decision can be based on the direct cost 
impact alone. Therefore, having considered the direct and indirect cost implications 
of structural reconfiguration, the networking strategy appears to be the best strategy 
under normal and disruption circumstances.  
With the combined ordering system, structural reconfiguration provides additional 
cost savings especially under highly disruptive or highly recurring breach. Since the 
wholesaling simplification strategy offers the best performance under the direct 
impact assessment and joint best under the indirect cost assessment, it is very clear 
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that WH structure is the ideal reconfiguration choice for the combined batch-and-
parameter ordering system.  
Option I WH MF NT 
Aggregate benefit (n-BS 
and BS) 
-3% 4% -6% 
Monitoring and review 
cost 
S1 - I1 S1 - I1 S1 - I1 
Overall benefit -3% + S1 - I1 4% + S1 - I1 -6% + S1 - I1 
Decider Max (WH, MF, N) 
Final Decision No reconfiguration, if  MF: 4% + S1 >> I1, else MF 
    
Option II WH MF NT 
Mitigation benefit 49.8% 47.7% 50.9% 
Monitoring cost - - - 
Overall benefit 49.8% 47.7% 50.9% 
Decider Max (WH , MF, NT)  
Final Decision NT 
    
Option III WH MF NT 
Mitigation benefit 29.0% 21.7% 25.0% 
Monitoring cost  S1 + A1  A1  S1 + A1 
Overall benefit 29% + S1 + A1 21.7% + A1 25.0% + S1 + A1 
Decider Max (WH, MF, NT) 
Final Decision WH   
1% is equivalent to £3.97 (for option I); £3.10 (for option II); £3.00 (for option III). 
Table 6.8 Decision framework for structural reconfiguration under each 
ordering policy 
6.4 INFORMATION SHARING LEVEL EFFECT ON UNCERTAINTY 
LEVEL OF BREACH IMPACT 
The result of the rating outcome for information sharing level effect on ordering 
systems I, II and III can be found in Appendix 6.2. The aim of this section is to 
establish the relative change in entropy level due to adopting various information 
sharing strategies and to examine the cost implication to monitoring and review 
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activities. To the end of understanding how this can affect information sharing 
adoption decision.  An examination of this result in the manner with which section 
6.3 was examined will provide the same level of insight for each ISL.    
6.4.1 Entropy Analysis of RW Effect 
The result of the relative change in uncertainty level due to information sharing 
between the retailer and wholesaler only can be found in Table 6.9.  
 
SFDD 
 
Retailer Wholesaler Manufacturer SC Total 
option I 0 1 0 0 
option II 0 -1 -2 -1 
option III 0 0 0 0 
 
AOW 
 
Retailer Wholesaler Manufacturer SC Total 
option I 0 -1 0 -1 
option II -1 0 -1 0 
option III 1 0 0 1 
 
PT 
 
Retailer Wholesaler Manufacturer SC Total 
option I 0 -1 1 0 
option II 0 0 -1 0 
option III 1 -1 0 1 
 
IBMS 
 
Retailer Wholesaler Manufacturer SC Total 
option I 0 -1 1 -1 
option II 0 0 -1 0 
option III 0 0 0 0 
Table 6.9 Effect of RW mode on information security breach impact 
uncertainty level 
Under the parameter based ordering system, information sharing between the retailer 
and the wholesaler alone in the supply chain increases the level of breach impact 
uncertainty by one under BP1 and BP2. However, under BP3, there is no difference 
between the uncertainty level in the non-information sharing mode (NI) and the RW 
mode. The uncertainty level remains unchanged for the retailer under all three breach 
profiles while that of the wholesaler is increased by one level under BP1 and BP2 
but decreased by one level under BP3. The manufacturer only derived a one level 
reduction in uncertainty level under BP1 but observed no changes to uncertainty 
level under high disruption duration or RoC.  
For the batch ordering system, RW effect cause a stabilisation of the uncertainty 
level under BP1 and BP2 but increases it under BP1 by one level (from low to 
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medium). For the respective supply agents, the wholesale experience a similar effect 
to that of the entire supply chain but the retailer is unaffected except under BP2 
where a one level increase is observed. The manufacturer is worst affected with a 
one level increase under BP1 and BP2 and a two level increase under BP3. The 
manufacturer happens to be the hotspot for uncertainty in such supply chains using 
the batch ordering policy.  
With the combined policy type, there is an observed one level reduction in 
uncertainty level after RW information sharing mode adoption only under BP2. On 
the other hand, the manufacturer and wholesaler are unaffected under all three 
scenarios while the retailer only benefits under BP1. 
6.4.2 Entropy Analysis of WM Effect 
The result of the relative change in uncertainty level due to information sharing 
between the wholesaler and manufacturer only can be found in Table 6.10.  
At the supply chain level, under a parameter based ordering system, adopting the 
WM mode of information sharing worsens the uncertainty by a level when the 
supply chain faces a breach of BP1 type but there is no apparent effect on the 
uncertainty level when the disruption duration and RoC are increased significantly. 
However at the level of the individual supply agents, only the manufacturer enjoys a 
reduced uncertainty level under BP2 and BP3 while the other agents are unaffected 
regardless of the breach profile. 
Under the batch ordering policy, the uncertainty level in the supply chain and at each 
individual agent is unaffected by a WM configuration. Hence no change in 
monitoring and review level required. 
With the combined policy, the supply chain uncertainty level is only affected under 
PT breach and this is due to the fact that WM mode reduces the entropy level at the 
retailer (from low to nil) under this breach. The manufacturer is unperturbed by the 
WM mode regardless of the breach profile but the wholesaler is affected negatively 
under BP2 with a level increase in uncertainty 
. 
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 SFDD 
 Retailer Wholesaler Manufacturer SC Total 
option I 0 0 1 0 
option II 0 0 0 0 
option III 0 0 0 0 
 AOW 
 Retailer Wholesaler Manufacturer SC Total 
option I 0 0 1 0 
option II 0 0 0 0 
option III 0 -1 0 0 
 PT 
 Retailer Wholesaler Manufacturer SC Total 
option I 0 0 0 0 
option II 0 0 0 0 
option III 1 0 0 1 
 IBMS 
 Retailer Wholesaler Manufacturer SC Total 
option I 0 0 0 -1 
option II 0 0 0 0 
option III 1 0 0 0 
Table 6.10 Effect of WM mode on information security breach impact 
uncertainty level 
6.4.3 Entropy Analysis of RWM Effect 
The result of the relative change in uncertainty level due to information sharing 
between the wholesaler and manufacturer only can be found in Table 6.11. 
The effect of full integration on the uncertainty level in a supply chain using 
parameter based ordering policy is a one level increase in breach impact uncertainty 
when a breach of the type BP1 and BP2 occurs. There is no effect on uncertainty 
level when breach of the type BP1 occurs. At the operational level, the wholesaler is 
affected in a similar way to the supply chain but the retailer and manufacturer are 
unaffected by the full information sharing strategy under any of the breach profiles.  
With the batch ordering system, adopting a full information sharing strategy does not 
affect uncertainty level when BP1and BP2 occurs but the uncertainty level is 
decreased by one level when PT occur. This means that a little increase in the RoC 
of the breach (comparing IBMS to PT) reduces the uncertainty level in a fully 
integrated mode by one level  while a significantly high increase in RoC (comparing 
IBMS to AOW) has no effect. On the other hand, the uncertainty level is increased 
by a level when the more disruptive breach occurs. Interestingly, the impact 
uncertainty at the manufacturer is reduced by a level only under BP1, increased at 
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the wholesaler by a level only under BP3 and increased at the retailer by a level only 
under BP2.  
RWM SFDD 
 Retailer Wholesaler Manufacturer SC Total 
option I 0 0 0 0 
option II 0 -1 0 -1 
option III 0 0 0 0 
 AOW 
 Retailer Wholesaler Manufacturer SC Total 
option I 0 -1 0 -1 
option II -1 0 0 0 
option III 1 -1 0 0 
 PT 
 Retailer Wholesaler Manufacturer SC Total 
option I 0 -1 0 -1 
option II 0 0 1 1 
option III 1 -1 0 0 
 IBMS 
 Retailer Wholesaler Manufacturer SC Total 
option I 0 -1 0 -1 
option II 0 0 1 0 
option III 0 0 0 0 
Table 6.11 Effect of WM mode on information security breach impact 
uncertainty level 
Under the combined policy, RWM does not affect the uncertainty at the supply chain 
level under any of the breach profiles. At the operational level, the manufacturer is 
also unaffected by the full information sharing mode. However the retailer benefits 
with a level reduction in uncertainty only under increased RoC while the wholesaler 
experiences a level increase in uncertainty under similar conditions. 
6.4.4 Summary and Cost Implication of Entropy Change Due to Information 
Sharing 
The implication of the effect of various information sharing modes on uncertainty 
level to monitoring and review control cost is patterned in a similar way to that 
described for the structure effect in section 6.3.4. The result in Table 6.12 reveals the 
cost implication of engaging in information sharing at the RW, WM and RWM 
levels based on the monitoring and review level change required.  
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Monitoring and Review Cost Implication 
Option I RW WM RWM 
SFDD - - - 
AOW -A1 - -A1 
IBMS -I1 -I1 -I1 
PT - - -P1 
Extra Cost Saving -(A1 +I1)  -I1 -(A1+P1+I1) 
Option II RW WM RWM 
SFDD  -S1 -  -S1 
AOW - - - 
IBMS - - - 
PT - - P1 
Extra Cost Saving  -S1  -   P1-S1 
Option III RW WM RWM 
SFDD - - - 
AOW A1 - - 
IBMS - - - 
PT P1 P1 - 
Extra Cost Saving  A1+P1  P1 -  
Table 6.12 Cost implication of structural reconfiguration effect on monitoring 
and review cost 
Under the parameter based ordering, it is clear from the result that there is additional 
cost required by the supply chain, where retailer’s information is being shared with 
the wholesaler, in order to increase its control over AOW and IBMS information 
security breach impact. Including the manufacturer in the sharing of retailer 
information increases the monitoring and review cost by P1. Information sharing that 
does not involve sharing retailer’s information but that only focuses on sharing 
wholesaler information with the manufacturer needs to increase its monitoring level 
for IBMS and hence will incur additional cost of monitoring and review.  Therefore 
with the RW and RWM strategy, total monitoring and review control cost should 
increase if the same level of control over security breach impact as that of a non-
integrated supply chain is to be maintained.  
With the batch ordering system, sharing retailer’s information with the wholesaler 
alone requires an increase in total monitoring and review cost by S1 while including 
the manufacturer in this information sharing reduces the S1 cost by providing 
additional cost saving of P1. The strategy that only involves sharing wholesaler’s 
information with the manufacturer does not incur any additional cost regardless of 
the breach profile.  
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Information sharing under the combined batch-and-parameter based ordering policy 
does not increase the uncertainty or complexity of the supply chain. The result 
suggest that sharing retailer’s information with the wholesaler alone saves 
monitoring and review cost (by A1+P1) while extending this information to the 
manufacturer will only eliminate this benefit but it would still be at the same level 
with that of a non-integrated supply chain. On the other hand, only sharing 
wholesaler’s information with the manufacturer helps save monitoring and review 
cost by P1. 
6.4.5 Decision Framework for Supply Chain Information Sharing Level 
Again the final decision of which ISL is most desirable for each ordering policy 
should not only be based on the above assessment, as it might be misleading, but 
also on the entropy assessment and its implication. Similar to the discussion in 
section 6.3.5, this section evaluates the performance of each ISL under various 
information security breach at the supply chain level. The decision framework 
incorporates the direct mitigation cost benefit of engaging in information sharing at 
different levels and the cost associated with uncertainty level change due to security 
breach. To decide on the ideal level of information sharing for each ordering policy, 
the steps outlined in section 6.3.5 is applied but with information sharing level as 
focus instead of supply chain structure. The result of this computation is summarised 
in Table 6.13. Recall that 1% is equivalent to £3.97 (for option I); £3.10 (for option 
II); £3.00 (for option III).  
From the result in Table 6.13, it is clear that under a parameter based ordering 
system, the supply chain will have to incur certain costs to increase the level of 
control that may otherwise be lost after adopting information sharing strategies. 
Based on simple logic, the best information strategy is this case would depend on the 
following conditions. If P1 is lesser than 30%, then RWM is the best choice, 
otherwise RW will be the best choice. However if A1 is less than 35%, then WM 
would become the ideal and if I1 is less than 1%, then a non-integrated scenario 
would be the ideal case. 
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Option I RW WM RWM 
Aggregate benefit (n-BS 
and BS) 
36% 1% 66% 
Monitoring and review 
cost 
-(A1 +I1) -I1 -(A1+P1+I1) 
Overall benefit 36% - (A1 +I1) 1% -I1 66% - (A1+P1+I1) 
Decider Max (RW, WM, RWM) 
Final Decision 
RWM (IF P1<30%, Else RW (IF A1< 35%, Else WM (IF 
I1<1%, Else No integration))) 
    
Option II RW WM RWM 
Mitigation benefit 12% 6% 31% 
Monitoring cost -S1 - P1-S1 
Overall benefit 12%-S1 6% 31% + P1-S1 
Decider Max (RW, WM, RWM) 
Final Decision RWM (IF S1 < P1 + 25%, Else WM) 
    
Option III RW WM RWM 
Mitigation benefit 18% 27% 32% 
Monitoring cost A1+P1 P1 - 
Overall benefit 18% + A1+P1 27% + P1 32% 
Decider Max (RW, WM, RWM) 
Final Decision RWM (IF P1<5%, Else WM (IF A1> 9%, Else RW)) 
1% is equivalent to £3.97 (for option I); £3.10 (for option II); £3.00 (for option III). 
Table 6.13 Decision framework for ISL adoption under each ordering policy 
For a batch ordering system, the decision is clearly between RWM and WM. If the 
cost magnitude of S1 is less than that of P1 + 25%, then the full integration mode 
would be the ideal choice for the batch ordering system under these conditions, 
otherwise WM would be the preferred choice. 
 With the combined policy, the decision is a bit more complicated than in the batch 
ordering system. The selection would be RWM, provided the magnitude of P1 is less 
than 5%, otherwise WM would be favoured. However, if A1 is less than 9%, RW 
becomes the best choice. 
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6.5 INFLUENCE OF THE INTERACTION BETWEEN ISL AND 
STRUCTURE ON UNCERTAINTY LEVEL OF BREACH IMPACT 
The influence of structural reconfiguration and information sharing strategies has 
been discussed separately in section 6.3 and 6.4 respectively. However the aim of 
this section is to establish how combining the two strategies would affect breach 
impact uncertainty and the cost implication of this under the three ordering policies. 
Given the proposed indirect cost assessment (entropy assessment), the objective is to 
know if combining both improvement strategies would be beneficial to the supply 
chain cost performance or if using a single improvement strategy would be better. It 
is also aimed to establish whether the decision made from direct cost assessment 
alone will be different from that made when the indirect cost assessment has been 
included. The result of the entropy level rating of the various combination of 
information sharing level (ISL) and supply chain structure scenarios can be found in 
Appendix 6.3.  
6.5.1 Summary and Cost Implication of Entropy Change Due to the Combined 
Effect of Information Sharing and Supply Chain Structure 
The change in entropy level as a result of the combined effect is shown in Table 6.14 
and the cost implication is shown in Table 6.15. As a general observation from Table 
6.14, under the parameter based policy, the effect of information sharing on the 
breach impact uncertainty level in different supply chain structures is mostly 
negative when the breach is of the BP1 type. The interaction effect is mostly of the 
stabilising or improvement type on uncertainty level under BP3 while it is mostly of 
a stabilising type under BP2. With the batch ordering policy, the interaction effect is 
mostly of the stabilising type under all three breach profiles. For the combined policy 
type, the interaction effect is predominantly of the stabilising type under BP1 type 
while the effect is predominantly of the improvement type under BP2 and BP3. 
Of the three ordering options, it appears that the batch ordering policy is the most 
stable to uncertainty level change due to the interaction effect under all three breach 
profiles. The combined policy offers the next best stability but the inherent 
instability favours the interaction effect under breaches of the type BP2 and BP3. 
The parameter based policy is the most unstable of the three to the interaction effect 
and this instability does not favour the interaction effect under breaches of type BP1.  
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In terms of the implication to cost, the result in Table 6.15 reveal that the interaction 
effect between the structural reconfiguration and information sharing strategies in a  
batch ordering system hardly incur additional monitoring and review cost, but the 
combined batch-and-parameter ordering policy provide additional cost saving in all 
but one of the various combinations. The interaction effect in a parameter based 
policy supply chain, however, requires additional monitoring and review cost for 
virtually all the combination scenarios.    
 
RW WM RWM 
 
Option I 
Breach WH MF NT WH MF NT WH MF NT 
SFDD 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 
AOW 0 0 0 -1 -1 0 0 0 0 
PT -1 0 -1 0 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 
IBMS -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 
 
Option II 
 
WH MF NT WH MF NT WH MF NT 
SFDD 0 0 -1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
AOW 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 
PT 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
IBMS 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
Option III 
 
WH MF NT WH MF NT WH MF NT 
SFDD 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 
AOW 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 
PT 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
IBMS 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Table 6.14 Relative change in uncertainty level due to ISL and structure 
interaction effect
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 RW WM RWM 
 Option I 
Breach WH MF NT WH MF NT WH MF NT 
SFDD - S1 - S1 - S1 S1 S1 - 
AOW - - - A1- A1- - - - - 
PT P1- - P1- - P1- P1- P1- P1- P1- 
IBMS I1- I1- I1- I1- I1- I1- I1- I1- I1- 
Extra Cost Saving -(P1+I1) -I1 -(P1+I1) S1-A1-I1 -(A1+P1+I1) S1-P1-I1 S1-P1-I1 S1-P1-I1 -(P1+I1) 
 Option II 
 WH MF NT WH MF NT WH MF NT 
SFDD - - S1- - - - - - - 
AOW - - - - - - A1 - A1 
PT - - - - - - - - - 
IBMS - - - - - - - - - 
Extra Cost Saving - - -S1 - - - A1 - A1 
 Option III 
 WH MF NT WH MF NT WH MF NT 
SFDD S1 S1 S1 - - S1 S1 S1 S1 
AOW A1 - A1 A1- - A1 A1 A1 A1 
PT - - - P1 - - - - - 
IBMS - - - - - - - - - 
Extra Cost Saving S1+A1 S1 S1+A1 A1+P1 - S1+A1 S1+A1 S1+A1 S1+A1 
Table 6.15 Cost implication of the interaction effect on monitoring and review cost
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6.5.2 Decision Framework for Combining Information Sharing and Supply 
Chain Structure 
To decide on the ideal combination of information sharing level and structure for 
each ordering policy, the decision framework incorporates the direct impact 
assessment and the indirect impact assessment. Again, the steps outlined in section 
6.3.5 are followed. The result of the computation in step (iii) has been established in 
section 5.5 and this is added to the cost implication of uncertainty level change 
already established in section 6.5.1. The overall benefit is computed and shown in 
Table 6.16. Recall that 1% is equivalent to £3.97 (for option I); £3.10 (for option II); 
£3.00 (for option III). 
 RW 
 
WH MF NT 
Option I 46.3% -(P1+I1) 45.5% -I1 8.2% -(P1+I1) 
Option II 52.9% 63.6% 23.1% - S1 
Option III 43.9% + S1+A1 53% + S1 2.7% + S1+A1 
 
WM 
 
WH MF NT 
Option I 4.2% +S1-A1-I1 - (1.2% +A1+P1+I1) S1-P1-I1-2.9% 
Option II 57.5% 40.3% 51.5% 
Option III 67% + A1+P1 39.8% 54.1% + S1+A1 
 
RWM 
 
WH MF NT 
Option I S1-P1-I1+87.4% S1-P1-I1+88.4% 44.4% - (P1+I1) 
Option II 75% + A1 78.3% 34.1% + A1 
Option III 59.7% + S1+A1 61.3% + S1+A1 34.0% + S1+A1 
1% is equivalent to £3.97 (for option I); £3.10 (for option II); £3.00 (for option 
III). 
Table 6.16 Overall Mitigation Benefit under combined strategies 
It is clear from the result that given a batch ordering or combined batch-and-
parameter based ordering system, significant benefit can be derived when the retailer 
shares its inventory information (including market demand) and even greater benefit 
can be derived when this information is shared with the manufacturer. Interestingly, 
sharing only the wholesaler information with the manufacturer under similar 
ordering policies yields significant overall benefit to the supply chain, even more 
than the RW and RWM strategies in some instances. The benefit derived under a 
parameter based policy however depends on certain conditions.  
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It is important for supply chains to know, given their pre-existing conditions, how 
these two advocated performance improvement strategies can be adopted. For those 
pre-existing in certain structures similar to those described in this study, the best 
information sharing strategy would be desired. On the other hand, for those who 
have already adopted some form of information sharing strategy and would like to 
improve the structure of the supply chain would consider the best structural 
reconfiguration strategy. This decision, given pre-existing conditions, is explained in 
the subsequent sections. 
6.5.2.1 Decision for structural reconfiguration given ISL and ordering 
Policy 
The best combination of structural reconfiguration with existing information sharing 
strategy is shown in Table 6.17. For the parameter based ordering policy, decision of 
whether to adopt any reconfiguration strategy at all depends on the magnitude of P1 
and I1. For a supply chain already adopting RW information strategy, if the 
magnitude of P1 and I1 is greater than 46.3% (which is equivalent to £ 183.8), then 
the supply chain is best to avoid adopting any of the reconfiguration strategies. 
Otherwise manufacturing or wholesaling simplification can be selected depending on 
whether P1 is greater than 0.8% (equivalent to £3.2) or not. The decision for 
structural reconfiguration in supply chain with pre-existing WM and RWM strategies 
is predicated on certain conditions as well.  
With the batch ordering and combined policy, the result in Table 6.17 suggests that 
structural reconfiguration can be implemented with potential for significant benefit. 
The decision of which reconfiguration strategy to select is quite straight forward in 
batch ordering system while in a combined policy type, the decision is not straight 
forward at least for the partial information sharing strategies (RW and WM).   
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Option I Option II Option III 
RW 
MF (IF P1>0.8%, Else 
WH (IF P1+I1<46.3%, 
Else No combination ) 
MF 
MF (IF A1< 9.1%, Else 
WH) 
WM 
WH (IF A1< P1+7.1%, 
Else NT (IF 
S1>P1+I1+2.9%, Else No 
combination) 
WH 
WH (IF S1<P1+12.9%, 
Else NT) 
RWM 
MF (IF P1+I1 < 44.4%, 
Else No combination) 
MF MF 
1% is equivalent to £3.97 (for option I); £3.10 (for option II); £3.00 (for option III). 
Table 6.17 Structural reconfiguration strategy decision given various ISL 
6.5.2.2 Decision for ISL Given Structure and Ordering Policy 
The best combination of structural reconfiguration with existing information sharing 
strategy is shown in Table 6.18. With the parameter based policy, again, the decision 
to adopt any information sharing should be preceded by the examination of certain 
conditions and these conditions vary for different supply chain structures. Under the 
batch ordering system, the decision of which information sharing best suit the 
current structure is quite straight forward for all pre-existing structures, except for 
the network structure where the decision is between RWM and WM depending on 
the magnitude of A1. For the combined policy type, the decision is also straight 
forward except under a wholesaler type structure (WH) where the decision is 
between RWM and WM depending on the size of S1 and P1.  
 
Option I Option II Option III 
WH 
RWM (IF P1< 83.2%+A1, Else 
WM (IF S1 > 4.2% +A1+I1, 
Else No combination) 
RWM 
RWM (IF S1 > 7.3% 
+ P1, Else WM) 
MF 
RWM (IF P1< S1 + 42.9%, Else 
RW (IF I1<45.5%, Else No 
combination) 
RWM RWM 
NT 
RWM (IF S1< 47.3%, Else 
WM (IF S1>P1+I1-2.9%, Else 
No combination) 
RWM (IF 
A1>17.4%, Else 
WM) 
WM 
1% is equivalent to £3.97 (for option I); £3.10 (for option II); £3.00 (for option III). 
Table 6.18 Information sharing level strategy decision given various supply 
structures 
6.5.2.3 Decision for combining ISL and structural reconfiguration 
strategy given specific ordering policy 
Supply chains seeking to improve their cost performance by adopting both 
improvement strategies, given a prevailing ordering policy, will need to decide 
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which combination of structural reconfiguration strategy and information sharing 
strategy would be most ideal. The best combination of structural reconfiguration 
with information sharing strategy under each ordering policy is shown in Table 6.19. 
The decision based on the direct cost assessment in the previous chapter (section 5.6) 
was RWM+MF for option I and option II and WM+WH for option III. However 
from the entropy assessment, this study has shown that such decisions based on 
direct cost assessment alone may, in fact, be misleading.     
 
Best Combination 
Option I 
RWM+MF(IF P1< 92.6%+A1, Else WM+WH (IF A1< S1- 41.3%, 
Else RW+MF (IF I1<45.5%, Else No combined adoption))) 
Option II RWM+MF (IF A1 <3.3%, Else RWM+WH) 
Option III RWM+MF (IF S1> 5.7% + P1, Else WM+WH) 
1% is equivalent to £3.97 (for option I); £3.10 (for option II); £3.00 (for option III). 
Table 6.19 Decision making for combined ISL and structural reconfiguration 
strategy 
6.5.2.3 Decision for the overall best ISL, Structure and Ordering Policy 
Combination 
Through the process of elimination by pairwise comparison one can obtain the 
scenario that offers the best combination of ISL, supply chain structure and ordering 
policy. It is inaccurate to use the percentage values for direct comparison between all 
scenarios because the magnitude of a percentage is different for each ordering 
policy. Therefore an accurate and direct comparison would require the use of cost (£) 
instead of percentage. It has been established that 1% is equivalent to £3.97 (for 
option I); £3.10 (for option II); £3.00 (for option III). 
 By considering the best options for each ordering policy and substituting the 
percentage values with their corresponding pound (£) equivalent, the overall best 
combination is selected contingent on the following conditions: 
RWM+WH+II (IF P1<£31.5, Else WM+WH+III (IF S1<£7.1+P1, Else 
RWM+MF+III (IF A1>£167.05-P1-I1, Else RWM+MF+I (IF S1>P1+I1- £108.22, Else 
RWM+MF+II)))). 
The decision could be any of the above five combinations depending on the 
magnitude of S1, A1, P1 and I1 which are the respective average daily cost of 
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increasing the monitoring and review activities by one level for SFDD, AOW, PT 
and IBMS breaches respectively. 
6.6 CONCLUSION  
Recall that this study is about understanding the impact of information security 
breach with the presumption that this cost estimate is in itself uncertain. The study 
has shown that predicting this impact can be uncertain and judging only by the 
average cost estimate may be misleading. Many organisations do not consider 
breaches with low cost impact as worthy of concern but history has shown that what 
might seem benign a year ago may become the bane of existence the following year 
due to changing complexities or environmental conditions. It is therefore imperative 
to understand the uncertainty surrounding the cost estimate so that an organisation 
would not be caught unawares. After the 2011 Sony’s PlayStation Network (PSN) 
security breach incidence, some experts opined that Sony was not prepared for such 
an attack and did not respond to the breach adequately and did not warn their 
consumers soon enough (Newman, 2011, Pollack, 2011). One may therefore 
presume that had Sony been certain about the huge impact of hacking incidence in 
their risk assessment then it might have implemented the right mix of risk prevention 
and mitigation strategies or at least increased their level of monitoring and review 
control (i.e. correction strategy). This study has therefore proposed measuring this 
uncertainty using entropy assessment. 
From the entropy assessment, the study found that the impact of information security 
breach on supply chains operating with an optimal batch ordering policy is more 
stable, hence less control is required when changing strategic elements of the supply 
chain than in a supply chain using the combined policy type. Those with the 
parameter based ordering system would require additional level of control when 
confronting the impact of information security breach. 
The study also found that the effect of the strategic factors on the uncertainty level is 
similar for the batch policy and the combined policy type when the profile of the 
breach is of the less disruptive and less recurring nature (BP1) or highly disruptive 
but less recurring (BP3). However, when the profile of the breach is highly increased 
in terms of the breach recurrence rate (as in BP2), this effect is dissimilar with the 
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combined policy parameter enjoying better stability and hence offering better 
control.  
In terms of the cost implication of uncertainty level change, the results suggest that 
the interaction effect between the structural reconfiguration and information sharing 
strategies in a  batch ordering system hardly incur any additional monitoring and 
review cost, but the combined batch-and-parameter ordering policy provide 
additional cost saving in virtually all the various combinations. On the other hand, 
the interaction effect in a parameter based policy requires additional monitoring and 
review cost in the supply chain for virtually all scenarios.    
This study has shown that the decision to undertake restructuring given an ISL or the 
decision to engage in information sharing given a particular structure is not straight 
forward from the initial impact cost assessment. Hence the conditions for decision 
has been shown in the framework for deciding ISL or supply chain structure for each 
ordering policy and for deciding ordering policy for each ISL and Structure 
combinations. The overall best supply chain state (i.e. ISL+ Structure+ Ordering 
option) has been shown and this depends on the magnitude of the cost implications 
of the various information security breaches. In conclusion, upon impact uncertainty 
consideration using entropy assessment, the study has shown that the cost associated 
with the impact uncertainty could make, what was otherwise thought of as a good 
decision into a wrong one.  
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Chapter 7 : IMPLICATION AND CONCLUSION OF FINDINGS 
Information security breach is increasingly becoming a huge subject in supply chain 
management owing to the increased level of dependence on information systems and 
the increased level of interdependence between operating partners brought about by 
integrated information systems. Several threats to information security exist that can 
compromise the confidentiality, integrity and availability of the goods and/or 
services provided by organisations. Therefore information security breach impact 
assessment is strongly advocated for a compromise to the information system may 
have restrictions on the flow of information, which may ultimately disrupt the flow 
of material in the supply chain. This has been shown to have catastrophic impact on 
the cost performance as well as the service performance of supply chain agents.  
To understand the landscape of information security impact and the role certain 
supply chain strategic factors play in this impact, this research was divided into three 
separate studies. The first study (Chapter 4) was to understand the improvements in 
supply chain performance that can be derived, under normal circumstances (i.e. no 
information security breach), when those strategic factors are changed from one 
alternative to another. This also serves as the bench mark for estimating the impact 
of information security breach. The second study (Chapter 5) examined the impact of 
information security breach on supply chain performance and how each of these 
strategic factors fare in the face of these breaches. The third study (Chapter 6) 
established the uncertainty associated with the impact of each security breach using 
entropy theory and the implication of this to the monitoring and review level 
required in the supply chain. This represented an indirect cost impact assessment 
which was used in a final decision framework to guide improvement strategy 
adoption decisions.  
In the following sections, the main research findings of three studies will be 
summarized respectively and the managerial implications of the findings will then be 
discussed. It is followed with the research contributions. Finally, a critical discussion 
of limitations is provided before the future research directions are pointed out. 
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7.1 RESEARCH FINDNGS AND MANAGERIAL IMPLICATION OF STUDY 
1 
7.1.1 The Role of Ordering Policy in a Non-Breach Scenario  
7.1.1.1 Effect on Ordering Pattern 
Given similar operating conditions, the magnitude of the order quantity each time an 
order is placed is higher in a batch ordering policy than in a parameter based 
ordering policy. Consequently, the frequency of ordering in the former is less than 
that of the latter. The cost performance of the batch ordering system was better than 
that of the parameter based ordering suggesting that the ordering pattern (magnitude 
of order quantity and the frequency of ordering) of the former was more favourable 
to supply performance than the latter. However, the ordering pattern of an ordering 
policy which combines aspects of the batch ordering system and parameter based 
ordering was the median of the three and the performance under this combined 
policy was the highest of all three ordering policies. This indicates that there exists a 
point along the ordering pattern continuum between batch ordering and parameter 
based ordering where performance is optimal (or at least near optimal). Therefore the 
combined policy appears to be an improvement of the batch ordering and the 
parameter based ordering and can be considered to be an ordering policy 
improvement strategy. The same result was observed under all three supply 
structures which validates the findings. 
Managerial Implication: Certain supply chains favour certain shipping strategies 
depending on whether bulk purchase is made less frequently or whether smaller 
quantities are needed to be shipped more frequently. The optimal EOQ ordering type 
would require a shipping strategy that favours higher order quantity with less 
ordering frequency while a base stock policy under the same supply chain condition 
would require a shipping strategy that favours lower order quantities ordered more 
frequently. 
7.1.1.2 Effect on Bullwhip 
The bullwhip effect has been the subject of many articles on supply chain 
management. Several authors have examined the factors that contribute to an 
increase in the bullwhip effect while others have suggested improvement strategies. 
However this study supports the earlier contribution of Chen and Samroengraja 
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(2004) and has shown that incorporating strategies to reduce the bullwhip effect does 
not necessarily constitute improvement in supply chain cost performance. In fact, as 
the results suggest, the policy with the lowest bullwhip effect (option I- parameter 
based ordering policy) has higher supply chain cost than that with higher bullwhip 
effect (option II- batch ordering policy). This study also included the wholesaler tier 
in the simulation modelling, which was not included in the work of Chen and 
Samroengraja (2004) when they made that assertion, and found evidence to support 
the claim of Baganha and Cohen (1998) that the wholesaler has a stabilising effect 
on bullwhip effect. However this claim of the stabilising role of the wholesaler does 
not always apply, at least, to the combined batch-and-parameter based policy type 
(option III). 
Managerial Implication: The implication of the bullwhip effect from past literature 
is that upstream agents tend to carry excess inventory and therefore incur higher 
inventory holding cost. Part of the strategies of reducing the bullwhip effect could be 
introducing a wholesaler which could effectively be a sort of distribution center 
acting autonomously. Again this has to be justified by analysing the cost of having 
such a structure against the reduction in inventory and other associated costs that it 
will generate. 
7.1.2 The Role of Structural Reconfiguration in a Non-Breach Scenario  
7.1.2.1 Effect on Ordering Pattern 
Structural reconfiguration as a strategy does not affect the ordering pattern of a 
parameter based policy but affects that of batch and combined batch-and-parameter 
based  ordering by reducing the effective average order quantity (EAOQ) and a 
commensurate increase in ordering rate (OR). Consequently, the cost performance in 
a parameter based ordering system does not change while the cost performance in 
the other two ordering policies is improved by any of the three structural 
reconfiguration strategies considered. It is clear that simplifying the ‘deliver’ aspect 
of the supply chain (i.e. the wholesaler tier) is the best option for a combined policy 
type while simplifying the ‘make’ aspect (i.e. the manufacturer tier) is the best 
choice of structural reconfiguration for a supply chain using a batch ordering policy.  
Managerial implication: Therefore one can infer that supply chains using the 
parameter based policy (base stock policy) need not change their shipping strategy 
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when considering structural reconfiguration, but those using batch or combined 
batch-and-parameter based models should revisit their shipping strategy to adopt one 
that favours lesser order quantity placed more frequently. In addition, changing the 
structure of a supply chain can be difficult especially for those organisations in 
existing serial structures. For a supply chain using batch ordering policy (e.g. 
optimal EOQ model) who wants to derive the benefit of structural reconfiguration 
but does not want to go through the hassle of restructuring should consider only 
modifying its policy to the combined batch-and-parameter based policy to reap 
similar benefits. Therefore the combined policy can be used as a supply chain 
performance improvement strategy. 
7.1.2.2 Effect on Cost Performance 
This study has shown that, like all improvement strategies, structural reconfiguration 
does not benefit all the parties in the supply chain and incentives need to be given to 
participating agents who are not benefiting from it. Hence a decision framework for 
accepting a given improvement strategy is developed and shown in Figure 4.1.  
Managerial Implication: For the parameter based policies such as the base stock 
policy, again neither simplification nor networking strategies offer any significant 
benefit to the supply chain, hence adopting either of these strategies is basically 
futile. For batch ordering policies such as the optimal EOQ model, the better strategy 
would be to share the orders between agents of the same tier rather than simplify the 
supply chain at either the wholesaler or the manufacture tiers, although the latter 
strategy still holds benefit. With the combined policy type such as the modified base 
stock policy with EOQ component, the preferred strategy is the simplification 
strategy at the wholesaler tier rather than networking strategy. 
7.1.3 The Role of Information Sharing Level in a Non-Breach Scenario 
7.1.3.1 Effect on Ordering Pattern 
The general effect of information sharing on the ordering pattern of the supply chain 
agents using the shared information is an increase in the effective average order 
quantity (EAOQ) and a commensurate increase in ordering rate (OR). This is 
contrary to the effect of structural reconfiguration where the case is the other way 
round. The ordering pattern of all supply agents using the parameter based policy is 
not perturbed by any of the information sharing strategies but under the other two 
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policies, only the retailer’s ordering pattern is not affected by all three information 
sharing modes.  
Managerial Implication: Therefore, under the batch or combined batch-and-
parameter based models, users of downstream inventory information should revisit 
their shipping strategy to adopt one that favours more order quantity placed less 
frequently while supply chains using the parameter based policy (base stock policy) 
need not change their shipping strategy when considering information sharing at any 
level. 
7.1.3.2 Effect on Bullwhip 
From the control theory perspective, engaging in information sharing does not 
change the nature of bullwhip effect for options I and II but only changes the 
magnitude. The stabilising effect of the wholesaler is more pronounced when the 
wholesaler using a batch ordering policy (e.g. optimal EOQ model) or a combined 
batch-and-parameter based ordering (e.g. modified base stock policy) is privy to, and 
uses, actual demand information.  
Managerial Implication: The supply chain would be able to reduce the bullwhip 
effect even further when a wholesaler type entity is introduced and retailer’s 
information is shared with at least the wholesaler. 
7.1.3.3 Effect on Cost Performance 
At the supply chain level, a supply chain using parameter based policy such as the 
base stock policy only benefits from information sharing when the wholesaler and/or 
the manufacturer uses retailer’s inventory information (which includes the market 
demand information). However the supply chain obtains benefit regardless of the 
mode of information sharing (RW, WM or RWM) under a batch or combined batch-
and-parameter based ordering policy. Interestingly, RW and RWM favours the 
parameter based ordering policy more than the other two policies while WM mode 
favours the combined policy more. 
Managerial Implication: The partial information sharing strategy that involves 
sharing retailer’s inventory information (RW) can be adopted in parameter based and 
batch ordering systems without any consideration for giving incentives to non-
benefiting members. However, in the combined policy type system, such information 
sharing strategy can still be adopted but the responsibility of incentive giving lies 
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with the manufacturer. On the other hand, the partial information sharing strategy 
that does not involve sharing retailer’s information but instead involves sharing 
wholesaler information with the manufacturer (WM) is not likely to be acceptable by 
the retailer and wholesaler. This is because the overall benefit of the strategy is not 
large enough to incentivise both the retailer and wholesaler in a parameter based 
system while the manufacturer would have to incentivise both downstream agents 
under the batch and combined batch-and-parameter systems for such strategy to be 
acceptable. The full information sharing mode (also referred to as full integration in 
this study) is completely acceptable by all supply chain agents and no incentivisation 
is required under parameter based and batch ordering policies respectively. However, 
under the combined policy, the retailer and wholesaler are less inclined to adopt 
RWM strategy unless the manufacturer can provide certain incentives to justify their 
involvement. 
7.1.4 The Combined Role of Information Sharing and Structural 
Reconfiguration in a Non-Breach Scenario 
This study has shown that the best improvement strategy under the information 
sharing category and that under the structural reconfiguration strategy category does 
not necessarily have the best synergy performance. Hence, the decision to adopt one 
single strategy should be made with a long term view (i.e. strategic) that includes the 
possibility of adopting another improvement strategy from a different improvement 
category, even if the other improvement strategy would be considered much later in 
the future.     
Managerial Implication: Therefore the supply chain using the parameter based 
policy such as the base stock policy will do well to adopt full information sharing 
and manufacturing simplification strategies even if a stepwise adoption is 
considered. Clearly for the batch ordering policy such as the optimal EOQ model, 
although the individual best performance comes under networking and full 
integration separately, the best option on the long run would be the combination of 
manufacturing simplification and full integration strategies. Under the combined 
policy mode, the decision would be to adopt both wholesaling simplification and 
information sharing between the wholesaler and the manufacturer only as opposed to 
the full information sharing strategy.   
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7.2 RESEARCH FINDNGS AND MANAGERIAL IMPLICATION OF STUDY 
2 
The second study has shown that the magnitude and direction of breach impact 
would depend on the breach profile, and the type of ordering policy being used in the 
supply chain. However the magnitude would depend on the current structure and 
information sharing level in the supply chain. On another level, this study has 
demonstrated that the impact of information security breach, however, can be 
mitigated by improvement strategies such as supply reconfiguration and information 
sharing as shown in this study. The impact of security breach is significant enough to 
affect supply chain decisions with regards to information sharing level (ISL) choice 
or supply chain structure preference and it has been established that the decision to 
opt for certain ISL and structure combinations should not be taken without 
disruption impact considerations.  
7.2.1 The Role of Ordering Policy in a Breach Scenario 
7.2.1.1 Effect on Breach Impact Resilience 
The parameter based policy is the most resilient to the negative impact of a breach, 
while the batch ordering policy is the least resilient with the combined policy having 
the median resilience. On the other hand, priorities of information security 
management can be known when the breach is profiled according to the average 
disruption duration and the average rate of occurrence rate. These priorities would 
differ based on the ordering policy of choice. 
Managerial Implication: Therefore, for a parameter based ordering policy, increased 
RoC only increases the oddly positive effect of a breach on the performance while 
disruption duration increases the negative effect. Therefore supply chain priority for 
such parameter based ordering policy would be to focus on reducing the disruption 
duration of a breach, hence breach correction or mitigation would be a priority. The 
priority for a supply chain with batch ordering policy and that for a combined batch-
and-parameter based ordering is also breach mitigation as disruption duration had a 
greater negative effect on breach cost impact than RoC. 
7.2.1.2 The Reverberating Effect 
The reverberating effect of the breach impact depends on the ordering policy of 
choice. The effect consistently increases under the parameter based policy while the 
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effect consistently decreases under the batch ordering policy. Under the combined 
policy the effect increases but the stabilising effect of the wholesaler makes it 
decrease as it gets to the manufacturer. 
Managerial Implication: Therefore supply chains using the parameter based 
ordering should be more wary of information security breach occurring downstream 
in the supply chain than those using batch ordering policy. In a supply chain using 
the combined policy type, the wholesalers specifically should be wary of information 
security breach occurring downstream. This study therefore calls for better 
cooperation among supply partners and supports the claim that information security 
breach (ISB) incidence should be shared between supply chain partners. This is so 
that upstream parties can be made aware of the incidence of the breach early enough 
to find ways to eliminate or reduce the reverberating effect of such a breach. 
7.2.2 The Role of Structural Reconfiguration in a Breach Scenario 
7.2.2.1 Structural Reconfiguration as a Breach Impact Mitigation 
Strategy 
This section examined the effect of changing the structure of a supply chain from a 
serial structure configuration to any of the three structural configurations discussed 
earlier. It evaluated the performance of these three structures relative to what would 
have been obtained in the serial counterpart. Since these three structures are forms of 
simplifying the supply chain by reducing the number of agents at the wholesaler tier 
(WH structure) or at the manufacturer tier (MF structure) or by simply risk pooling 
(NT structure), this study has shown that reconfiguration to these structure types can 
be a worthwhile strategy that can help the supply chain improve cost performance 
and also reduce the impact of information security breach. A single-strategy decision 
framework that incorporates breach impact assessment was developed and shown in 
Figure 5.2. 
Managerial Implication: Structural reconfiguration by itself does not mitigate the 
impact information security breach has on supply chain performance for a parameter 
based policy but instead makes it worse. The only exception is the MF structure 
where benefit is derivable and the retailer needs to share ISB incidence and data with 
the wholesaler. Reconfiguration will prove beneficial to batch ordering systems and 
batch-and parameter based policy in a security breach scenario and there is no need 
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for ISB data sharing and incentivisation after a security breach. In general, 
information security management (ISM) priority would be to focus more on 
prevention and deterrence when any of the structural reconfiguration strategies is 
adopted. 
7.2.3 The Role of Information Sharing Level in a Breach Scenario 
The performance of a partially or fully integrated supply chain under information 
security breach is significantly better than the performance of a non-integrated 
supply chain under similar conditions. In general, the full integration mode (RWM) 
is the preferable sharing mode regardless of the type of ordering policy be it 
parameter based or batch ordering or the combination of both. However, the profile 
of the breach affects the performance of each information sharing strategy and some 
strategies fare better under certain profiles than others.  
Managerial Implication: Apart from the normal incentivisation required in a non-
breach scenario, the study suggest that additional incentivisation for the 
reverberating effect of the breach is required for the wholesaler when the sharing 
mode does not include sharing the retailer’s information under a parameter based or 
combined parameter based ordering policy. However, under the batch ordering 
system, further incentivisation and ISB sharing can be prevented when the partial 
information sharing strategy of type RW includes the manufacturer in information 
sharing. 
7.2.4 The Combined Role of Information Sharing and Structural 
Reconfiguration in a Breach Scenario 
The supply chain stands to benefit from a significant improvement in performance 
when these two strategies are used as long as the use and adoption is well informed. 
The study has highlighted the best information strategy given a specific supply chain 
structure and also the best structural reconfiguration strategy given a specific 
information sharing level that may be pre-existing in the supply chain. It has been 
shown that certain strategies fare better alone while others that are otherwise 
detrimental may yet prove beneficial when combined with other strategies.  
Managerial Implication: These two improvement strategies could be used as part of 
breach impact management strategy in addition to the ISM measures as they reduce 
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the impact information security breach would otherwise have on a normal serial 
supply chain without information sharing. 
7.3 RESEARCH FINDNGS AND MANAGERIAL IMPLICATION OF STUDY 
3 
To decide on the ideal configuration for each ordering policy, first the benefit of the 
improvement strategy is assessed under a non-breach scenario (n-BS). Then the 
performance under various information security breaches is evaluated and the best 
improvement strategy is selected based on the aggregate performance in a non-
breach and in various breach scenarios. This aggregate performance is considered to 
be the potential benefit held by such an improvement strategy.  
However since the impact of information security breach is uncertain in itself, 
organisations ought to be wary of this uncertainty and should be intentional about 
reducing it. The more certain you are of a negative impact the more convinced you 
are that a risk management strategy is needed. However the less certain you are the 
less convinced you are on implementing any risk management action which could be 
unwise in the long run. According to a 2002 survey by  Mitroff and Alpaslan (2003), 
proactive businesses existed for an average 16yrs more than their reactive 
counterpart. This is perhaps due to the fact that the reactive ones were not certain of 
experiencing negative impact and therefore were not proactive about putting proper 
mitigation strategy in place. It is therefore of the essence to increase the certainty 
level of breach impact so that the necessary corrections or implementation can be put 
in place to avoid unprecedented future impact. Increasing the certainty level requires 
regular monitoring of the breaches and regular review of the supply chain. This 
knowledge of uncertainty is important in the supply chain as according to Mitroff 
and Alpaslan (2003) in Altay and Ramirez (2010), 95 percent of Fortune 500 
companies are unlikely to be able to manage a disruption that the company has not 
experienced before because they are ill-equipped. This could be the bane of 
existence for most supply partners. 
Reducing the uncertainty level requires actions that are appropriate to the uncertainty 
level. These actions involve increasing the level of information required to manage 
the supply chain and information security management effectively and be 
categorised as monitoring and review control measures. Several monitoring and 
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review activities or measures exist and any organisation cannot implement all of it 
but implementation must be guided by the level of control required by the specific 
organisation or supply chain.  
In addition to the above argument this study also found that, of the three ordering 
options, it appears that the batch ordering policy is the most stable to the interaction 
effect under all three breach profiles in terms of uncertainty level change. The 
combined policy offers the next best stability but the inherent instability favours the 
interaction effect under breaches of the type BP2 and BP3. The parameter based 
policy is the most unstable of the three to the interaction effect and this instability 
does not favour the interaction effect under breaches of type BP1. 
Managerial Implication: In terms of the implication to cost, the interaction effect 
between the structural reconfiguration and information sharing strategies in a batch 
ordering system hardly incur additional monitoring and review cost, but the 
combined batch-and-parameter ordering policy provide additional cost saving in all 
but one of the various combinations. The interaction effect in a parameter based 
policy supply chain, however, requires additional monitoring and review cost for 
virtually all the combination scenarios.    
The study has shown that, given a batch ordering or combined batch-and-parameter 
based ordering system, significant benefit can be derived when the retailer shares its 
inventory information (including market demand) and even greater benefit can be 
derived when this information is shared with the manufacturer. Interestingly, sharing 
only the wholesaler information with the manufacturer under similar ordering 
policies yields significant overall benefit to the supply chain, even more than the RW 
and RWM strategies in some instances. The benefit derived under a parameter based 
policy however depends on the magnitude of a level change in the daily average 
monitoring and review cost of the various breaches.  
7.5 SUMMARY OF THE RESEARCH CONTRIBUTION 
This study examined the impact of various information security breach types on 
different supply chain scenarios. An examination of this impact with a focus on the 
role that supply chain structure, information sharing level and ordering policy play, 
in either mitigating or exacerbating it, is of significance to theory and practice. Not 
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only that, the notion of uncertainty of breach impact makes some organisations wary 
of investing in Information System Security. This study therefore applied the 
concept of entropy in measuring this uncertainty to guide organisations on how 
much investment to make and where the investment is needed most (i.e. priority), if 
at all it is required. This study was extensive to a level that has not been done before 
in past literature and provided some valuable insight that has significant managerial 
implications. 
7.5.1 Theoretical Contribution 
Theoretically, this study has extended the contribution of a few authors in the distinct 
fields of Supply Chain Management and Information Security Management. In the 
field of Supply Chain Management, this study extends the works of Hosoda and 
Disney (2004) and Chen and Samroengraja (2004) on the effect of ordering policy; 
Lau et al. (2002 and 2004) and Wu and Cheng (2008) on the impact of information 
sharing; and Beamon and Chen (2001) on the performance analysis of co-joined 
supply chain structure on supply chain performance, by examining the synergic 
impact of the various combinations of these strategic factors. The study found that 
the combination of the various alternatives of each strategic factor have varying 
effect on supply chain performance and the best alternative of one factor may not 
provide the best benefit when combined with the best alternative of another factor. 
Hence a long term perspective should be adopted in these decisions. However, a step 
wise adoption can still be done provided the alternatives represent the best 
combination on the long run. 
In the Information Security Management field, this study appears to represent the 
first (if not the only) study in literature that quantified information security breach 
impact on supply chain inventory cost performance using the disruption duration and 
frequency of breach occurrence information. This study also extends the work of 
Whitman (2003) by not only using the frequency of breach occurrence but also 
including disruption duration in profiling information security breaches. 
7.5.2 Methodological Contribution 
A major contribution of this study, in terms of methodology, is the novel application 
of Shannon’s Entropy (Shannon 1948) to information security breach impact 
assessment. Improvement strategies, while enhancing the cost performance of the 
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organisation or supply chain, may increase the complexity of the operation and 
hence make the impact of disruptions even more uncertain. Therefore this study has 
shown that the cost benefit of such improvement strategies should be weighed 
against the level of uncertainty introduced into the system. It has been established 
that a change in the uncertainty level has cost implication and it is important to 
include this indirect cost assessment in supply chain strategy decision making. 
Hence a simulation-entropy assessment methodology has been developed and 
presented in this study to help assess the direct and indirect cost impact of 
information security breach which is useful in evaluating any improvement 
strategies. The proposed methodology creates a more inclusive approach to impact 
assessment than other existing ones that only concentrate on the direct impact such 
as Bellefeuille (2005). This can also be applied to the assessment of other types of 
threat to supply chain operations. It can also be used to evaluate any strategic 
decision aimed at improving supply chain performance. The single-strategy and a 
joint-strategy adoption decision framework developed can be used to guide supply 
chain management decisions. The joint-strategy framework can be used particularly 
for understanding the counter-intuitiveness of combining two or more strategic 
decisions. 
7.5.3 Contribution to Practice 
In the budding field of Supply Chain Response to Information Security, this thesis is 
one of the pioneering works to study the influence of various supply chain based 
strategic factors such as ordering policy, information sharing level and supply chain 
structure on the level of impact information security breach can have on supply chain 
performance. In addition, this study has established that synergic effect of these 
strategic factors can be used as an information security breach impact mitigation 
strategy. This of course should not, in any way, become a substitute for the 
implementation of proper security control measures. Their use would however 
provide additional benefit that may offset the installation and running cost of 
appropriate security controls. 
This study also has implication to organisations or supply chains that are interested 
in selecting third party security provider or those requiring the services of third party 
database or application hosting. Using a third party operator (TPO) takes the 
responsibility of IT or IT security away from the organisation or supply chain. It is 
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therefore advisable for organizations to select TPOs based on their security 
performance profile as evidenced by their historical performance in providing 
adequate security. This requires an assessment of their past and current ability to 
prevent security breach from occurring and on how quickly they are able to correct 
and restore the functionality of the system after experiencing a compromise. This 
assessment can be carried out by profiling the security threats facing the TPO and 
this can be done by asking the TPO for information relating to the history of security 
breach incidence that has occurred in the past. The security profile of such operators 
can be classified as BP1, BP2 or BP3 as shown in this study and this can be used as a 
performance criterion in third party service provider selection. This study has shown 
that organisations or supply chains should be wary of third party service providers 
with history of higher disruption duration profile than those with higher breach 
recurrence rate profile. In addition, the level and type of information required in 
managing and controlling the system would differ based on the security profile of the 
third party operator. Those with high disruption duration profile would worry more 
about the extent of negative impact when a breach occurs and those with high breach 
recurrence rate would worry more about the impact being negative or positive. 
7.6 LIMITATIONS OF RESEARCH 
This study would be incomplete if some of the limitations of this study are not 
mentioned. Every study has its limitations and this study is without a fair share of 
such limitations. One of the main draw backs of this study is that the assessment of 
information security breach is only based on four breach types. In practice a lot more 
breach types exist and organisations need to make an assessment of all the breach 
types they are exposed to. Having said that, this study has allowed for certain level 
of generalisability by examining the effect of the breach profile under high and low 
states and any organisation can anticipate what the impact of any unconsidered 
breach would be as long as the profile is known.  
The focus of this study was on the benefit derived from changing the strategic factors 
from one alternative to another and does not include a consideration of the cost 
required to make such a change. The study agrees that a cost benefit analysis which 
compares the cost of implementing improvement initiatives against the benefit that is 
derivable is crucial to any acceptance decision. However, the assumption that 
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changing the structure or the ordering policy does not carry huge costs, is not 
farfetched. On the other hand, information integration may require substantial capital 
but it has been established that computing models such as cloud computing makes 
this cost relatively small. Given the peculiarity of supply chains, still this study 
believes the onus of decision falls on the supply chain manager after a careful 
consideration of the cost of such improvement initiatives against the benefits 
established in this study.  
Another drawback in this study was the assumption made when a breach occurs. It 
was assumed that a customer’s order is not lost and hence the customer will wait for 
the system to be restored and then place his order. While this may not be the reality 
for some organisations in the fast moving goods (FMG) industry, it is still applicable 
in some specialised markets with highly customised product. It can even be argued 
that based on the work of Capraro et al. (2003) and Hennig-Thurau and Klee (1997) 
it is understood that loyal customers are still likely to purchase from vendors despite 
incessant dissatisfaction. In the same line, it was assumed that the demand during the 
disruption period is zero and this may affect the forecast estimate especially when 
the disruption duration is very high. While the author believes that such an 
assumption may affect the breach impact outcome, the effect will not be felt when 
the moving average is estimated over a very long period of time. In other words, as 
the number of periods increases, the effect of that assumption decreases.  
While the ordering policies used may not be the optimal for each scenario, it is 
important to state that these policies are frequently used in practice. In addition, this 
study does not in any way claim that the forecasting technique used (i.e. Moving 
Average Technique) is optimal but it is quite frequently used in practice and 
commonly studied. Hence its use is somewhat justified.  
The overarching issue of simulation studies is the question of fitness for purpose 
(Shannon 1998). Therefore despite some of the above listed limitations, which have 
been somewhat justified, the simulation model used in this study is fit for the 
purpose for which it was built. The supply chain has been modelled in a similar way 
to established supply chain operations and the input parameters used were adapted 
from established literature, Lau et al. (2002 and 2004). The output of the experiments 
were verified and validated. Although the simulation model assumptions may affect 
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the generalisability of the study, a sensitivity analysis of the models to increased 
demand variation shows that only the magnitude of the impact is affected, not the 
direction of the impact. Therefore the findings can be generalized to a reasonable 
extent. 
7.7 FUTURE RESEARCH  
There are various types and causes of information disruption (perturbation) that can 
occur in the supply chain/network. There is however a need for systematic 
classification of information threats and how these threats impact the entire network. 
Although some classification of threat exist emanating from surveys done by 
practitioners (Baker et al., 2010, Potter and Beard, 2012); institutions (Stoneburner et 
al., 2002, Richardson, (2009)) and; academic sources (Samy et al., 2010, Warren, 
2000, Whitman, 2003, Loch et al., 1992, Kim et al., 2011), these are partial lists and 
there is need for a complete list of threats to information and how these impact the 
network and how the supply chain context can be leveraged to contain these impacts. 
It is therefore essential to have a systematic and in-depth investigation into the 
impact of Information Management on network operations and collaboration 
success. To set the ball rolling, this study has proposed a simulation-entropy 
assessment approach to investigate the impact of established threats to information 
flow on the performance of supply chain and how supply chain contextual factors 
moderate these impacts.  
Using appropriate case studies or interviews, the cost-benefit analysis should be 
carried out for different supply chains in a future study to further substantiate the use 
of the approach discussed in this study. 
The contextual factors referred to in this study are the structure of the supply chain, 
level of integration and ordering policy. These factors, among other complexity 
drivers, have more alternatives that require evaluation to build a more holistic picture 
of the role of context in supply chain studies. 
The impact of assuming zero demand during the breach disruption period would be 
investigated under varying forecasting techniques. The forecasting technique 
generally requires an estimation of future demand based on the actual demand from 
past period. |However, the number of past period demand used in this estimation 
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may vary for different organisations and it is believed that this will affect the impact 
of information security breach when the demand during the disruption period is 
assumed to be zero. The future study should also investigate the effect of using other 
assumptions apart from the zero demand assumption during the disruption duration. 
An example is the presumption that demand during the disruption period is same as 
that of the last non-zero demand or that it is the average demand over a selected 
number of past periods.  
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APPENDIX 4.1 SIMULATION OUTPUT OF ALL THE EXPERIMENTED SCENARIOS 
Average cost performance of all the scenarios for options I, II and III.  
H-Holding Cost; B- Backlog cost; O- Ordering cost. 
Option I 
 Retailer Wholesaler Manufacturer SC 
 H (£) B (£) O (£) Total (£) H (£) B (£) O (£) Total (£) H (£) B (£) O (£) Total (£) Total (£) 
NI-S 0.0 140.0 54.8 194.9 1.9 56.0 54.8 112.7 24.7 5.1 59.6 89.4 397.0 
NI-WH 0.0 144.1 54.9 199.0 0.5 59.6 52.4 112.4 21.9 3.0 59.7 84.7 396.1 
NI-MF 0.0 139.8 54.9 194.8 1.8 55.3 54.9 112.0 21.8 3.0 54.7 79.5 386.3 
NI-NT 0.0 144.0 54.9 198.9 0.5 59.5 54.9 114.9 21.9 3.1 59.7 84.8 398.6 
RW-S 0.1 116.4 54.8 171.3 5.2 32.2 54.8 92.3 5.7 26.7 59.7 92.2 355.8 
RW-WH 0.1 116.4 54.9 171.4 2.5 31.8 52.4 86.7 3.5 26.6 59.8 89.9 348.1 
RW-MF 0.1 116.3 54.9 171.2 4.8 31.6 54.9 91.3 3.5 26.4 54.8 84.8 347.4 
RW-NT 0.0 129.3 54.9 184.2 6.5 44.7 54.9 106.1 3.6 26.6 59.8 90.1 380.4 
WM-S 0.0 143.9 54.8 198.7 1.7 59.8 54.8 116.2 8.2 9.6 59.8 77.5 392.5 
WM-WH 0.0 145.6 54.9 200.6 0.4 61.1 52.4 113.9 9.1 4.7 59.9 73.7 388.2 
WM-MF 0.0 145.3 54.9 200.2 1.6 60.7 54.9 117.1 4.5 9.3 54.9 68.7 386.0 
WM-NT 0.0 147.1 54.9 202.1 0.5 62.6 54.9 118.0 6.3 6.5 59.9 72.7 392.7 
RWM-S 0.1 100.7 54.8 155.6 7.7 16.3 54.8 78.8 17.7 2.2 59.8 79.6 314.0 
RWM-WH 0.1 98.2 54.9 153.2 4.6 13.4 52.4 70.4 19.2 1.0 59.9 80.0 303.6 
RWM-MF 0.1 100.9 54.9 155.9 7.5 16.0 54.9 78.5 13.2 1.5 54.9 69.6 304.0 
RWM-NT 0.0 114.4 54.9 169.3 9.5 29.7 54.9 94.1 15.4 1.1 59.9 76.3 339.8 
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Option II 
 Retailer Wholesaler Manufacturer SC 
 H (£) B (£) O (£) Total (£) H (£) B (£) O (£) Total (£) H (£) B (£) O (£) Total (£) Total (£) 
NI-S 2.4 63.3 54.2 120.0 17.0 16.9 52.9 86.8 39.2 9.1 54.7 103.0 309.8 
NI-WH 2.1 67.2 54.4 123.7 9.4 18.8 51.6 79.8 34.7 6.3 54.7 95.6 299.2 
NI-MF 2.1 66.8 54.4 123.4 15.7 18.3 53.0 87.1 30.5 7.0 52.3 89.8 300.3 
NI-NT 1.8 68.5 54.4 124.7 8.9 20.6 53.4 82.8 28.1 7.3 54.7 90.1 297.6 
RW-S 2.7 56.9 54.2 113.8 20.9 9.8 52.3 83.0 46.2 4.3 54.7 105.3 302.1 
RW-WH 2.7 56.7 54.4 113.8 20.2 7.1 51.1 78.5 49.2 4.6 54.8 108.6 300.8 
RW-MF 2.5 58.5 54.4 115.4 21.1 9.3 52.4 82.9 37.3 4.4 52.3 94.0 292.3 
RW-NT 1.6 71.6 54.4 127.6 23.2 24.2 52.4 99.8 34.9 4.8 54.8 94.5 321.9 
WM-S 2.3 65.2 54.2 121.8 15.6 18.9 52.9 87.5 25.9 15.6 53.7 95.3 304.5 
WM-WH 2.1 67.6 54.4 124.0 8.8 19.3 51.6 79.7 29.5 8.7 53.8 92.1 295.8 
WM-MF 2.0 70.9 54.4 127.3 14.0 22.7 53.0 89.7 19.7 17.2 51.9 88.7 305.7 
WM-NT 1.8 69.7 54.4 125.9 8.2 22.0 53.4 83.5 24.7 11.1 53.8 89.5 298.9 
RWM-S 2.7 57.3 54.2 114.2 19.2 10.3 52.3 81.8 25.4 10.5 55.3 91.3 287.3 
RWM-WH 2.7 56.9 54.4 113.9 17.7 7.3 51.1 76.2 23.3 13.0 55.4 91.8 281.9 
RWM-MF 2.4 59.5 54.4 116.3 19.1 10.5 52.4 82.0 17.7 12.5 52.5 82.6 280.9 
RWM-NT 1.4 74.0 54.4 129.8 21.8 26.9 52.4 101.2 17.5 11.9 55.5 84.8 315.8 
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Option III 
 
Retailer Wholesaler Manufacturer SC 
 
H (£) B (£) O (£) Total (£) H (£) B (£) O (£) Total (£) H (£) B (£) O (£) Total (£) Total (£) 
NI-S 1.9 50.0 54.7 106.7 12.9 12.6 54.3 79.7 56.6 0.6 56.3 113.5 299.9 
NI-WH 1.8 48.6 54.8 105.3 8.0 10.4 52.3 70.7 51.6 0.3 56.5 108.5 284.5 
NI-MF 1.8 51.2 54.8 107.8 12.2 12.9 54.4 79.5 53.4 0.2 53.2 106.8 294.1 
NI-NT 1.8 49.0 54.8 105.6 8.2 10.9 54.7 73.7 51.8 0.3 56.2 108.4 287.7 
RW-S 1.8 52.2 54.7 108.7 12.5 14.8 53.4 80.7 40.8 1.3 56.6 98.7 288.1 
RW-WH 1.7 51.9 54.8 108.4 10.4 13.7 51.7 75.8 40.5 0.8 56.6 97.8 282.1 
RW-MF 1.7 53.1 54.8 109.7 12.1 15.0 53.5 80.6 30.1 2.5 53.0 85.6 275.8 
RW-NT 1.2 59.1 54.8 115.1 12.3 22.0 53.6 87.8 33.8 1.8 56.3 91.9 294.8 
WM-S 1.7 57.4 54.7 113.9 10.5 20.4 54.3 85.2 13.6 16.6 55.3 85.5 284.6 
WM-WH 1.6 54.1 54.8 110.6 6.4 16.3 52.3 75.0 14.3 11.7 55.3 81.3 266.9 
WM-MF 1.5 60.4 54.8 116.8 9.3 22.8 54.4 86.4 9.9 19.7 52.5 82.2 285.4 
WM-NT 1.5 56.7 54.8 113.1 6.1 19.2 54.7 79.9 11.9 15.6 55.1 82.7 275.7 
RWM-S 1.8 53.4 54.7 109.9 11.8 16.2 53.4 81.3 23.6 5.0 57.9 86.5 277.7 
RWM-WH 1.7 52.7 54.8 109.2 9.4 14.6 51.7 75.6 23.5 5.2 57.4 86.0 270.9 
RWM-MF 1.7 53.8 54.8 110.3 11.8 15.7 53.5 81.0 19.4 4.2 54.1 77.7 269.1 
RWM-NT 1.2 60.1 54.8 116.1 11.8 23.1 53.6 88.5 20.6 4.4 58.4 83.4 287.9 
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Fill rate performance (in %) of all the supply chain scenarios for options I, II and III. 
 Option I Option II Option III 
 Retailer Wholesaler Manufacturer Retailer Wholesaler Manufacturer Retailer Wholesaler Manufacturer 
NI-S 41.6 64.0 95.1 61.2 85.5 91.7 66.6 88.8 99.4 
NI-WH 40.9 62.6 97.0 59.8 84.2 94.1 67.3 90.6 99.7 
NI-MF 41.7 64.4 97.1 59.9 84.5 93.4 66.1 88.5 99.8 
NI-NT 41.0 62.7 96.9 59.4 82.9 93.2 67.1 90.2 99.7 
RW-S 46.1 75.6 78.9 67.0 90.9 94.7 65.7 87.1 98.8 
RW-WH 46.2 75.8 79.0 63.8 93.3 95.6 65.8 87.9 99.2 
RW-MF 46.2 76.0 79.0 63.1 91.5 95.8 65.3 87.0 97.6 
RW-NT 43.6 69.1 78.9 58.3 80.5 95.4 62.9 82.0 98.3 
WM-S 40.9 62.5 91.2 60.5 84.1 86.4 63.5 83.0 85.7 
WM-WH 40.7 62.0 95.5 59.7 83.8 92.0 64.9 85.9 89.5 
WM-MF 40.8 62.2 91.5 58.5 81.5 85.3 62.3 81.4 83.5 
WM-NT 40.4 61.5 93.9 58.9 82.0 90.0 63.8 83.9 86.5 
RWM-S 49.8 86.0 97.8 63.5 90.7 90.5 65.1 86.1 95.3 
RWM-WH 50.4 88.2 99.1 65.5 87.3 95.1 65.5 87.3 95.1 
RWM-MF 49.8 86.2 98.5 62.7 90.5 88.9 65.0 86.4 95.9 
RWM-NT 46.6 77.1 98.9 57.5 78.8 89.4 62.5 81.2 95.8 
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APPENDIX 4.2 ORDERING PATTERN FOR ALL SUPPLY CHAIN 
SCENARIOS 
Ordering Pattern of scenarios under the Serial Supply Chain Structure 
OR- Ordering Rate (in decimal) 
AEOQ- Average Effective Order Quantity (in units) 
 
NI 
 
Retailer Wholesaler Manufacturer 
 
OR AEOQ OR AEOQ OR AEOQ 
Option I 1.00 9.98 1.00 9.97 1.00 9.94 
Option II 0.89 11.28 0.62 16.00 0.49 20.36 
Option III 0.98 10.18 0.89 11.16 0.67 14.81 
 
RW 
 
Retailer Wholesaler Manufacturer 
 
OR AEOQ OR AEOQ OR AEOQ 
Option I 1.00 9.98 1.00 9.98 1.00 9.96 
Option II 0.89 11.28 0.50 20.00 0.49 20.38 
Option III 0.98 10.18 0.71 14.04 0.69 14.53 
 
WM 
 
Retailer Wholesaler Manufacturer 
 
OR AEOQ OR AEOQ OR AEOQ 
Option I 1.00 9.98 1.00 9.97 1.00 9.97 
Option II 0.89 11.28 0.62 16.00 0.39 25.30 
Option III 0.98 10.18 0.89 11.16 0.55 18.01 
 
RWM 
 
Retailer Wholesaler 
 
Manufacturer 
 
 
OR AEOQ OR AEOQ OR AEOQ 
Option I 1.00 9.98 1.00 9.98 1.00 9.97 
Option II 0.89 11.28 0.50 20.00 0.55 18.00 
Option III 0.98 10.18 0.71 14.04 0.81 12.27 
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Ordering Pattern of scenarios under the Wholesaler Supply Chain Structure 
 NI 
 Retailer Wholesaler Manufacturer 
 OR AEOQ OR AEOQ OR AEOQ 
Option I 1.00 10.00 1.00 9.99 1.00 9.96 
Option II 0.99 10.09 0.69 14.50 0.62 16.01 
Option III 1.00 10.00 0.96 10.37 0.75 13.29 
 RW 
 Retailer Wholesaler Manufacturer 
 OR AEOQ OR AEOQ OR AEOQ 
Option I 1.00 10.00 1.00 10.00 1.00 9.98 
Option II 0.99 10.09 0.48 20.95 0.50 20.03 
Option III 1.00 10.00 0.70 14.26 0.69 14.43 
 WM 
 Retailer Wholesaler Manufacturer 
 OR AEOQ OR AEOQ OR AEOQ 
Option I 1.00 10.00 1.00 9.99 1.00 9.99 
Option II 0.99 10.09 0.69 14.50 0.63 15.99 
Option III 1.00 10.00 0.96 10.37 0.69 14.54 
 RWM 
 Retailer Wholesaler  Manufacturer  
 OR AEOQ OR AEOQ OR AEOQ 
Option I 1.00 10.00 1.00 10.00 1.00 9.99 
Option II 0.99 10.09 0.48 20.95 0.82 12.25 
Option III 1.00 10.00 0.70 14.26 0.98 10.22 
 
 
 
 
 
241 
 
Ordering Pattern of scenarios under the Manufacturer Supply Chain Structure 
 
NI 
 
Retailer Wholesaler Manufacturer 
 
OR AEOQ OR AEOQ OR AEOQ 
Option I 1.00 10.00 1.00 9.99 1.00 9.96 
Option II 0.99 10.09 0.86 11.62 0.48 21.01 
Option III 1.00 10.00 0.99 10.11 0.69 14.38 
 
RW 
 
Retailer Wholesaler Manufacturer 
 
OR AEOQ OR AEOQ OR AEOQ 
Option I 1.00 10.00 1.00 10.00 1.00 9.98 
Option II 0.99 10.09 0.75 13.25 0.48 21.01 
Option III 1.00 10.00 0.92 10.91 0.63 15.76 
 
WM 
 
Retailer Wholesaler Manufacturer 
 
OR AEOQ OR AEOQ OR AEOQ 
Option I 1.00 10.00 1.00 9.99 1.00 9.99 
Option II 0.99 10.09 0.86 11.62 0.39 25.50 
Option III 1.00 10.00 0.99 10.11 0.53 18.69 
 
RWM 
 
Retailer Wholesaler 
 
Manufacturer 
 
 
OR AEOQ OR AEOQ OR AEOQ 
Option I 1.00 10.00 1.00 10.00 1.00 9.99 
Option II 0.99 10.09 0.75 13.25 0.53 19.00 
Option III 1.00 10.00 0.92 10.91 0.84 11.89 
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Ordering Pattern of scenarios under the Network Supply Chain Structure 
 NI 
 Retailer Wholesaler Manufacturer 
 OR AEOQ OR AEOQ OR AEOQ 
Option I 1.00 10.00 1.00 9.99 1.00 9.96 
Option II 0.99 10.09 0.88 11.41 0.67 14.99 
Option III 1.00 10.00 0.96 10.36 0.73 13.65 
 RW 
 Retailer Wholesaler Manufacturer 
 OR AEOQ OR AEOQ OR AEOQ 
Option I 1.00 10.00 1.00 10.00 1.00 9.98 
Option II 0.99 10.09 0.75 13.34 0.50 20.08 
Option III 1.00 10.00 0.85 11.72 0.68 14.76 
 WM 
 Retailer Wholesaler Manufacturer 
 OR AEOQ OR AEOQ OR AEOQ 
Option I 1.00 10.00 1.00 9.99 1.00 9.99 
Option II 0.99 10.09 0.88 11.41 0.62 16.01 
Option III 1.00 10.00 0.96 10.36 0.68 14.80 
 RWM 
 Retailer Wholesaler  Manufacturer  
 OR AEOQ OR AEOQ OR AEOQ 
Option I 1.00 10.00 1.00 10.00 1.00 9.99 
Option II 0.99 10.09 0.75 13.34 0.70 14.70 
Option III 1.00 10.00 0.85 11.72 0.93 10.68 
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APPENDIX 4.3 BULLWHIP QUANTIFICATION OF ALL SCENARIOS 
Structure Effect on Order Amplification In A Non-Breach Scenario 
The variance of all orders at each tier of the supply chain in the non-breach scenario 
under the various supply chain structures 
  
Order variance at each tier 
 
  
Serial WH MF NT 
Op. I 
Demand 4.11 4.26 4.26 4.26 
R Order 4.23 4.24 4.24 4.24 
W Order 4.42 4.41 4.42 4.40 
M Order 4.57 4.57 4.56 4.55 
Op. II 
Demand 4.11 4.26 4.26 4.26 
R Order 12.90 11.33 11.33 11.33 
W Order 60.13 90.18 59.79 51.51 
M Order 103.99 154.79 220.43 136.16 
Op. III 
Demand 4.11 4.26 4.26 4.26 
R Order 6.17 5.88 5.88 5.88 
W Order 18.20 14.78 18.19 16.09 
M Order 61.20 100.85 110.05 108.98 
 
The order amplification at the retailer, wholesaler and manufacturer computed as a 
ratio to the demand variance (Chen at al. 2000a). 
Order Amplification Relative to Demand variance 
  Serial WH MF NT 
Option I Retailer 1.03 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Wholesaler 1.07 1.04 1.04 1.03 
Manufacturer 1.11 1.07 1.07 1.07 
Option II Retailer 3.14 2.66 2.66 2.66 
Wholesaler 14.63 21.19 14.05 12.10 
Manufacturer 25.30 36.37 51.80 32.00 
Option III Retailer 1.50 1.38 1.38 1.38 
Wholesaler 4.43 3.47 4.27 3.78 
Manufacturer 14.89 23.70 25.86 25.61 
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The order amplification at the retailer, wholesaler and manufacturer computed as a 
ratio to the order variance of the adjacent downstream tier, Control Theory (Jury 
1974). 
 
Order Amplification based on Control Theory 
  
Serial WH MF NT 
Option I 
Retailer 1.03 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Wholesaler 1.04 1.04 1.04 1.04 
Manufacturer 1.03 1.03 1.03 1.03 
Option II 
Retailer 3.14 2.66 2.66 2.66 
Wholesaler 4.66 7.96 5.28 4.55 
Manufacturer 1.73 1.72 3.69 2.64 
Option III 
Retailer 1.50 1.38 1.38 1.38 
Wholesaler 2.95 2.51 3.09 2.74 
Manufacturer 3.36 6.82 6.05 6.77 
 
Information Sharing Level Effect on Order Amplification in A Non-Breach 
Scenario 
The variance of all orders at each tier of the serial supply chain in the non-breach 
scenario under the various supply information sharing levels. 
 Order variance under each ISL 
  NI RW WM RWM 
Option I Demand 4.11 4.11 4.11 4.11 
R Order 4.23 4.23 4.23 4.23 
W Order 4.42 4.36 4.42 4.36 
M Order 4.57 4.48 4.55 4.19 
Option II Demand 4.11 4.11 4.11 4.11 
R Order 12.90 12.90 12.90 12.90 
W Order 60.13 100.14 60.13 100.14 
M Order 103.99 104.20 153.19 80.20 
Option III Demand 4.11 4.11 4.11 4.11 
R Order 6.17 6.17 6.17 6.17 
W Order 18.20 50.39 18.20 50.39 
M Order 61.20 56.98 87.35 31.19 
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The order amplification at the retailer, wholesaler and manufacturer computed as a 
ratio to the demand variance (Chen at al. 2000a). 
 
Order Amplification Relative to Demand variance 
  
NI RW WM RWM 
Option I 
Retailer 1.03 1.03 1.03 1.03 
Wholesaler 1.07 1.06 1.07 1.06 
Manufacturer 1.11 1.09 1.11 1.02 
Option II 
Retailer 3.14 3.14 3.14 3.14 
Wholesaler 14.63 24.36 14.63 24.36 
Manufacturer 25.30 25.35 37.26 19.51 
Option III 
 
Retailer 1.50 1.50 1.50 1.50 
Wholesaler 4.43 12.26 4.43 12.26 
Manufacturer 14.89 13.86 21.25 7.59 
 
The order amplification at the retailer, wholesaler and manufacturer computed as a 
ratio to the order variance of the adjacent downstream tier, Control Theory (Jury 
1974). 
 
Order Amplification based on Control Theory 
  
NI RW WM RWM 
Option I 
Retailer 1.03 1.03 1.03 1.03 
Wholesaler 1.04 1.03 1.04 1.03 
Manufacturer 1.03 1.03 1.03 0.96 
      
Option II 
Retailer 3.14 3.14 3.14 3.14 
Wholesaler 4.66 7.76 4.66 7.76 
Manufacturer 1.73 1.04 2.55 0.80 
      
Option III 
Retailer 1.50 1.50 1.50 1.50 
Wholesaler 2.95 8.17 2.95 8.17 
Manufacturer 3.36 1.13 4.80 0.62 
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APPENDIX 4.4 INTERACTION EFFECT OF INFORMATION SHARING STRATEGIES AND STRUCTURAL 
RECONFIGURATION STRATEGIES 
Singular effect and Interaction effect of information sharing level and supply chain structure on supply chain daily operational cost 
performance (‘nd’ means not statistically significant at p<0.05) 
    Option I Option II Option III 
    
Ret. 
(%) 
Whole. 
(%) 
Manuf. 
(%) 
SC 
Total 
(%) 
Ret. 
(%) 
Whole. 
(%) 
Manuf. 
(%) 
SC 
Total 
(%) 
Ret. 
(%) 
Whole. 
(%) 
Manuf. 
(%) 
SC 
Total 
(%) 
Singular 
effect of 
Structure 
WH -2.1nd 0.2nd 5.3 0.2nd -3.1 8 7.1 3.4 1.3nd 11.3 4.4 5.2 
MF 0.1nd 0.6nd 11 2.7nd -2.8nd -0.4nd 12.8 3.1 -1 0.3 5.9 1.9 
NT -2.0nd -1.9nd 5.2 -0.4nd -3.9 4.6 12.5 3.9 1.0nd 7.5 4.5 4.1 
Singular 
effect of 
Integration 
RW 12.1 18.1 -3.1nd 10.4 5.1 4.4 -2.3nd 2.5 -1.9 -1.2nd 13 3.9 
WM -2 -3.2 13.3 1.1nd -1.5 -0.8 7.5 1.7 -6.7 -6.9 24.7 5.1 
RWM 20.2 30.1 10.9 20.9 4.8 5.8 11.4 7.3 -3 -2 23.8 7.4 
RW and 
structure 
synergy 
WH 12.1 23 -0.6nd 12.3 5.2 9.6 -5.5 2.9 -1.7nd 4.9 13.8 5.9 
MF 12.1 18.9 5.2nd 12.5 3.8nd 4.5 8.7 5.6 -2.8nd -1.0nd 24.6 8 
NT 5.5 5.9 -0.7nd 4.2 -6.4 -15 8.2 -3.9 -7.9 -10.2 19 1.7nd 
WM and 
structure 
synergy 
WH -2.9 -1.1nd 17.5 2.2nd -3.4 8.2 10.6 4.5 -3.6 5.9 28.3 11 
MF -2.7nd -3.9nd 23.2 2.8nd -6.1 -3.3 13.8 1.3nd -9.5 -8.4 27.6 4.8 
NT -3.7 -4.7nd 18.7 1.1nd -4.9 3.8 13 3.5 -6 -0.3nd 27.2 8.1 
RWM and 
structure 
synergy 
WH 21.4 37.6 10.5 23.5 5.1 12.3 10.8 9 -2.3nd 5.1 24.2 9.7 
MF 20 30.3 22.2 23.4 3.1nd 5.6 19.7 9.3 -3.4 -1.6 31.5 10.3 
NT 13.1 16.5 14.6 14.4 -8.2 -16.5 17.6 -1.9 -8.8 -11 26.6 4 
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Nature of Interaction Effect 
  
RW WM RWM 
  
WH MF N WH MF N WH MF N 
Option 
I 
Retailer CA+ CO CA+ W CA- W CA+ CO CA+ 
Wholesaler CO CO CA+ CA- CA- W CO CO CA+ 
Manufacturer CA- CA+ CA- CO CO CO CO CO CO 
SC Total CO CO CA+ CO CO CA+ CO CO CA+ 
Option 
II 
Retailer CA+ CA+ CA- W W W CA+ CA+ CA- 
Wholesaler CO CA+ R- CA+ W CA+ CO CA+ R- 
Manufacturer CA- CA+ CA+ CO CO CO CO CO CO 
SC Total CO CO R- CO CO CO CO CO R- 
Option 
III 
Retailer CA- W CA- CA- W CA- CA- W CA- 
Wholesaler CA+ CA- CA- CA+ CA- CA- CA+ CA- CA- 
Manufacturer CO CO CO CO CO CO CO CO CO 
SC Total CO CO CO CO CO CO CO CO CO 
 
Positive cancellation (CA+) means the resultant effect is beneficial 
produced from a positive ISL and negative Structure or a negative ISL and a 
positive Structure effect. A negative cancellation (CA-) occurs when the 
resultant effect is negative produced either from a positive ISL and negative 
Structure effect or vice versa. A negative repelling effect (R-) occurs when 
the positive effect of both ISL and Structure produces a resultant negative 
effect. On the other hand a positive repelling effect (R+) occurs when the 
negative effect of both ISL and Structure produces a resultant positive 
effect. Worsening effect (W) is generated when the resultant effect is 
negative which is produced from both negative ISL and Structure effects 
and a corroborating effect (CO) is felt when the resultant effect is positive 
produced from a positive ISL and a positive Structure effect. 
CO, CA+, and R+ symbols are all beneficial effects but CA-, R- and W are 
all detrimental effects. 
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APPENDIX 5.1 INTERACTION EFFECT OF ISL AND SUPPLY STRUCTURE UNDER INFORMATION SECURITY BREACH 
Interaction effect under SFDD (‘*’ means not statistically significant at p<0.05) 
  
option I option II option III 
  
R. Cost 
% 
W. 
Cost % 
M. 
Cost % 
SC 
Total 
% 
R. Cost 
% 
W. 
Cost % 
M. 
Cost % 
SC 
Total 
% 
R. Cost 
% 
W. 
Cost % 
M. 
Cost % 
SC 
Total 
% 
Singular 
effect of 
Structure 
WH -4 6 19 4 60 21 10 32 10 30 13 16 
MF -4 2 25 4 60 13 15 32 8 18 16 14 
NT -4 4 19 3 58 16 15 32 9 27 13 15 
Singular 
effect of 
Integration 
RW 0 0 8 2 22 -8 -14 2 -8 -1 10 1 
WM -2 -4 12 1 -4 -5 7 0 -7 -7 22 4 
RWM 4 5 4 4 21 -1 -11 4 -10 -4 18 2 
RW and 
structure 
synergy 
WH 3.1 17.2 16.2 10.7 77.1 16.2 -4.4 32.9 5.5 24.5 22.0 16.8 
MF 2.8 11.8 9.3 10.3 74.6 9.3 7.8 34.1 3.6 16.7 32.0 17.9 
NT -0.4 4.6* 7.8 2.5 75.1 7.8* -0.7 31.0 7.4* 17.4 3.7 8.6 
WM and 
structure 
synergy 
WH -5.1 4.6 20.0 4.8 59.1 20.0 13.3 32.9 5.7 26.0 34.5 22.0 
MF -7.4 -4.0 7.5 3.0 55.6 7.5 15.5 28.8 -0.4* 9.7 33.8 15.3 
NT -6.0 0.6* 14.2 4.1 56.7 14.2 15.3 31.0 3.5 20.4 34.2 19.6 
RWM and 
structure 
synergy 
WH 9.3 26.8 27.3 16.0 76.7 27.3 -13.8 32.8 3.5 22.3 28.0 17.8 
MF 8.1 19.2 11.7 16.9 73.2 11.7 14.8 36.6 2.1 14.9 37.9 19.0 
NT 3.0 9.0 4.2 9.7 69.4 4.2 10.9 31.7 -1.0* 8.8 32.6 14.3 
Interaction effect under AOW (‘*’ means not statistically significant at p<0.05) 
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option I option II option III 
  
R. Cost 
% 
W. 
Cost % 
M. 
Cost % 
SC 
Total 
% 
R. Cost 
% 
W. 
Cost % 
M. 
Cost % 
SC 
Total 
% 
R. Cost 
% 
W. 
Cost % 
M. 
Cost % 
SC 
Total 
% 
Singular 
effect of 
Structure 
WH -10 -2 5 -5 8 9 7 8 -4 13 4 4 
MF -12 -8 11 -6 8 1 13 8 -1 6 9 5 
NT -10 -4 5 -5 7 6 12 9 -4 11 5 3 
Singular 
effect of 
Integration 
RW 6 2 12 6 12 -6 -2 2 4 0 13 6 
WM -2 -7 0 -3 -2 -1 7 1 0 -2 16 6 
RWM 8 6 -3 5 11 2 -2 4 3 1 19 9 
RW and 
structure 
synergy 
WH -1.5* 9.6 7.4 3.6 20.0 7.4 -5.5 8.0 1.4* 14.8 16.8 10.8 
MF -2.2 3.5 0.5 2.8 18.2 0.5* 8.0 9.8 -0.3* 5.7 27.7 11.9 
NT -4.5 1.7 -9.0 -0.1 13.7 -9.0 0.3 2.9 -2.5 2.4* 4.2 1.3 
WM and 
structure 
synergy 
WH -11.7 -5.2 9.4 -5.0 7.8 9.4 10.3 9.1 -4.6 13.1 26.8 12.0 
MF -15.4 -15.1 -2.3 -8.5 5.0* -2.3 13.4 5.7 -6.1 3.7 28.8 9.7 
NT -12.8 -9.8 5.2 -6.3 6.3 5.2 12.7 8.1 -5.6 9.3 27.2 10.8 
RWM and 
structure 
synergy 
WH 3.5 17.6 13.3* 7.3 19.8 13.3 4.9 13.0 1.3* 15.7 25.8 14.4 
MF 2.0 9.5 3.1 7.5 16.5 3.1 13.2 11.7 -1.3* 5.9 31.5 13.0 
NT -2.1 1.3* -10.6 1.4 9.3 -10.6 11.9 4.6 -3.5 0.5* 26.5 8.9 
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Interaction effect under PT (‘*’ means not statistically significant at p<0.05) 
  
option I option II option III 
  
R. Cost 
% 
W. 
Cost % 
M. 
Cost % 
SC 
Total 
% 
R. Cost 
% 
W. 
Cost % 
M. 
Cost % 
SC 
Total 
% 
R. Cost 
% 
W. 
Cost % 
M. 
Cost % 
SC 
Total 
% 
Singular 
effect of 
Structure 
WH -5 -2 6 -2 0 9 7 5 -1 11 4 4 
MF -3 -2 11 1 0 0 13 4 -3 0 6 2 
NT -5 -4 6 -2 -1 6 13 5 -1 7 4 3 
Singular 
effect of 
Integration 
RW 10 15 -1 9 7 4 -3 3 -3 -2 13 3 
WM -2 -3 13 1 -2 -1 8 2 -6 -6 25 6 
RWM 17 25 10 18 7 6 11 8 -4 -2 24 7 
RW and 
structure 
synergy 
WH 8.2 18.7 10.8* 9.4 8.9 10.8 -5.1 4.8 -3.7 5.0 14.2 5.4 
MF 8.4 14.7 5.4 9.7 7.5 5.4 8.9 7.4 -4.7 -1.1 24.8 7.4 
NT 3.6* 4.7* -11.7* 0.3* -0.5* -11.7 1.0 -3.2* -3.9 -4.3 -5.4 -4.6* 
WM and 
structure 
synergy 
WH -5.3 -2.9* 9.2 0.8* -0.5* 9.2 10.9 6.0 -5.0 6.5 29.2 11.0 
MF -5.6 -6.7 -2.6 0.5* -3.3* -2.6 14.0 2.6 -10.3 -7.3 28.1 5.0 
NT -6.5 -7.3 4.8 -1.0* -2.1* 4.8 13.3 4.9 -7.5 0.3* 27.7 7.9 
RWM and 
structure 
synergy 
WH 17.0 32.4 13.9 19.8 8.7 13.9 10.4 10.7 -4.3 5.2 24.4 9.1 
MF 15.7 25.2 6.6 19.9 6.7 6.6 19.4 10.9 -5.4 -1.7 31.7 9.6 
NT 9.0 11.9 -14.3 11.1 -3.9* -14.3 17.5 0.3* -10.7 -10.8 26.8 3.5 
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Interaction effect under IBMS (‘*’ means not statistically significant at p<0.05) 
  
option I option II option III 
  
R. Cost 
% 
W. 
Cost % 
M. 
Cost % 
SC 
Total 
% 
R. Cost 
% 
W. 
Cost % 
M. 
Cost % 
SC 
Total 
% 
R. Cost 
% 
W. 
Cost % 
M. 
Cost % 
SC 
Total 
% 
Singular 
effect of 
Structure 
WH -4 -1 6 -1 -1 9 7 4 0 11 4 4 
MF -2 -1 11 1 -1 0 13 4 -2 0 6 2 
NT -4 -4 5 -2 -2 5 13 5 -1 7 5 3 
Singular 
effect of 
Integration 
RW 10 15 -2 9 6 4 -2 3 -3 -2 13 3 
WM -2 -3 13 1 -2 -1 8 2 -6 -6 25 6 
RWM 18 26 10 19 6 6 11 8 -4 -3 24 7 
RW and 
structure 
synergy 
WH 9.2 20.0 10.3* 10.2 7.3 10.3 -5.1 4.0 -3.4 4.8 14.1 5.4 
MF 9.4 16.0 5.0 10.5 5.9 5.0 8.9 6.7 -4.5 -1.3* 24.8 7.4 
NT 4.6* 5.9* -12.9* 1.0* -2.4* -12.9 1.0 -4.2 -3.4 -4.2 -5.4 -4.4* 
WM and 
structure 
synergy 
WH -4.6 -2.2* 8.8 1.2* -1.7* 8.8 10.9 5.4 -4.8 6.2 28.9 10.9 
MF -4.8 -5.8 -2.8 1.2* -4.5 -2.8 14.0 2.1 -10.3 -7.9 27.8 4.8 
NT -5.7 -6.4 4.4 -0.4* -3.3 4.4 13.3 4.4 -7.3 0.0* 27.5 7.8 
RWM and 
structure 
synergy 
WH 18.2 34.1 13.2 20.9 7.1 13.2 10.6 10.0 -4.0 5.0 24.3 9.1 
MF 17.0 26.9 6.2 21.0 5.1* 6.2 19.7 10.3 -5.2 -1.9 31.6 9.6 
NT 10.2 13.3 -15.3 12.1 -5.8* -15.3 17.6 -0.7* -10.5 -11.1 26.7 3.4 
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Aggregate of interaction effect under all four information security breaches 
  
option I option II option III 
  
R. Cost 
% 
W. 
Cost % 
M. 
Cost % 
SC 
Total 
% 
R. Cost 
% 
W. 
Cost % 
M. 
Cost % 
SC 
Total 
% 
R. Cost 
% 
W. 
Cost % 
M. 
Cost % 
SC 
Total 
% 
Singular 
effect of 
Structure 
WH -23 1 35 -3 66 48 32 50 5 65 27 29 
MF -20 -9 58 1 67 14 53 48 2 26 37 22 
NT -23 -8 35 -6 62 33 53 51 4 51 27 25 
Singular 
effect of 
Integration 
RW 27 32 17 26 48 -5 -21 10 -10 -5 49 14 
WM -8 -17 38 0 -8 -8 29 4 -18 -20 88 22 
RWM 47 62 21 45 45 14 9 24 -14 -8 84 25 
RW and 
structure 
synergy 
WH 19 65 45 34 113 45 -20 50 0 49 67 38 
MF 18 46 20 33 106 20 34 58 -6 20 109 45 
NT 3 17 -26 4 86 -26 1 27 -2 11 -3 1 
WM and 
structure 
synergy 
WH -27 -6 47 2 65 47 45 53 -9 52 119 56 
MF -33 -32 0 -4 53 0 57 39 -27 -2 119 35 
NT -31 -23 29 -4 58 29 54 48 -17 30 117 46 
RWM and 
structure 
synergy 
WH 48 111 68 64 112 68 12 66 -4 48 102 50 
MF 43 81 28 65 101 28 67 69 -10 17 133 51 
NT 20 36 -36 34 69 -36 58 36 -26 -13 113 30 
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APPENDIX 5.2 COMPARISON OF THE NATURE OF 
INTERACTION EFFECT UNDER BREACH AND NON-BREACH 
SCENARIOS 
Since this section is only concerned with the analysis of the interaction 
between ISL and structure, an examination of the interaction effect in 
Appendix 5.1 reveals the state or categories of the types of interaction effect 
which is presented in the subsequent tables in this section. The 
state/categories of the types of interaction has been described in section 
4.4.4 and these are cancellation effect (which can be positive or negative), 
repelling effect (which can be positive or negative), worsening effect and 
corroborating effect. A cancellation effect is observed when an agent is 
favoured by structural reconfiguration and disfavoured by ISL or the other 
way round. A positive cancellation effect is observed when the resultant 
cancellation effect yields improvement in performance and a negative 
cancellation effect is observed when the resultant effect worsens the 
performance. The repelling effect occurs when both ISL and reconfiguration 
are of the same nature either positive or negative producing the opposite 
effect when combined. Therefore a positive repelling effect produces a 
positive effect from the negative effects of ISL and reconfiguration while a 
negative repelling effect produces a negative effect from the positive effects 
of both ISL and structural reconfiguration. A worsening effect is observed 
when both structural reconfiguration and ISL do not favour the supply 
agent, hence the agent would have been better off in a serial supply chain 
where no information is being shared. A corroborating effect is the case 
when both structure and ISL favour the agent. 
Interacting Effect of RW and Supply Chain Structure in a Breach 
Scenario 
To address the two issues stated in section 5.5, the categories of the 
interaction effect between RW and supply chain structure is shown in the 
table below. The categories of RW+Structure interaction effect under the 
non-breach scenario is extracted from Appendix 4.4 and is included for 
comparison purpose in the table below. Those of the breach scenarios are 
deduced from Appendix 5.1. The table below therefore paints the picture of 
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how the effect categories changes from a non-breach state to a less 
disruptive and less recurring breach scenario and how this changes when the 
disruption duration and the RoC increases significantly.  
Under the impact of IBMS, the state or category of the interaction between 
RW and structure on supply chain total operating cost remains the same for 
options II and III as under a non-breach scenario. However, under option I, 
this changes for the RW+WH interaction from the desirable CO 
(collaborating effect) in the non-breach context to a less desirable CA+ 
(positive cancellation) in the breach scenario. When the disruption duration 
is intensified the state of the interaction of RW with the WH and MF 
structure is similar to the non-breach scenario but that of the network 
structure changes from the less desirable CA+ in the non-breach scenario to 
the more desirable CO in the SFDD breach counterpart. A breach with 
increased RoC such as is the case of AOW would cause a state change in the 
interaction effect for all supply chain structures under option I scenario. CO, 
CO, CA+ for WH, MF and N respectively changes to CA+, CA+, CA- in 
the highly recurring breach state. Under option II, the result also shows that 
a breach with less disruptive tendencies and less recurring nature have no 
effect on the state of interaction between RW and structure. However when 
the disruption duration and RoC increases significantly, the state of 
interaction between RW and N changes from a less desirable R- to a more 
desirable CO. Option III represents a more stable policy in this regard. 
Regardless of the breach profile, the state of the interaction between RW 
and Structure is not changed for option III.  
When the result in Appendix 4.4 is compared to the result in Appendix 5.1, 
it clear that the magnitude of RW+ structure effect is reduced under a breach 
scenario (IBMS) for options I and III but that of option II is actually 
increased. Hence the benefit of the interaction effect under IBMS security 
breach is higher for option II but lower for options I and III.
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Interaction effect between RW and Structure and the effect of security breach profile 
 Option I Option II Option III 
 Retailer Wholesaler Manufacturer SC Retailer Wholesaler Manufacturer SC Retailer Wholesaler Manufacturer SC  
Non-Breach Scenario 
WH CA+ CO CA- CO CA+ CO CA- CO CA- CA+ CO CO 
MF CO CO CA+ CO CA+ CA+ CA+ CO W CA- CO CO 
N CA+ CA+ CA- CA+ CA- R- CA+ R- CA- CA- CO CO 
Less Disruptive and Less Recurring Breach (IBMS) Scenario 
WH CA+ CA+ CA+ CA+ CA+ CO CA- CO W CA+ CO CO 
MF CA+ CA+ CA+ CO CA+ CO CA+ CO W CA- CO CO 
N CA+ CA+ CA+ CA+ CA- R- CA+ R- W CA- CO CO 
High Disruptive and Less Recurring Breach (SFDD) Scenario 
WH CA+ CA+ CO CO CO CA+ CA- CO CA+ CA+ CO CO 
MF CA+ CA+ CO CO CO CA+ CA+ CO CA+ CA+ CO CO 
N CA- CA+ CO CO CO CA+ CA+ CO CA+ CA+ CO CO 
Less Disruptive but High Recurring Breach (AOW) Scenario 
WH CA- CA+ CO CA+ CO CA+ CA- CO CA+ CA+ CO CO 
MF CA- CA+ CO CA+ CO CA+ CA+ CO CA- CA+ CO CO 
N CA- CA- CO CA- CO CA- CA+ CO CA- CA+ CO CO 
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Further examination reveals that this benefit tend to increase when the 
security breach has higher disruptive tendencies or RoC for option II and for 
option III, with the exception of the WH structure under option II where the 
magnitude of interaction effect is negative and less than the non-breach 
counterpart.  
Interacting Effect of WM and Supply Chain Structure in a Breach 
Scenario 
The change in the state of interaction effect between WM and Structure due 
to information security breach profile is shown in the table below. In a less 
disruptive and less recurring security breach scenario, the state of the 
interaction between WM and structure under options II and III remains 
unchanged while that of option I is changed from a more desirable state to a 
less desirable type for WH and N structures only. Under option I, only the 
state of WM+N is changed from CA+ to CO under a more disruptive breach 
while the state of WM+WH and WM+MF remains the same. In a more 
recurring breach scenario, the state of all three structures under the influence 
of WM changes to W which is a worsening effect. However, for option II, 
breaches of type SFDD causes a change in state for all structure types from 
CO in the non-breach scenario to CA+ in the SFDD breach scenario but 
breaches of the type AOW do not effect any changes to the state of the 
interaction between WM and all structure types discussed in this study. 
Again the state of the WM+Structure interaction under option III appear to 
be unperturbed by the incidence of security breach regardless of the breach 
profile. The corroborating interaction effect remains unchanged despite 
increasing recurring rate and disruption duration.  
A comparison of the result for WM in Appendix 4.4 with the result for WM 
shown in Appendix 5.1 reveals that for a breach profile similar to IBMS 
profile, the magnitude of WM+Structure interaction effect is higher under 
option II, while lower under option I but somewhat stable under option III.
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Interaction effect between WM and Structure and the effect of security breach profile 
 Option I Option II Option III 
 Retailer Wholesaler Manufacturer SC  Retailer Wholesaler Manufacturer SC  Retailer Wholesaler Manufacturer SC  
Non-Breach Scenario 
WH W CA- CO CO W CA+ CO CO CA- CA+ CO CO 
MF CA- CA- CO CO W W CO CO W CA- CO CO 
N W W CO CA+ W CA+ CO CO CA- CA- CO CO 
Less Disruptive and Less Recurring Breach (IBMS) Scenario 
WH W W CO CA+ W CA+ CO CO W CA+ CO CO 
MF W W CO CO W CA- CO CO W CA- CO CO 
N W W CO CA- W CA+ CO CO W CA- CO CO 
High Disruptive and Less Recurring Breach (SFDD) Scenario 
WH W CA+ CO CO CA+ CA+ CO CA+ CA+ CA+ CO CO 
MF W CA- CO CO CA+ CA+ CO CA+ CA- CA+ CO CO 
N W CA+ CO CO CA+ CA+ CO CA+ CA+ CA+ CO CO 
Less Disruptive but High Recurring Breach (AOW) Scenario 
WH W W CA+ W CA+ CA+ CO CO CA- CA+ CO CO 
MF W W CA+ W CA+ CA- CO CO CA- CA+ CO CO 
N W W CA+ W CA+ CA+ CO CO CA- CA+ CO CO 
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Therefore WM+Structure interaction benefit is higher under a less 
disruptive and less disruptive breach only for option II. The story changes 
when the breach profile is of the SFDD type causing the magnitude of the 
WM+Structure interaction effect to be greater under all three ordering 
options (I, II and III). It therefore shows that a combination of WM and 
structural reconfiguration offers greater benefit to the supply chain in highly 
disruptive breach scenario than in the non-breach scenario. This study does 
not try to infer that a security breach scenario is more desirable but only 
demonstrates that the supply chain can with this WM+Structure 
combination can rest assured that they would be protected even better in a 
security breach state with SFDD type profile. A highly recurring breach 
type however worsens the interaction effect under option I producing a 
negative result but the performance under options II and III is improved 
under this breach profile. 
Interacting Effect of RWM and Supply Chain Structure in a Breach 
Scenario 
The result for the effect of security breach profile on the state of 
RWM+Structure interaction effect is shown in the table below. Again the 
state change from non-breach scenario to a less disruptive and less recurring 
breach scenario is first examined and then the state change under increased 
disruption duration and increased recurring rate is then examined. Under 
IBMS type profile, only the combination that involves WH is affected with 
a change in state from CO to CA+ in the option I scenario. However the 
state in the options II and III scenarios are unaffected. With a more 
disruptive breach, only the network structure combination is affected, 
however only under options I (CA+ to CO) and II (R- to CO) scenarios. A 
less disruptive but highly recurring breach is seen to cause a change in state 
of the WH and MF combinations from CO to CA+ under option I scenario. 
However this produces a change only under the N structure from R- to CO 
in the option II scenario. Again the state of all combinations under option III 
scenario remain unperturbed by breach profile. 
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Interaction effect between RWM and Structure and the effect of security breach profile 
 Option I Option II Option III 
 Retailer Wholesaler Manufacturer SC  Retailer Wholesaler Manufacturer SC  Retailer Wholesaler Manufacturer SC  
Non-Breach Scenario 
WH CA+ CO CO CO CA+ CO CO CO CA- CA+ CO CO 
MF CO CO CO CO CA+ CA+ CO CO W CA- CO CO 
N CA+ CA+ CO CA+ CA- R- CO R- CA- CA- CO CO 
Less Disruptive and Less Recurring Breach (IBMS) Scenario 
WH CA+ CA+ CO CA+ CA+ CO CO CO W CA+ CO CO 
MF CA+ CA+ CO CO CA+ CO CO CO W CA- CO CO 
N CA+ CA+ CO CA+ CA- R- CO R- W CA- CO CO 
High Disruptive and Less Recurring Breach (SFDD) Scenario 
WH CA+ CO CO CO CO CA+ CA- CO CA+ CA+ CO CO 
MF CA+ CO CO CO CO CA+ CA+ CO CA+ CA+ CO CO 
N CA+ CO CO CO CO CA+ CA+ CO CA- CA+ CO CO 
Less Disruptive but High Recurring Breach (AOW) Scenario 
WH CA+ CA+ CA+ CA+ CO CO CA+ CO CA+ CO CO CO 
MF CA+ CA+ CA+ CA+ CO CO CA+ CO CA- CO CO CO 
N CA- CA+ CA+ CA+ CO R- CA+ CO CA- CO CO CO 
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In summary, the state of interaction between RWM and structure is not affected by 
changing breach profile for an option III supply chain but that of the option II is 
changed only for the Network structure under conditions of high disruption duration 
and high RoC. For option I, the change comes for the WH structure combination 
only under IBMS and AOW breach profiles, for MF the change comes only under 
AOW breach profile and for N the only change seen comes under SFDD breach 
type.  
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APPENDIX 6.1 UNCERTAINTY RATING UNDER SUPPLY CHAIN STRUCTURE  
Uncertainty rating in a Parameter based ordering system (Option I). 
WH STRUCTURE 
 
Retailer Wholesaler Manufacturer SC 
 
Hold Backlog R Total Hold Backlog W Total Hold Backlog M Total Average 
SFDD 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
AOW 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
PT 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 
IBMS 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 
MF STRUCTURE 
 
Retailer Wholesaler Manufacturer SC 
 
Hold Backlog R Total Hold Backlog W Total Hold Backlog M Total Average 
SFDD 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 
AOW 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
PT 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 
IBMS 1 1 1 1 1 1 3 1 2 1 
NT STRUCTURE 
 
Retailer Wholesaler Manufacturer SC 
 
Hold Backlog R Total Hold Backlog W Total Hold Backlog M Total Average 
SFDD 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
AOW 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
PT 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 
IBMS 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 
262 
 
Uncertainty rating in a Batch ordering system (Option II). 
WH 
 
Retailer Wholesaler Manufacturer SC 
 
Hold Backlog R Total Hold Backlog W Total Hold Backlog M Total Average 
SFDD 0 3 2 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 
AOW 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
PT 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
IBMS 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
MF 
 
Retailer Wholesaler Manufacturer SC 
 
Hold Backlog R Total Hold Backlog W Total Hold Backlog M Total Average 
SFDD 0 3 2 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 
AOW 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
PT 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
IBMS 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
NT 
 
Retailer Wholesaler Manufacturer SC 
 
Hold Backlog R Total Hold Backlog W Total Hold Backlog M Total Average 
SFDD 0 3 2 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 
AOW 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
PT 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
IBMS 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
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Uncertainty rating in a Combined Batch-and-Parameter based ordering system (Option III). 
WH 
 Retailer Wholesaler Manufacturer SC 
E. I. Hold Backlog R Total Hold Backlog W Total Hold Backlog M Total Average 
SFDD 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 
AOW 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
PT 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 
IBMS 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 
MF 
 Retailer Wholesaler Manufacturer SC 
E. I. Hold Backlog R Total Hold Backlog W Total Hold Backlog M Total Average 
SFDD 0 1 1 1 1 1 3 1 2 1 
AOW 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
PT 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 
IBMS 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 
NT 
 Retailer Wholesaler Manufacturer SC 
E. I. Hold Backlog R Total Hold Backlog W Total Hold Backlog M Total Average 
SFDD 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 
AOW 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
PT 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 
IBMS 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
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APPENDIX 6.2 UNCERTAINTY RATING UNDER INFORMATION INTEGRATION  
Uncertainty rating in a Parameter based ordering system (Option I). 
RW 
 
Retailer Wholesaler Manufacturer SC 
 
Hold Backlog R Total Hold Backlog W Total Hold Backlog M Total Average 
SFDD 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 
AOW 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 
PT 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 
IBMS 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 
WM 
 
Retailer Wholesaler Manufacturer SC 
 
Hold Backlog R Total Hold Backlog W Total Hold Backlog M Total Average 
SFDD 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 
AOW 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
PT 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 
IBMS 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 
RWM 
 
Retailer Wholesaler Manufacturer SC 
 
Hold Backlog R Total Hold Backlog W Total Hold Backlog M Total Average 
SFDD 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 
AOW 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 
PT 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 
IBMS 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 
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Uncertainty rating in a Batch ordering system (Option II). 
RW 
 
Retailer Wholesaler Manufacturer SC 
 
Hold Backlog R Total Hold Backlog W Total Hold Backlog M Total Average 
SFDD 1 3 2 3 0 2 3 2 3 2 
AOW 1 2 2 1 0 1 3 1 2 1 
PT 0 1 1 1 1 1 3 1 2 1 
IBMS 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 2 1 
WM 
 
Retailer Wholesaler Manufacturer SC 
 
Hold Backlog R Total Hold Backlog W Total Hold Backlog M Total Average 
SFDD 1 3 2 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 
AOW 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
PT 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
IBMS 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
RWM 
 
Retailer Wholesaler Manufacturer SC 
 
Hold Backlog R Total Hold Backlog W Total Hold Backlog M Total Average 
SFDD 1 3 2 3 1 2 1 1 1 2 
AOW 1 2 2 2 0 1 0 1 1 1 
PT 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 
IBMS 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 
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Uncertainty rating in a Combined Batch-and-Parameter based ordering system (Option III). 
RW 
 
Retailer Wholesaler Manufacturer SC 
 
Hold Backlog R Total Hold Backlog W Total Hold Backlog M Total Average 
SFDD 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 
AOW 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
PT 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 
IBMS 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
WM 
 
Retailer Wholesaler Manufacturer SC 
 
Hold Backlog R Total Hold Backlog W Total Hold Backlog M Total Average 
SFDD 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 
AOW 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 
PT 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 
IBMS 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 
RWM 
 
Retailer Wholesaler Manufacturer SC 
 
Hold Backlog R Total Hold Backlog W Total Hold Backlog M Total Average 
SFDD 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 
AOW 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 
PT 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 
IBMS 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
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APPENDIX 6.3 UNCERTAINTY RATING UNDER INFORMATION INTEGRATION AND SUPPLY STRUCTURE INTERACTION 
Uncertainty rating under WH structure and information integration interaction in a Parameter based ordering system (Option I). 
4 
 
Retailer Wholesaler Manufacturer SC 
 
Hold Backlog R Total Hold Backlog W Total Hold Backlog M Total Average 
SFDD 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 
AOW 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
PT 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 
IBMS 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 
WM+WH 
 
Retailer Wholesaler Manufacturer SC 
 
Hold Backlog R Total Hold Backlog W Total Hold Backlog M Total Average 
SFDD 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
AOW 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 
PT 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 
IBMS 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 
RWM+WH 
 
Retailer Wholesaler Manufacturer SC 
 
Hold Backlog R Total Hold Backlog W Total Hold Backlog M Total Average 
SFDD 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
AOW 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 
PT 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 
IBMS 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
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Uncertainty rating under MF structure and information integration interaction in a Parameter based ordering system (Option I). 
RW+MF 
 
Retailer Wholesaler Manufacturer SC 
 
Hold Backlog R Total Hold Backlog W Total Hold Backlog M Total Average 
SFDD 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 
AOW 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
PT 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 
IBMS 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
WM+MF 
 
Retailer Wholesaler Manufacturer SC 
 
Hold Backlog R Total Hold Backlog W Total Hold Backlog M Total Average 
SFDD 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 
AOW 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 
PT 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
IBMS 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
RWM+MF 
 
Retailer Wholesaler Manufacturer SC 
 
Hold Backlog R Total Hold Backlog W Total Hold Backlog M Total Average 
SFDD 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
AOW 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
PT 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 
IBMS 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
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Uncertainty rating under NT structure and information integration interaction in a Parameter based ordering system (Option I). 
RW+NT 
 
Retailer Wholesaler Manufacturer SC 
 
Hold Backlog R Total Hold Backlog W Total Hold Backlog M Total Average 
SFDD 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 
AOW 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
PT 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 
IBMS 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 
WM+NT 
 
Retailer Wholesaler Manufacturer SC 
 
Hold Backlog R Total Hold Backlog W Total Hold Backlog M Total Average 
SFDD 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
AOW 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
PT 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 
IBMS 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 
RWM+NT 
 
Retailer Wholesaler Manufacturer SC 
 
Hold Backlog R Total Hold Backlog W Total Hold Backlog M Total Average 
SFDD 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 
AOW 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
PT 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
IBMS 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
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Uncertainty rating under WH structure and information integration interaction in a Batch ordering system (Option II). 
RW+WH 
 
Retailer Wholesaler Manufacturer SC 
 
Hold Backlog R Total Hold Backlog W Total Hold Backlog M Total Average 
SFDD 0 3 2 3 0 2 1 0 1 1 
AOW 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 
PT 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 
IBMS 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
WM+WH 
 
Retailer Wholesaler Manufacturer SC 
 
Hold Backlog R Total Hold Backlog W Total Hold Backlog M Total Average 
SFDD 0 3 2 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 
AOW 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
PT 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
IBMS 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
RWM+WH 
 
Retailer Wholesaler Manufacturer SC 
 
Hold Backlog R Total Hold Backlog W Total Hold Backlog M Total Average 
SFDD 0 3 2 2 0 1 1 1 1 1 
AOW 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 
PT 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 
IBMS 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
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Uncertainty rating under MF structure and information integration interaction in a Batch ordering system (Option II). 
RW+MF 
 
Retailer Wholesaler Manufacturer SC 
 
Hold Backlog R Total Hold Backlog W Total Hold Backlog M Total Average 
SFDD 0 3 2 3 0 2 1 0 1 1 
AOW 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 
PT 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 
IBMS 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
WM+MF 
 
Retailer Wholesaler Manufacturer SC 
 
Hold Backlog R Total Hold Backlog W Total Hold Backlog M Total Average 
SFDD 0 3 2 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 
AOW 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
PT 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
IBMS 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
RWM+MF 
 
Retailer Wholesaler Manufacturer SC 
 
Hold Backlog R Total Hold Backlog W Total Hold Backlog M Total Average 
SFDD 0 3 2 3 0 2 0 0 0 1 
AOW 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 
PT 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 
IBMS 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
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Uncertainty rating under NT structure and information integration interaction in a Batch ordering system (Option II). 
RW+NT 
 
Retailer Wholesaler Manufacturer SC 
 
Hold Backlog R Total Hold Backlog W Total Hold Backlog M Total Average 
SFDD 0 3 2 3 0 2 3 1 2 2 
AOW 1 1 1 1 0 1 3 1 2 1 
PT 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 2 1 
IBMS 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 2 1 
WM+NT 
 
Retailer Wholesaler Manufacturer SC 
 
Hold Backlog R Total Hold Backlog W Total Hold Backlog M Total Average 
SFDD 0 3 2 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 
AOW 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
PT 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
IBMS 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
RWM+NT 
 
Retailer Wholesaler Manufacturer SC 
 
Hold Backlog R Total Hold Backlog W Total Hold Backlog M Total Average 
SFDD 0 2 1 2 0 1 0 0 0 1 
AOW 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
PT 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
IBMS 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
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Uncertainty rating under WH structure and information integration interaction in a Combined Batch-and-Parameter based ordering system 
(Option III). 
RW+WH 
 
Retailer Wholesaler Manufacturer SC 
 
Hold Backlog R Total Hold Backlog W Total Hold Backlog M Total Average 
SFDD 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
AOW 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 
PT 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
IBMS 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 2 1 
WM+WH 
 
Retailer Wholesaler Manufacturer SC 
 
Hold Backlog R Total Hold Backlog W Total Hold Backlog M Total Average 
SFDD 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 
AOW 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 
PT 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 
IBMS 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 
RWM+WH 
 
Retailer Wholesaler Manufacturer SC 
 
Hold Backlog R Total Hold Backlog W Total Hold Backlog M Total Average 
SFDD 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
AOW 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 
PT 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 
IBMS 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
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Uncertainty rating under MF structure and information integration interaction in a Combined Batch-and-Parameter based ordering system 
(Option III). 
RW+MF 
 
Retailer Wholesaler Manufacturer SC 
 
Hold Backlog R Total Hold Backlog W Total Hold Backlog M Total Average 
SFDD 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
AOW 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 
PT 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 
IBMS 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
WM+MF 
 
Retailer Wholesaler Manufacturer SC 
 
Hold Backlog R Total Hold Backlog W Total Hold Backlog M Total Average 
SFDD 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 
AOW 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 
PT 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
IBMS 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
RWM+MF 
 
Retailer Wholesaler Manufacturer SC 
 
Hold Backlog R Total Hold Backlog W Total Hold Backlog M Total Average 
SFDD 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
AOW 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
PT 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
IBMS 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
 
275 
 
Uncertainty rating under NT structure and information integration interaction in a Combined Batch-and-Parameter based ordering system 
(Option III). 
RW+NT 
 
Retailer Wholesaler Manufacturer SC 
 
Hold Backlog R Total Hold Backlog W Total Hold Backlog M Total Average 
SFDD 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
AOW 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 
PT 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
IBMS 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
WM+NT 
 
Retailer Wholesaler Manufacturer SC 
 
Hold Backlog R Total Hold Backlog W Total Hold Backlog M Total Average 
SFDD 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 
AOW 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 
PT 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 
IBMS 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 
RWM+NT 
 
Retailer Wholesaler Manufacturer SC 
 
Hold Backlog R Total Hold Backlog W Total Hold Backlog M Total Average 
SFDD 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
AOW 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 
PT 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
IBMS 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
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